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Abstract 
The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) advocates that integrated reporting 
(IR) addresses limitations to corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. However, little is 
known about the real benefits of the information disclosed through IR because it has been 
mandated only in South Africa through the King III Report on Governance. In its 
commitment to promoting accountability, King III also recommends a formal external 
assurance process for sustainability reporting and the implementation of a combined 
assurance model (CAM). This thesis uses the best available selection of companies listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa to examine whether the quality of IR 
disclosures, the assurance of sustainability performance, the use of assurance standards 
ISAE3000 and AA1000AS, the level of information audited, and the implementation of a 
CAM are all associated with market liquidity and lower analyst forecast error. Its results 
suggest that IR quality is associated with lower analyst error and positively associated with 
market liquidity. The evidence also indicates that the earnings forecast error is lower for 
firms in the materials sector of the South African economy. Forecast errors are higher for 
companies with volatile returns and lower for larger firms, which is consistent with prior 
research. Contrary to expectations, the assurance of non-financial information in IR does not 
have a significant effect on analyst forecast accuracy. These results suggest that, in a setting 
such as South Africa, the assurance of sustainability performance does not provide additional 
informative value to analysts, irrespective of who provides the assurance and of the level of 
information. In contrast, the assurance of sustainability disclosures is associated with market 
liquidity. Similar results are found for those companies that use assurance standards. Results 
of an in-depth analysis indicate that the level of the audit performed influences a company’s 
stock liquidity, with a significant association found for those companies that engage in at 
least some level of reasonable coverage. In contrast, there is no statistical significance 
between limited audit procedures and market liquidity. Furthermore, this thesis provides 
evidence that the implementation of a CAM is associated with lower analyst forecast error 
and market liquidity, suggesting that the use of a homogeneous process and coordination 
between internal and external assurance seems to provide informative value for investors and 
financial analysts regarding the credibility and quality of sustainability performance and 
reporting. Overall, these findings support the virtues of IR, thus providing useful information 
to capital markets. Additionally, this evidence progresses the discussion on the economic 
incentives necessary to assure non-financial information. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The number of stand-alone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports has increased since the 
1990s (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012). According to the records of 
Corporateregister.com, there has been a worldwide increase of over 34% in the period 2010–2014, 
and the trend of reporting non-financial information appears to be continuing for the world’s largest 
companies.1 The gap between linking financial information with other value capital reported 
motivated the publication of the International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF) in December 
2013, with the aim of providing a more realistic form for reporting the value created by a firm. Its 
purpose was to cover accounting information gaps and integrate a firm’s business model, 
governance, strategy, social and economic performance. Integrated reporting (IR) can be understood 
as the combination of financial information required by regulators and non-financial information 
that, in most cases, is voluntarily published as a CSR or sustainability report. Advocates of IR have 
argued that this report more effectively communicates a company’s ability to create value because it 
integrates financial and sustainability information into a single report (Serafeim, 2015). It is based 
on the idea that non-financial metrics are a leading indicator of a company’s future financial 
performance, while current financial performance are considered trailing measures from historical 
data. 
 It has been argued that non-financial information affects the value of tangible assets and can be tied 
to intangible assets such as reputation, intellectual capital and a firm’s market value (EY, 2016). 
Studies involving components of S&P 500 market value have shown that companies have deviated 
markedly from their book value in recent times; for example, Ocean Tomo, a merchant bank 
specialising in intellectual capital, reports that the market value of firms attributed to tangible assets 
has decreased by more than 80% since the 1970s. In 2015, the average corporation’s value 
represented by physical and financial assets was less than 20% (Ocean Tomo, 2015). Given these 
precedents, financial information and stand-alone CSR reports seem insufficient for shareholders to 
fully understand a firm’s performance and value (Fasan, 2013). Because IR is the latest generation 
of corporate reporting, one might expect that measures like book value of assets will become less 
relevant to users. IR, like CSR reporting, informs an organisation’s sustainability strategy and 
performance. However, unlike traditional CSR reports, IR is intended to inform how sustainability 
initiatives and financial information are expected to contribute to the long-term growth strategy of a 
                                                             
1 According to Corporateregister.com, which is an independent organisation that provides the world’s largest online 
directory of CSR reports, the number of CSR reports has increased from 6,069 to 8,151 in the period mentioned. In 
South Africa, the only country in the world having Integrated Reporting as a listing requirement, that increase was over 
177%, from 134 to 238 reports. 
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business (Churet & Eccles, 2014). In other words, IR attempts to integrate the information disclosed 
in a single report, focus on providers of financial capital (the target), and show the effects of the 
capitals identified on the value-creation process over time (the focus). The capitals identified by the 
IR Council are financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural 
capital. Together, these represent the basis of an organisation’s value creation (IIRC, 2013a). 
Although it has become increasingly common to disclose non-financial information through CSR 
reports, there has been scepticism about the value-relevance of non-financial disclosures to usefully 
indicate financial performance. Theoretically, CSR disclosures have been associated with a 
reduction in a firm’s cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011) and lower analyst 
forecast error and dispersion (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). However, it is also possible that firms engage 
in CSR reporting for impression management (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007) by using “boiler-
plate” language or “green-washing” disclosures.  
1.2 Motivation and summary of findings 
 1.2.1 IR and information asymmetry 
There is considerable research evidence of the potential benefits of CSR reporting—see, for 
example, Hope (2003); Bailey, Andrew Karolyi, and Salva (2006); Dhaliwal et al. (2011); Dhaliwal 
et al. (2012). However, research on the benefits of IR is still at an early stage. Therefore, the first 
motivation for this thesis arose from the need to understand and evaluate the incentives for 
preparing IRs. This investigation is set in South Africa, which is the only country in which IR is a 
listing requirement.2 South Africa has been considered a leader in the adoption of IR, mainly due to 
the Code of Governance for South Africa King III (IRC, 2014; Rensburg & Botha, 2014). Principle 
9.1 of King III encourages all organisations to ensure the integrity of their companies’ reports by 
disclosing IR (IoDSA, 2009). 
Due to the short period in which an international IR framework has been publicly available and that, 
except for South Africa, issuing these reports is voluntary, research evidence about the incentives 
for IR disclosure is at a very early stage of development. Most of the studies in this area have 
focused on institutional rather than economic theories. However, a growing stream of research 
provides evidence about the economic consequences of IR information—see for example Zhou, 
Simnett, and Green (2017), Bernardi and Stark (2016), Barth, Cahan, Chen, and Venter (2017), and 
Zhou, Simmet, and Hoang (2016).  
                                                             
2 Integrated reports have been compulsory for firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange on an apply-or-explain 
basis since 2010. 
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The primary purpose of IR is to improve the quality of information available to providers of 
financial capital, to shareholders or to investors by communicating broader and more relevant 
information that can assist in decisions on effective capital allocation (IIRC, 2013c). Research 
indicates that investors utilise IR for purposes such as managing investment risk, evaluating 
industry dynamics and the regulatory environment, and assessing a company’s forward-looking 
information (IIRC, 2015b). Consistent with this view, a recent survey of 158 investors and analysts 
explored the use of qualitative information in investment decision-making (Edelman, 2015). More 
than 90% of respondents agreed that a well-articulated, forward-looking strategy helps them better 
understand and value a company. In theory, IR provides forward-looking information about how the 
firm creates value in the short, medium and long terms by reporting a comprehensive range of 
financial and manufactured, intellectual human, social, and natural factors that impact on the firm’s 
value creation process. Therefore, IR disclosures potentially improve the quality of information 
used by investors and analysts to value the firm.  
By using economic-based theory, the first part of this study investigates the impact of IR quality on 
market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy using a sample of South African companies listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) from 2013–2015.3 The study hypothesizes that analyst 
forecast error and bid-ask spread (BAS) (as a proxy of market liquidity specifically, and 
information asymmetry generally) are negatively related to the quality of IR. Using a Sustainability 
Disclosure Transparency Index (SDTI) developed by Integrated Reporting and Assurance Services 
(IRAS)—a South African accounting firm that designed an in-house IR quality index—this study 
finds that the quality of the information disclosed is associated with lower analyst forecast error. 
These results remain constant for current, one-year, and two-year-ahead analyst forecast accuracy. 
The results show that the quality of the information presented is negatively and significantly 
associated with the BAS before and after incorporating control variables. This study builds on Zhou 
et al. (2017), Bernardi and Stark (2016), and Barth et al. (2017), who evaluate the association 
between IR quality and economic consequences in the mandatory de facto South African setting. 
While different quality measures were used, similar results were found, supporting the virtues of IR.  
This thesis differs from previous studies because it analyses a period between 2013 and 2015 during 
which the international IR framework was published and was endorsed by South African regulation. 
In contrast, Zhou et al. (2017) analysed a sample of JSE firms from 2009 to 2012, and Bernardi and 
Stark (2016) from 2008 to 2012. Similarly, while Barth et al. (2017) found similar results analysing 
market liquidity, they did so before the international IR framework was published in 2013 and 
                                                             
3 KPMG (2013) found that the 97% of South African firms provided integrated reports in 2011 and 98% provided them 
in 2013. Thus, and consistent with Barth et al. (2015), it is argued that IR is effectively mandatory for JSE firms. 
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endorsed by the JSE in March 2014. Therefore, in contrast to prior studies, the analysis from 2013 
to 2015 allows market behaviours to be understood with some clarity, and guides firms as to the 
purpose of IR reports. 
 1.2.2 IR assurance 
This study has concerns about CSR and the nature of soft disclosures, which are less verifiable than 
financial reports; it thus considers not only the quality of the sustainability information disclosed 
but also its objectivity and reliability. It is notable that the assurance of the non-financial 
information through King III has also been a de facto mandatory requirement on an “apply or 
explain” basis since 2010. Principle 9.3 of King III recommends independent assurance of 
sustainability reporting and disclosure, in addition to the IR requirement.  
Empirical analysis of the economic consequences of IR assurance has been scarce. To shed some 
light on IR mandatory de facto assurance, this thesis examines (1) the assurance of non-financial 
information presented in an IR, (2) the use of assurance standards, and (3) the level of information 
assured, as a proxy of assurance quality, and how these interact with market liquidity and analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Consequently, I pose two major research questions: (1) Is the assurance of IR and 
the use of assurance standards associated with market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy? (2) Is 
the quality of IR assurance associated with market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy? 
The second motivation for this study, therefore, is to contribute to the literature about the effects of 
IR disclosure and its assurance, thus indicating the potential market behaviour that might arise and 
its economic consequences. Misleading signals sent to the market through the disclosure of 
incomplete and inaccurate information might negatively impact stakeholder perceptions. By 
enhancing a firm’s credibility through integrating environmental, social and governance 
information with financial disclosures, the second part of this thesis evaluates whether the reduction 
of information risk through the assurance of non-financial disclosures adds value for both investors 
and financial analysts. 
The potential benefits of IR assurance have received modest research attention to date. Therefore, 
this thesis will investigate whether IR assurance (IRA), the use of assurance standards, and the level 
of information assured, are associated with both market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy. In 
contrast to prior studies, it examines in-depth the implications of the assurance of soft information 
for IR. Research on assurance of CSR disclosures has been mixed and sparse (Clarkson, Li, 
Richardson, & Albert, 2015). Some scholars suggest that CSR assurance (CSRA) is used to 
improve the credibility of soft disclosures (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Cohen & Simnett, 2015; 
Simnett & Huggins, 2015), and corporate reputation (Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett, Vanstraelen, & 
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Chua, 2009). Others claim that investors do not value the assurance of CSR reports because they are 
likely to be an unjustifiable cost unless there is substantial need for enhancing the credibility of 
CSR disclosure (Cho, Michelon, Patten, & Roberts, 2014), used symbolically because CSR does 
not provide high-quality information (Duflo, Greenstone, Pande, & Ryan, 2013; Michelon, 
Pilonato, & Ricceri, 2015). 
Consistent with the mix of results mentioned above, the results of this thesis indicate that the 
assurance of IR is significantly and negatively associated with market liquidity before and after the 
incorporation of control variables, thus suggesting that the external audit of sustainability 
performance tends to mitigate information asymmetry. However, contrary to expectations, 
regression results do not show a significant association between assurance of non-financial 
information and analyst forecast error. These results indicate that while the assurance of IR has an 
impact on market liquidity, it does not add incremental information for financial analysts. 
Additional analyses were conducted to examine the effect of the level of information assured on 
market liquidity. The international assurance framework identifies two types of assurance 
engagement. They are differentiated by the level of evidence to provide an audit conclusion, 
classified into either a limited or reasonable assurance engagement.  
Consequently, this thesis evaluates whether the level of information assured, as a proxy for 
assurance quality, is associated with market liquidity. The assurance quality proxy is subdivided 
into four levels in accordance with the audit opinion: (1) undisclosed (where the information could 
not be found in published reports), (2) limited, (3) limited and reasonable, and (4) reasonable 
assurance engagement. As expected, regression results show that limited assurance of some 
sustainability indicators has no significant association with BAS. In contrast, a negative and 
significant association with the BAS is predominant in those companies that engage assurance 
services with some level of reasonable verification. In an in-depth analysis, and consistent with 
previous findings in the CSR field, the results indicate that this association is driven by auditors 
belonging to the accounting profession rather than other types of assurers. 
In response to growing demands for sustainability and transparency, companies have opted not only 
to present CSR/IR reports but also to audit them by following specific assurance standards. 
Additional analyses examine the association between market liquidity and the use of the most 
common assurance standards referenced by assurance providers: AA1000AS and ISAE3000 
(CorporateRegister, 2008; GRI, 2013a). While both cover assurance engagements other than audits 
of historical financial information, their approaches differ significantly.  
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ISAE3000 is used by the accounting profession because auditors must comply with the 
International Federation of Accountants’ Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by the 
IAASB (Ackers & Eccles, 2015). In contrast, AA1000AS was developed by sustainability 
professionals in response to stakeholder concerns about the narrow focus of the ISAE standard 
(IRAS, 2015). AA1000AS is used by specialist bodies and emphasizes the need for organisations to 
demonstrate effective stakeholder engagement. The results of this study reveal that, in South Africa, 
audits performed according to these standards have a negative and significant association with the 
BAS. In a sensitivity analysis, and consistent with previous research (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012; 
Perego & Kolk, 2012), it is notable that this association is influenced mainly by those firms using 
the accounting profession standard ISAE3000 rather than the sustainability assurance standard 
AA1000AS. This is not surprising because the market distribution of assurance services in South 
Africa is largely controlled by accounting firms (more than 80%). 
The International Integrated Reporting Council, the founder and body responsible for IR, 
acknowledges that, while the assurance of key performance indicators (KPIs) helps to improve the 
credibility of IR, there are alternative assurance mechanisms that may have greater impact if 
utilized and properly coordinated by management. In response, an innovative credibility-
enhancement mechanism is emerging: the combined assurance model (CAM) (Zhou et al., 2016). 
South Africa provides an appropriate context to analyse the possible economic effects of CAM due 
to its de facto compulsory requirement for IR since 2010. Principle 3.5 of King III recommends a 
coordinated approach to all assurance activities by applying a CAM to address all the significant 
risks facing a company (IoDSA, 2009). The CAM seeks to reduce information risk through proper 
coordination between all assurance activities by management and internal and external auditors, 
maximising assurance coverage. The CAM is intended to help identify the risk areas affecting the 
organisation and how assurance is achieved and reported to the board through the audit committee 
(PWC, 2015). 
Consequently, this thesis examines the association between the implementation of a CAM and both 
market liquidity and analysts’ earnings forecast error in South Africa. It finds that introducing a 
CAM is significantly associated with market liquidity before and after incorporating control 
variables. Furthermore, evidence indicates that applying a CAM is negatively related to analyst 
forecast error, suggesting that this model provides new value-relevant information to financial 
analysts which would enable them to forecast more accurately. This finding is in contrast to Zhou et 
al. (2016) who analyse the implementation of this model in South Africa. They found that the 
CAM’s application reduces information risk, reflected by a significant and negative association 
with analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion; nevertheless, they did not find a significant effect on 
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analysts’ forecast error. Zhou et al. (2016), using a sample period between 2009 and 2013, found 
that 30.7% of companies reported in their IR the use of a CAM as a mechanism of credibility-
enhancing while, in 2009, only 1.75% disclosed the use of this model. In contrast, this thesis 
indicates that, a few years later, the implementation of a CAM increased significantly through 
2013–2015. Over 65% of the reports analysed disclosed the implementation of this assurance 
model. This suggests not only a learning period by South African firms but also that the 
implementation of a more coordinated assurance approach tends to reduce information asymmetry, 
providing new information to investors and adding information value to financial analysis. 
1.3  Contribution 
This thesis offers several contributions to the emerging literature on IR and the assurance of 
sustainability performance. Firstly, it provides evidence about the dynamics of sustainability 
assurance and deepens our understanding of how it affects capital markets. While previous studies 
on CSRA were principally carried out in an environment where the decision to assure non-financial 
information is voluntary, this thesis analyses an economy where the assurance of sustainability KPIs 
is a de facto compulsory requirement, allowing a comparison between compulsory and voluntary 
approaches. 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the growing literature about the use of the most common 
assurance standards that can be undertaken by assurance providers for non-financial reports: 
ISAE3000 and AA1000AS. It thus contributes to theoretical development in this area, particularly 
emphasizing the need to understand the nature and scope of the assurance standards. The results 
suggest that, while assurance standards can mitigate information asymmetries for investors, it may 
negatively affect the analyst’s ability to predict earnings per share. The use of different criteria to 
evaluate non-financial information may result in combining heterogeneous procedures that might be 
mutually conflicting. Considering the nature of the environment analysed in this thesis, companies 
may have different incentives to engage in external sustainability information because all 
companies must integrate sustainability activities into their core business. Therefore, the results of 
this thesis contribute to fill the gap in the early literature about the benefits of using assurance 
standards as a guide for comprehensive implementation. 
The third contribution of this thesis is to provide evidence which extends the understanding of when 
and how the assurance of sustainability disclosures is substantive rather than symbolic. Limited 
evidence has been provided about the economic incentives to engage in a limited or reasonable 
assurance process. This research contributes to the empirical evidence that the level of information 
assured does matter to investors, mitigating the levels of information asymmetry. Such a 
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perspective is novel in indicating that the level of KPI assured is not used as a symbolic image of 
accountability. Indeed, this thesis contributes to theory by suggesting that, while those companies 
that engage in a limited assurance present a negative association with BAS, only those that have a 
reasonable assurance service of sustainability performance show a significant association. 
Consistent with these expectations, the results suggest that the substantive impact on market 
liquidity is acutely sensitive to the level of information risk associated with the assurance engaged. 
Little empirical evidence has documented IR capital market responses regarding assurance 
engagement, level of information assured, and the use of assurance standards. Therefore, from the 
experience acquired from the JSE’s application of IR guidelines, and using a sample period three 
years after the King III adoption, this study extends the discussion of the real incentives to assure 
non-financial information. 
Fourthly, this study contributes to the growing literature concerning the combined assurance 
adopted in South Africa. It suggests that the coordination between internal and external assurance 
through a CAM is an essential source for monitoring the level of information risk used to enhance 
the credibility of the information disclosed to mitigate the levels of information asymmetry. These 
findings complement the research contribution by Zhou et al. (2016) which extends the discussion 
on how the implementation of a CAM enhances the decision making of investors and financial 
analysts. 
Fifthly, this study contributes incrementally to the existing debate about whether disclosure 
information through IR has real benefits or is a passing fad. It examines the economic consequences 
of IR in a mandatory setting using an in-house ranking system, adapted to South Africa, designed 
by IRAS to determine IR quality. IRAS provides a SDTI that assesses the accuracy, consistency, 
completeness and reliability of quantitative data for 84 indicators based on IR and GRI aspects, and 
subdivided into seven categories: (1) Standard Disclosures; (2) Economics; (3) Governance; (4) 
Labour; (5) Health and Safety; (6) Environment; (7) Corporate Social Investment (Spend 
indicators). The growing literature on IR has investigated whether the disclosure of integrated 
information helps financial analysts to predict their forecasts. This study complements the research 
contributions by Bernardi and Stark (2016) and Zhou et al. (2017) that analyse whether financial 
analysts respond to the IR quality in the same market but before the international IR framework was 
published and adopted. This study, therefore, contributes to the IR literature, demonstrating the 
benefits of IR disclosure through its association with market liquidity and analysts’ forecast error 
after the publication of the international framework and its adoption by the International Reporting 
Committee of South Africa in 2014 (IIRC, 2014b). While the results of this thesis cannot be 
generalised to settings which differ from South African market conditions, it can document 
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empirical evidence to advance the discussion about the incentives for voluntarily disclosing IR 
information in economies where it is not compulsory. Overall, this study extends the literature on 
CSR and IR reporting by demonstrating that large companies tend to have fewer errors between 
their announcement and the forecasts made by analysts, and that firms with highly volatile profits 
reduce the ability of analysts to predict earnings per share.  
A sixth contribution of this thesis is to benefit national regulators that are globally incorporating the 
disclosure of CSR information, consistently linked with the principles established in the 
international IR framework. For example, a survey by the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants (ACCA) of 200 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the UK and Ireland indicated that 
38% of them were actively moving to an IR model in the next three years, and that 48% are 
adopting a “wait and see” approach to IR (ACCA, 2014). Like South Africa, the Singapore 
Exchange (SGX) and the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange also incorporate sustainability information on 
a “comply or explain” basis, complementing financial information with the environmental, social 
and governance aspects of business strategy (EY, 2014; Singapore Exchange, 2016). 
Overall, the results obtained in this thesis are consistent with IR expectations, thus providing useful 
information for investors and financial analysts. It is expected that the results might have practical 
implications for other nations about the cost and benefits of implementing integrated management 
reporting. 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 summarises the environment of IR 
use around the world, the assurance of soft disclosure, and the implementation of CAM as a listing 
requirement. Chapter 3 then discusses the theoretical framework of the study, previous relevant 
research, and its relationship to the current study. Chapter 4 describes the hypotheses developed in 
this study. Finally, sample selection procedures, statistical analysis, results and conclusions are 
described in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 2: Institutional background 
This chapter describes integrated reporting (IR), how it was created, and the extent to which IR has 
been adopted. Section 2.1 discusses the creation of the International Integrated Reporting Council 
(IIRC) and the development of the International IR Framework (IIRF). Principles underlying IR and 
examples of information disclosed by companies (capital and business models), as part of the IIRC 
pilot program, are discussed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter by outlining the 
mandatory IR environment on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as part of South Africa’s 
economy. 
2.1  The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) 
The IIRC emerged as an initiative of the Prince of Wales’ Accounting for Sustainability Project 
(A4S)4 in a 2009 forum held in London, at which the importance of creating a global framework for 
IR was discussed and agreed. By integrating both financial and non-financial information, the IIRC 
developed a coherent, balanced model capable of providing a complete set of company information 
based on a firm’s strategic targets, and governance and business model (The Prince’s Accounting 
for Sustainability Project, 2009). The A4S (2009) argues that the financial information disclosed by 
companies through existing accounting policies and rules does not fully reflect how non-financial 
factors can impact on a firm’s current and future performance. Consequently, where non-financial 
disclosure is lacking, it may be more difficult to evaluate its governance and performance. 
The IIRC was founded to develop an internationally accepted IR framework. In 2011, the IIRC 
piloted a program to extend the framework. A select group of firms was chosen to demonstrate 
global leadership and shape the future of corporate reporting (IIRC, 2013b). The pilot program ran 
for three years from September 2011 with the participation of 100 large multinational organisations 
(e.g., CPA Australia, Ernst & Young ShinNihon LLC, HSBC Holdings, Microsoft Corporation, 
National Australia Bank Limited, PepsiCo Inc., the Coca-Cola Company, Masisa S.A., and Deloitte 
LLP). The active involvement of these organisations was central to the IIRF. The pilot program 
focused on three main areas: use of capital, value creation, and defining an organisation’s business 
model (IIRC, 2013b). 
The draft proposal underwent public consultation (with more than 350 comments) and a testing 
process involving 140 businesses and investors from 26 countries (IIRC, 2014c). In December 
                                                             
4 Concerned about the current rate at which the planet’s resources are being used, the Prince of Wales established the 
Accounting for Sustainability Project (A4S) to adopt sustainable and resilient business models and transform financial 
decision making to foster an integrated approach which reflect the opportunities and risks posed by environmental and 
social issues. See more at https://www.accountingforsustainability.org 
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2013, the IIRF was presented (IIRC, 2013d). Its main purpose is “…to establish guiding principles 
and content elements that govern the overall content of an integrated report, and to explain the 
fundamental concepts that underpin them” (IIRC, 2013c). The IIRF considers long-term investors 
or providers of financial capital as the primary audience of IR. This long-term vision underlies the 
mainstream business practice facilitated by IR as a corporate reporting norm, thus resulting in 
efficient and productive capital allocation (IIRC, 2013c). 
IRs can be understood as the combination of the sustainability report and financial information into 
a single “narrative”, but with different goals and focus. IR is intended to provide information on 
how sustainability matters and initiatives may contribute to the long-term growth strategy of a 
business (Churet & Eccles, 2014). To better understand IR, the IoDSA (2009, p. 54)—in its King 
Code III—refers to it as a “…holistic and integrated representation of the company’s performance 
in terms of both its finance and its sustainability”. 
In this respect, it is striking that IR is not a simple mix of sustainability and financial reports; it is 
more than that. Solomon and Maroun (2012, p. 7) argue that IR 
…incorporates, in clear language, material information from these and other 
sources to enable stakeholders to evaluate the organisation’s performance and to 
make an informed assessment about its ability to create and sustain value. An 
integrated report should provide stakeholders with a concise overview of an 
organisation, integrating and connecting important information about strategy, 
risks and opportunities and relating them to social, environmental, economic and 
financial issues (p. 7). 
Similarly, PWC (2012) states that IR more comprehensively assesses and presents a company’s 
value and performance, offering more holistic information about their strategy, business model and 
ability to create and sustain value in the short, medium and long term. 
Particularly relevant to this thesis is the IIRF’s definitions of IR as: 
…concise communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, 
performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the 
creation of value over the short, medium and long term (IIRC, 2013c, p. 7)  
and 
…a process founded on integrated thinking that results in a periodic integrated 
report by an organization about value creation over time and related 
communications regarding aspects of value creation (IIRC, 2013c, p. 33). 
Therefore, IR is more than just a combination of financial and sustainability reports: it incorporates 
a new perspective on forward-looking information to provide a long-term vision of how companies 
use resources, or the different forms of capital, to create value over time, and focuses sharply on 
providers of financial capital. 
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It is important to understand how IR differs from other reporting (see Table 1a): the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2013b), in its report on principles and standard disclosures 
(Sustainability Reporting Guidelines: G4), clarifies the difference. While the G4 considers 
sustainability reports (SRs) essential to illustrating economic, environmental, social and governance 
performance, the primary purpose of IR is to facilitate an integral representation of the principal 
factors that materially impact the value-creation process over time. Fasan (2013) suggests that, 
since IR is not an extension of an SR, it might be viewed as an evolution of the accounting report, 
even if it captures some sustainability elements. The primary target of IRs are the providers of 
capital, thus entailing high industry customisation (as IR is principle-based) and a low assurance 
level because non-financial information is more challenging to assure than financial information 
(Fasan, 2013). 
 [INSERT TABLE 1a ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 1b ABOUT HERE] 
Others also argue that, while SRs may provide important information for stakeholders, SR and IR 
differ in two important respects (see Table 1b): their target and focus (Adams, 2015; De Villiers, 
Rinaldi, & Unerman, 2014). Table 1b shows that, firstly, the target of SR is a wider stakeholder 
audience than providers of financial capital or long-term investors. Secondly, while SR mainly 
focuses on environmental, social and economic performance, IR focuses on the effects and 
interaction of the firm’s capital with the value-creation process (Fasan, 2013; IIRC, 2013a) through 
disclosure of financial information in conjunction with soft disclosures about how the business 
model interrelates with the external environment. 
2.2  Capital of integrated reporting 
A major focus of IR is the effect of company resources (or capital) on the process of value creation. 
The IIRF points out that IR’s pillar is its enhancement of accountability and stewardship of the 
broad base of capital, promoting interdependence and understanding between them. Capital within 
IR takes six forms: financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and 
natural. Every company depends on some type of capital for its success. Forms of capital, however, 
are not entirely independent. Their interaction depends on different factors such as type of industry, 
business model, and other external and internal matters that affect the organisation. Every form of 
capital can be increased, decreased or transformed through the company’s business activities and 
outcomes. 
The purpose of categorising capital in the theory of value creation is to ensure that companies will 
consider every type of capital that could materially affect the value created; that is, the business 
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model plays a principal role in clarifying how different activities interact to create value over time. 
For example, Indra and the Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company are companies that participated 
in the pilot program carried out by the IIRC. Indra, a consulting and multinational technology 
corporation based in Spain, described the interaction between their business model, performance, 
strategy and outlook for each of the key successes of the value creation process. They align strategic 
objectives with the six forms of capital recommended by the IIRC (see Figure 1). Coca-Cola HBC 
(see Figure 2) similarly demonstrated how their business model and strategic framework connect 
with information and stakeholder relationships. Coca-Cola’s report details capital inflows, the value 
chain, and value created as a result of the corporation’s activities. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The capital framework provides a theoretical guideline for companies to ensure that all forms of 
capital are disclosed. Capital disclosures are thus determined in accordance with a firm’s ability to 
create value in the short, medium and long term, rather than whether or not they are owned by the 
organisation (IIRC, 2013c). While the IIRC endorses the six forms of capital—financial, 
manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relational, and natural—it does not require companies 
to adopt it. Instead, companies can take different IR options to best inform interconnections 
between the six forms of capital. 
Capital is considered a flexible concept: not all forms apply equally to all companies with the same 
level of importance. Some organisations, for instance, simply focus on the most utilised forms of 
capital by analysing the interdependence between them. Other companies are developing objectives 
and tools to measure the use of capital in their business strategy (IIRC, 2013b). The IIRF seeks to 
provide greater cohesion and efficiency of corporate reports by recognising forms of capital and the 
connectivity between them. 
2.3  The South African context 
The literature characterises the South African market as an economy characterised by concentrated 
ownership, a well-regulated stock exchange, high levels of institutional ownership, weak 
shareholder activism, and a satisfactory level of accounting transparency and disclosure (Collins, 
Kwaku, Jo, & Dennis, 2012; Ntim, 2013; Rabin & Negash, 2015). South Africa is considered a 
leader in the adoption of IR, principally due to the Code of Governance for South Africa: King III 
(IRC, 2014; Rensburg & Botha, 2014). Through its IR Committee (IRC), the nation has been 
innovative by mandating that firms listed on the JSE since 1 March 2010 are obligated to produce 
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IRs. Principle 9.1 of King III suggests that company boards should ensure the integrity of their 
company’s reports by disclosing adequate information regarding the company’s financial and 
sustainability performance (IoDSA, 2009). The approach focuses on the substance of content rather 
than form. In other words, King III seeks to establish the necessary principles to ensure IR (i.e., the 
“what”) but is not prescriptive about its format (IoDSA, 2014). King III (2009) “…recommends 
integrated reporting to reflect the business reality that strategy, risk, performance and sustainability 
have become inseparable. This integrated thinking is evidenced in an integrated report” (IRC, 2014, 
p. 2). 
Proponents of IR suggest that a separate sustainability report is unlikely to be an effective 
mechanism to communicate environmental and social performance (Eccles, Cheng, & Saltzman, 
2010). This argument is based on the lack of integration between the business model and a firm’s 
strategy. Moreover, it has been argued that sustainability reports are less credible than financial 
reports because financial information is externally verified at a high level of assurance (Serafeim, 
2015). King III regulation thus represents a significant milestone for assurance providers. Principle 
9.3 requires that IR sustainability reporting and disclosure should be independently assured so that 
the information contained is reliable and does not contradict the financial aspects of the report 
(IoDSA, 2009). The King III framework recommends engaging an external assurance provider on 
matters of material sustainability. 
The environment analysed in this thesis is one in which the assurance of soft disclosures is neither 
voluntary nor compulsory. While the King III framework recommends engaging an external 
assurance provider on issues of material sustainability on an “apply or explain” approach, it does 
not mention “how”, and “what”, information should be audited. Nevertheless, the number of 
independent assurances of non-financial information has increased gradually in South Africa. 
Before King III came into force, 30% of CSR reports presented an independent assurance (Marx & 
van Dyk, 2011). By 2014―four years after the adoption of King III―this had increased to 37% 
(Ackers, 2016). While the number of reports assured has increased, it still remains low―probably 
because, through King III regulation, companies have the option to explain why they are not 
engaging independent assurance. However, several companies have not disclosed the reasons for 
not assuring CSR disclosures. When a reason was provided, companies usually gave reasons such 
as “not ready to do so”, or “the independent assurance of the sustainability reporting and disclosure 
will be considered in the future”, or “due to the nature of the business, there is a limited impact on 
the environment and society expected”. 
King III regulation, through its stakeholder approach, has striven to ensure integrity, accountability 
and the alignment of assurance processes in companies. Through Principle 3.5 of King III, South 
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Africa’s IRC recommends applying a combined assurance model (CAM) to provide a coordinated 
approach to all assurance activities. A CAM should ensure synergy between the work of external 
and internal auditors to maximise risk and governance on critical areas that affect the company. It 
has been argued that the application of an effective CAM must ensure three lines of defence (see 
Figure 3): operational management, risk management and compliance functions, and internal audit 
(IIA, 2013). The draft of King IV released in 2016 expands the CAM by introducing five levels 
which separate the level of risk ownership and the independence of assurance (Deloitte, 2016) (see 
Figure 4). King IV (IoDSA, 2016a) incorporates external assurances such as external audit, 
sustainability and environmental auditors or regulatory inspectors in line four, and the governing 
body, audit or other committees as the fifth line (see Figure 5). King IV does not prescribe the 
design of the model, thus allowing the administration to exercise its judgment about this (PWC, 
2017). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Because the application of IR is a relatively new phenomenon, little evidence has been provided 
about the economic incentives for disclosure and assurance. Since the 2010 implementation of a 
CAM, the disclosure of financial and non-financial information in an independently assured 
integrated report has been mandatory on an “apply or explain” basis. However, before 2013, there 
was no internationally accepted framework on how to prepare IR; therefore, in March 2014, the 
South African IRC endorsed the IIRF as guidance on good practice for preparing IRs (IIRC, 2014b) 
(see Table 2). Therefore, the IIRF could be seen as a strong basis for IR. While King III established 
some content and formats, it did so when there was no other guidance available on this matter. The 
South African IRC thus clarifies that “the principles and practice recommendations of King III 
operate on a conceptual level whereas the Framework offers implementation guidance” (IRC, 2014, 
p. 7). 
In November 2016, the new King Report on Corporate Governance (CG), King IV, was published; 
it related to the financial years commencing from April 2017. In contrast to King III―which adopts 
an “apply or explain” basis― King IV CG assumes that all requirements of integrated reporting are 
applied (IoDSA, 2016b). This report replaced King III in its entirety, so JSE-listed companies are 
now required to comply with King IV principles. Unlike the prior system, firms must disclose how 
these fundamentals are implemented. King IV thus moves from an “apply or explain” basis to 
“apply and explain”, requiring companies to explain how the principles are applied. While King IV 
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emphasises “outcome”, it allows for flexibility of application (Deloitte, 2016). Simplification and 
ease of interpretation are key tenets of this new governance framework (IoDSA, 2015). Because 
King IV builds on the content of King III, the same subject matter is covered (IoDSA, 2015). Some 
of the King IV objectives are to promote CG as integral to delivering governance outcomes. 
Reinforcing CG in an integrated manner encourages transparent and meaningful reporting by 
making it accessible across a variety of industries (Deloitte (2016). Mervyn King, the Chairman of 
the King Committee on CG, stated:  
It is hoped that King IV will result in quality governance on the part of directors and 
help change corporate behaviour by adopting integrated thinking. The business 
landscape has changed dramatically in the intervening years (between King III and IV) 
and economic uncertainty has increased, [so] the need for strong governance has never 
become more apparent (GrantThornton, 2017). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
One of the most significant differences between the principles of King regulation and the IR 
framework is their primary purpose. The IRC recommends a stakeholder-inclusive approach to 
governance, rather than just including providers of financial capital. Although this perspective could 
be problematic, the IIRF is flexible by clarifying whether the report responds to other requirements, 
such as local law. Therefore, the report needs to include more information beyond that required by 
the IR framework. Nevertheless, IR can still be considered flexible if other information does not 
obstruct specific information required by the IIRF (IIRC, 2013c). 
2.4  South Africa’s economy 
Since it is the only economy in the world that requires IR, it is relevant to ask why South Africa is 
going further with IR than other nations. South Africa is a developing country with around 54 
million inhabitants in 2015. Its unemployment rate that year was 25.1%,5 indicating that the 
economy is supported by just 75% of the active labour force. It is estimated that the South African 
economy must create approximately 1.2 million jobs to close the existing employment gaps (The 
World Bank, 2014). 
The economy, which has a relatively stable inflation rate (6.5%, 5.7% and 4.0% in 2013, 2014 and 
2015 respectively),6 is subdivided into a highly regulated formal economy and an informal economy 
which functions outside the legal framework but employs 13% of the active labour force― 
approximately 2.4 million people (Charman, Petersen, Piper, Liedeman, & Legg, 2015). Since 
2011, South Africa’s economy has failed to achieve two consecutive trimesters of economic 
                                                             
5 Information obtained from The World Bank at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS 
6 See more at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG 
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growth, and thus faces a progressive decrease in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 3.6% in 
2011 to 1.9% in 2013 (The World Bank, 2014). The annual GDP per capita growth has reduced 
from 1.5% in 2010 to -0.4% in 2015.7 Lacklustre economic performance is partially due to internal 
factors: labour unrest and limits to the supply of infrastructure and skills8 (AfDB, OECD, & UNDP, 
2014; The World Bank, 2014). 
However, the South African Government has progressed in the reduction of income equality and 
poverty through an advanced tax and spending policy process (The World Bank, 2014). Since 
December 2010, South Africa has been one of the BRICS group of emerging economic nations 
(with Brazil, Russia, India and China) (Rensburg & Botha, 2014). Additionally, it is the world’s 
second-largest exporter of fruit, first in its output of platinum, second in palladium, third in gold, 
sixth in coal, and ninth in wool (DTI & Deloitte, 2014). In 2014 the JSE was ranked the twelfth-
largest stock exchange in the world in terms of market value, trade and turnover, and tenth for good 
practice in protecting business investors (DTI & Deloitte, 2014).  
It is thus difficult to explain why South Africa is leading other world powers in implementing IR. It 
may be partially linked to both cultural and social developments experienced in the mid-1990s, and 
the stakeholder-inclusive philosophy of King I (1994), King II (2002), King III (2009) as essential 
to CG (Rensburg & de Beer, 2011). Additionally, South Africa’s governance principles coincided 
with the country’s first multiracial elections in 1994 and, at the same time, the concept of 
“stakeholder-inclusivity”, where non-shareholder interests and expectations are considered in a 
company’s decisions (Krzus, Eccles, & Ribot, 2014). Krzus et al. (2014) similarly agree that IR in 
South Africa has been one consequence of these political and social changes, moving from racial 
segregation to an era of social and economic inclusion. These authors indicate that the promoters of 
this new South Africa saw CG as necessary to rehabilitating the nation’s image in the post-apartheid 
era,9 and attracting the foreign capital that had receded during apartheid-era sanctions. 
The current literature does not document well the global number of firms that are issuing IRs. This 
is mainly due to the recent effect of IIRC and the lack of formal requirements to produce IRs in 
countries other than South Africa. However, most of the top-100 listed companies in South Africa, 
as well as an important number of smaller firms and larger state-owned organisations, currently 
prepare IRs to demonstrate good governance and reporting (IRC, 2014). The majority of these 
                                                             
7 See more at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=ZA 
8 For example, in the South African platinum sector there was a protracted strike that caused an economic contraction in 
the primary production sector from -17.2% to -5.1% in the first and second quarter of 2014 (The World Bank, 2014). 
9 Apartheid was the system of racial segregation in South Africa and Namibia enforced through legislation, which was 
officially terminated in 1990 (Krzus et al., 2014).  
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reports―more than 76%―are concentrated in prominent South African sectors such as mining and 
minerals, finance, and manufacturing.10  
2.5  Summary 
This chapter outlined how the IIRC was formed and how the IIRF was prepared and published in 
December 2013. To better understand the potential value of this new corporate trend, the 
differences between current practices (annual and sustainability reports) and IRs were analysed. 
Examples of business models of early adopters were illustrated to clarify the principal foci of IR: 
the value creation process through the interaction of forms of capitals as the foundation. Finally, the 
South African economy was described as the only stock exchange that requires the disclosure of 
integrated information, the external assurance of sustainability reporting, and the implementation of 
a CAM for listing. 
  
                                                             
10 According to the African Economic Outlook (2014, p. 245): “South Africa is an important hub in the global mining 
value chain, a regional assembly hub in the global automotive value chain and a key player in the regional finance and 
retail value chains. It should capitalise on these links as engines of growth at home.”   
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Chapter 3: Literature review 
Chapter 3 is a review of the literature about voluntary corporate disclosures. Section 3.1 discusses 
the major theories that apply to the disclosure of non-financial information; two prominent socio-
political and economic theories can be used to explain the behaviour of firms and corporate 
disclosure. Using these paradigms, Sub-sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 outline agency and signalling 
theories respectively. The benefits of voluntary disclosure, and previous relevant research in the IR 
field, are analysed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Section 3.4 is an outline of the motivations of companies 
for assuring the non-financial information contained in CSR reports and IRs, both in environments 
where the assurance decision is voluntary and in the de facto regulatory setting of South Africa. 
3.1 Theoretical framework on voluntary disclosure 
Although this thesis investigates an environment where the decision to disclose non-financial 
information and its external independent assurance is a de facto mandatory requirement, its focus is 
different from prior research in CSR. CSR research has generally analysed environments where the 
decision to issue a sustainability report and the decision to assure it is entirely voluntary (e.g., 
(Casey & Grenier, 2015; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Peters & Romi, 2015). Prior research has also 
adopted a range of theories to examine voluntary corporate disclosure, including agency, signalling, 
proprietary cost, stakeholder, political economy, institutional, and legitimacy theories (Bansal, 
2005; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008; Moser & Martin, 2012; Verrecchia, 2001). These 
approaches can be broadly classified into two: socio-political theories that include legitimacy, 
institutional, stakeholder, and political economy theory, and those based on wealth maximisation—
agency, signalling, and proprietary cost theory. 
Social accounting research considers corporate disclosure a symbolic legitimacy tool, while market-
based research relies on agency theory and considers corporate disclosure a valuable source of 
information for stakeholders and investors (Michelon et al., 2015). Despite their similarities, these 
theories differ in the type of information disclosed and the objective function of the firm. Social 
accounting disclosures are primarily concerned with how companies respond to society and/or 
political forces (Bansal, 2005; Patten, 2002). The theories involved do not consider business value. 
In contrast, economics-based methods such as agency or signalling theory are concerned with 
maximising company value and attend little to corporate citizenship. 
The international IR framework (IIRC, 2013c) emphasizes the importance of stakeholders to the 
value-creation process; however, there is a strong and specific focus on capital providers rather than 
society as a whole. As such, scholars have criticised the capitalistic approach of the IIRC since its 
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foundation in 2010. For example, Flower (2015) claims that, in its origins, the principal target of the 
IIRC was to promote sustainability. Now, however, the IIRC has abandoned this idea and focused 
rather on value-creation for investors rather than for society. Thomson (2015) agrees, arguing that, 
despite developments in corporate social, environmental and ethical accounting, there is little 
evidence that these initiatives have substantially reduced the negative social and environmental 
impacts of corporations and social institutions. 
Given that socio-political theories such as stakeholder theory focus broadly on the interaction 
between corporate disclosure and society or the environment, there is less scope for their 
application to IR. As discussed earlier, the IR required by the JSE is prepared primarily for the 
providers of financial capital; therefore, it is logical to investigate IR disclosure and assurance in the 
JSE environment using an economics-based theory because the emphasis of IR is to explain to 
providers of financial capital how an organization creates value (IIRC, 2013c). This is not to 
suggest that the IR reports prepared by JSE companies will include only financial disclosures. 
However, motivations for soft disclosure may be influenced by the focus on financial capital. 
Inspired by the South African context and consistent with the stated purpose of IR, this study uses 
economics-based theories, such as agency and signalling theory, rather than socio-politics. It thus 
investigates the IR disclosure and assurance choice within the JSE mandatory environment. 
Furthermore, it directly assesses the value of IR, IR assurance and the application of a combined 
assurance model (CAM) to two important groups: investors and the analyst community. 
3.1.1 Agency and signalling theories 
The pioneers of agency theory were Jensen and Meckling (1976), who described an agency 
relationship as arising when there is a contract whereby one party (the principal) appoints another 
party (the agent) to perform some service on behalf of the principal. If both parties are utility 
maximizers, the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Divergent interests between shareholders and managers mean that each party seeks to 
maximise its interests differently. Shareholders typically seek wealth creation through dividends 
and higher share prices, while managers usually strive to maximise their self-interest, which can 
sometimes be detrimental to shareholder interests (Tosi, Brownlee, Silva, & Katz, 2003). 
The separation of decision-making incurs monitoring costs and a divergence of the information 
available between principal and agent (Fama & Jensen, 1983).11 Information asymmetry results 
                                                             
11 Agency costs arise as the sum of the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent, 
and residual loss as, for example, the dollar equivalent of the reduction of the principal’s welfare due to the divergence 
of decisions between them (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
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from the divergence of information between managers and shareholders, the former typically 
having greater access to information than the latter (Healy & Palepu, 2001). It assumes that agents 
have more information than owners, which may have an adverse effect on the owner’s ability to 
monitor whether their interests are properly served by their agent. Therefore, information 
asymmetry can lead to the mispricing of a corporation (Myers & Majluf, 1984). When a firm 
increases the level of disclosure, the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, or 
among buyers and sellers of the firm’s shares, tends to decline (Bailey et al., 2006). Large firms 
tend to disclose more voluntary information because they face higher agency costs and greater 
agency problems (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987). High levels of information asymmetry across 
investors tend to lead to high transaction costs, thin markets, lower liquidity of securities and 
decreased gains from trade (Lev, 1988). These can produce a deviation from a firm’s actual credit 
risk assessment (Barakat, Chernobai, & Wahrenburg, 2014). This literature presents a model of 
voluntary disclosure as a means of reducing information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994).  
Accordingly, voluntary disclosure can mitigate information asymmetry; CSR disclosures are made 
for this purpose. Management, through agency theory, has incentives to pursue greater credibility of 
reported information as a means of signalling greater management ability (Verrecchia, 1990). 
Therefore, it is expected that IR contains incremental information in comparison to CSR reports: IR 
shows the extent of integration between financial and sustainability information by focusing on how 
companies create value in the short, medium and long terms. Through the disclosure of IRs, 
companies can thus demonstrate both whether they are maximising shareholder wealth using 
capital, and the extent of the interdependencies of their value creation and business models. IR 
would be expected to minimise the gap between what shareholders demand and what firms disclose 
in a de facto compulsory environment—for example, mitigating information asymmetry. 
Economics-based theory, such as signalling and agency theories, suggest that auditors are 
voluntarily selected by firms to differentiate themselves from others (Morris, 1987) and to help 
control the conflict of interests amongst the firm’s managers, shareholders and bondholders (Chow, 
1982). In South Africa, where an “apply or explain” governance framework has been established, 
companies may attempt to differentiate themselves from others by assuring the non-financial 
information contained in IR. Signalling mechanisms, such as assurance, may reduce agency costs, 
enhancing credibility and corporate reputation and, therefore, amplifying future cash flow benefits 
(O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011). 
Most of the CSRA literature argues that companies engage in assurance when they need to improve 
the credibility of their non-financial information (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Simnett et al., 2009). 
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However, evidence based on socio-political theories has not been consistent. While recent 
developments in this field show that the assurance of CSR reports enhances credibility (Perego & 
Kolk, 2012; Pflugrath, Roebuck, & Simnett, 2011) as well as corporate reputation (Cohen & 
Simnett, 2015; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett et al., 2009), others suggest that external auditors 
produce unreliable information for the market (Duflo et al., 2013) which is not associated with 
higher market value for report-issuing companies (Cho et al., 2014). 
Signalling and agency theory are relevant because, in South Africa, companies with high levels of 
disclosure quality may have incentives to signal their quality to the market in a way which cannot 
be easily mimicked by poor CSR performers. Managing the risk of the sustainability information 
through this assurance, companies may improve their reputation to the providers of financial 
capital, facilitating the acquisition of resources. Higher company reputation has been associated 
with higher firm performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Thus, and by using economics-based 
theories, it is expected that, in South Africa, de facto compulsory regulation would put more 
pressure on firms to signal their quality/reputation to the shareholders as a signal for future 
corporate value. 
3.2 Literature review on voluntary disclosure. 
3.2.1 Benefits of voluntary disclosure: The CSR context. 
Voluntary disclosure is defined as “…free choices on the part of company management to provide 
accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual 
reports” (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995, p. 555). Since the 1990s, it has been argued that voluntary 
disclosure should satisfy the needs of a variety of stakeholders (Meek et al., 1995) in a capital 
market where disclosures arise from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between 
managers and outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that 
information asymmetry of this kind could be mitigated by increasing accounting disclosures—not 
only for firms and stockholders but also among providers of capital. Agency theory predicts how 
the level of information available, and incentives, influence managers’ decisions (Harrison & 
Harrell, 1993). However, problems arise when managers have more information than the principals, 
thus acting in self-interest at the expense of the latter—the adverse selection problem (Harrison & 
Harrell, 1993). 
Prior research demonstrates the benefits of voluntary disclosure and argues that there is substantial 
evidence that CSR activities, and the quality of these reports, significantly enhance a company’s 
value (Malik, 2015) and maximises shareholder value (Manchiraju & Rajgopal, in press). 
Consistent with economics theory, such results find a positive association between the amount of 
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company disclosures and corporate environmental performance (Clarkson et al., 2008; Herbohn, 
Walker, & Loo, 2014). Consequently, scholars find a positive association between voluntary 
environmental disclosure, the improvement in environmental performance, and a firm’s value 
(Clarkson, Fang, Li, & Richardson, 2013; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2011).  
These benefits have been demonstrated through channels such as lower analyst forecast error 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2012), reduction of agency costs, lesser information asymmetry, and lower cost of 
capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 
1999). The leading motivation for engaging in strategic voluntary disclosure is to reduce agency 
costs in the form of information asymmetries that, in turn, influence the cost of capital (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 1999). This is due to the impaired ability of 
the non-informed user to diversify their risk because of the limited available public information and 
the subsequent demand for a premium rate of risk based on the expected level of information 
asymmetry. In contrast, informed users can stay one step ahead. Greater quality disclosure 
disaggregation results in more information for both types of user, changing—to a certain extent—
from private to public information. This leads to less information asymmetry between informed and 
non-informed users and lower levels of asymmetry associated with a lower cost of equity capital. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that companies that present high levels of equity capital cost in the 
previous period are more likely to encourage standalone CSR disclosures. The cost of equity capital 
decreases for companies initiating CSR, with superior CSR performance attracting dedicated 
institutional investors and receiving analyst coverage. Furthermore, financial analysts gain more 
accurate forecasts and lower forecast dispersion when CSR disclosures are made (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2012). High levels of disclosure are more likely to attract investors, 
improving a company’s liquidity and reducing a firm’s cost of capital (Bailey et al., 2006; Diamond 
& Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & Verrecchia, 1991a, 1991b, 1994). On average, individual investors 
capitalise more in companies with clear and concise financial disclosure because this positively 
affects returns for individuals (Lawrence, 2013). 
Theoretically, IR is not the same as a CSR report; an IR integrates both financial and non-financial 
disclosures into a single narrative to inform investors how companies create value over time. While 
the literature focuses on determining the economic consequences of IR, most of it uses institutional 
theory rather than economics-based approaches. 
3.3  Previous research on IR 
While most IR would be expected to address some corporate sustainability issues, it involves more 
than just extending CSR information. IR differs because it targets a narrower stakeholder group—
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financial capital providers—and covers matters other than just environmental and societal 
performance (De Villiers et al., 2014). 
Although CSR reporting may differ from IR, its research has some relevance to this study. There is 
much research literature on the incentives for and the economic consequences of the disclosure of 
voluntary information through CSR reports (e.g., (Adams & Whelan, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2011)). 
However, standalone CSR reports have been criticised for not integrating the information they 
present (Stent & Dowler, 2015), not focussing on material matters, being difficult to read, and often 
being disconnected from strategy and the firm’s business model (Eccles et al., 2010). 
IR is relatively recent, and few jurisdictions require IRs; therefore, empirical evidence is sparse on 
the economic consequences of IR adoption for firms operating in capital markets. Several studies 
have contained advice about implementing the internal transition process of early IR adopters (De 
Villiers, Venter, & Hsiao, 2016). However, little evidence suggests that IR has become 
institutionalised in early adopting companies; indeed, IR appears to have been adopted ceremonially 
in some cases in response to external pressures or because a firm’s social legitimacy is threatened 
(Haji & Anifowose, 2016, 2017; Higgins, Stubbs, & Love, 2014). 
Furthermore, IR adoption does not appear to stimulate integrated thinking by management, nor is it 
seen internally as a new disclosure mechanism (Stubbs & Higgins, 2014). Instead, IR is regarded as 
the next step in sustainability reporting, rather than a transformation of the firm’s existing financial 
and sustainability reporting (Rensburg & Botha, 2014). Most studies on IR have focused on the 
management incentives to establish IR relatives to the firm’s size, industry and profitability (Velte 
& Stawinoga, 2016). 
This is the case with economic theory, where the implementation of IR is associated with company 
size and profitability (Frias, Rodríguez, & Garcia, 2014). Recent research notes a significant 
increase in the extent and quality of the information presented through IR (Haji & Anifowose, 2016, 
2017; Solomon & Maroun, 2012). Consequently, the disclosure of IR is associated with superior 
outcomes for combined environmental, social and corporate governance performance 
(Mervelskemper & Streit, 2016). 
Recent IR literature also indicates that firms with higher financing need a higher firm valuation and 
better IR. This suggests that better disclosure arising from IR may reduce agency and information 
asymmetry costs (Lee & Yeo, 2016). Similarly, three important recent papers have supported the 
benefits of IR in South Africa, although their findings seem to be conditional on the quality of the 
information disclosed. For example, the use of a disclosure index to measure the extent of 
alignment between individual IR and the IR prototype framework (Zhou et al. (2017) find that 
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analyst forecast errors, forecast dispersion and the cost of capital (in this case, specifically for firms 
with small followings of analysts) are negatively related to IR quality. Similarly, high IR quality has 
been found to be positively associated with stock liquidity, firm value, and future cash flows (Barth 
et al., 2017), suggesting that the effect on the firm’s value is mainly driven by the future cash flow 
effect (as opposed to findings by Zhou et al. (2017)) rather than cost of capital. Unlike these studies 
that support the benefits of IR after its introduction in South Africa, empirical analysis conducted 
before and after the regulation in South Africa came into force suggest that the level of 
environmental, social and governance information is a mediating variable in determining the 
effectiveness of IR; this provides useful information to analysts and investors in the IR regime 
(Bernardi & Stark, 2016). Their findings also suggest that this significant association was not 
presented before the IR was introduced because the potential of IR to provide useful information on 
ESG and financial performance.  
3.4 Assurance of non-financial information 
3.4.1 Assurance and CSR 
Unlike the audit of financial statements that are required by regulation and are commonly 
dominated by the accounting profession, the assurance of non-financial information, which usually 
reports on environmental, social and corporate governance performance, occurs in a broader context 
than accounting (see Figure 6). As a result, new assurance providers, which include accountancy 
firms, certification bodies and specialist consultancies, have emerged to cover the ESG information 
disclosed by companies (CorporateRegister, 2008).12 Nevertheless, evidence about voluntary CSRA 
is scarce (Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Weber, 2014), more so when IR is involved. 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
In recent years, the number of CSR reports that have been assured has increased rapidly. In 2012, 
46% of reports listed on GRI’s sustainability disclosure database indicated some external assurance 
(GRI, 2013a). In 2015, 92% of the world’s 250 largest companies (G250) presented a corporate 
CSR report, and almost two-thirds (63%) had been independently assured (KPMG, 2015). While 
some attempts have been made to improve the quality of the sustainability information presented, a 
paucity of informed assurance related to CSR reporting remains (Cohen & Simnett, 2015). 
                                                             
12 Assurance providers other than accountancy organisations have increased their participation to 36% and 35% among 
the largest 100 companies in 45 countries (the “N100” companies) and the G250 respectively between 2013 and 2015 
(KPMG, 2015) 
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Independently-assured ESG increases the credibility of the disclosure (Casey & Grenier, 2015; 
Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Coram, Monroe, & Woodliff, 2009; Simnett et al., 2009). In addition, 
comparability is enhanced through the use of assurance standards (Ackers & Eccles, 2015; Owen, 
Swift, Humphrey, & Bowerman, 2000). The credibility of CSR reports seems to be associated with 
the type of assurer and market characteristics. Value assurance of financial analysis in the USA is 
greater when the CSR report is assured and when the assurer is a professional accountant (Pflugrath 
et al., 2011). This differs from Australia and the UK, where analysts perceive little difference in the 
value of assurance provided by accounting firms compared to other assurers (Pflugrath et al., 2011). 
This is possibly because the assurance of non-financial information is commonly provided in 
Australia and Britain (Simnett et al., 2009). On the other hand, Michelon et al. (2015) find no 
evidence that assurance and the use of GRI guidelines are associated with the quality and quantity 
of the information presented. They suggest that CSR reports and CSRA are used symbolically to 
manage the corporate image of sustainability disclosures rather improve substantive accountability.  
Studies based on economic theories suggest that the voluntary assurance of CSR reports increases 
the likelihood that more socially responsible investors will be attracted (Clarkson et al., 2015). 
CSRA has also been associated in the USA with lower cost equity capital and with lower analyst 
forecast error and dispersion (Casey & Grenier, 2015). The reductions in cost of capital and 
dispersion are significantly higher when CSR assurance is provided by an accounting firm. Poor 
CSR performers which engage in external CSRA present lower cost of equity capital than those 
who do not (Casey & Grenier, 2015). Furthermore, companies with high levels of leverage are less 
likely to engage in CSRA (Weber, 2014). These findings may suggest that investors require a high 
degree of credibility to distinguish good performers from “greenwash companies”, the latter being 
those that tend to falsify their CSR disclosure to capitalise on the benefits associated with strong 
CSR performance. (Ackers & Eccles, 2015). Indeed, investors are more willing to invest in a firm 
when the sustainability disclosures have higher strategic relevance, and even more when the 
information is externally assured (Cheng, Green, & Ko, 2015). 
Overall, current CSRA literature offers little research into the factors that lead companies to engage 
in assurance on their CSR reports, and its results have been mixed (Clarkson et al., 2015). Some 
scholars find that CSR assurance serves to bridge the credibility gap by improving the relevance of 
CSR information (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Cohen & Simmett, 2015; Fuhrmann, Ott, Looks, & 
Guenther, 2017; Peters & Romi, 2015; Pflugrath et al., 2011; Simnett et al., 2009). Others find that 
the assurance of sustainability information does not provide a higher quality of information (Duflo 
et al., 2013; Michelon et al., 2015), and is not associated with higher market value (Cho et al., 
2014). 
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3.4.2 Assurance and IR 
IR assurance is an important issue for assurance providers because companies are evolving from 
preparing a suite of reports (financial and sustainability reports) to a single IR. In addition, there is 
variation in the nature of information disclosed in an IR which depends on factors such as the type 
of company and industry. In addition, while the term “non-financial information” is often used to 
refer to data on sustainability matters, it covers a much broader area. Accounting auditors consider 
this term to refer to the additional items in the annual reports beyond the financial statements, which 
include, for example, sustainability, ESG, ethics, human capital, and health and safety information 
(EY, 2016).  
Assurance providers use selected frameworks for the reporting and verification of non-financial 
data, as exemplified by the GRI, the Integrated IR Framework, Global Compact, specific industry 
standards, and AA1000 and ISAE3000 (Deloitte, 2015). Additionally, the process used to evaluate 
the audit will depend on the level of assurance engaged by the companies—limited or reasonable—
and the type of risk that the firm is willing to take to meet their strategic objectives. The audit is 
based on the verification of data accuracy and completeness, the review of reporting process and the 
information disclosed, and the assessment of current reporting of nonfinancial information against 
innovative standards for integration, such as the IR Framework (Deloitte, 2015; EY, 2016). Early 
literature recognises the absence of academic and professional research on IR assurance. In South 
Africa there is no agreement on how to assure the information contained in IR findings, confirming 
the challenges of using the existing IR framework and professional standards for assuring IR 
(Maroun, 2017). 
Because IR is in its early stages of development, research on the incentives for assuring the non-
financial information contained in IR is lacking. Consistent with economic theory, this thesis 
evaluates the possible economic impacts of assuring non-financial information. South Africa 
provides the best setting to evaluate this factor because it is the only world economy that de facto 
mandates the independent external verification of sustainability information. 
Due to its unique characteristics, recent studies have analysed the South African setting. Principle 
9.2 of King III requires that “…sustainability reporting and disclosing should be integrated with the 
company’s financial reporting” (IoDSA, 2009, p. 49). In addition, Principle 9.3 requires that 
“…sustainability reporting and disclosure should be independently assured” (IoDSA, 2009, p. 49). 
Previous studies suggest that King III is institutionalising CSRA practices in South Africa because 
of the consistent growth in CSRA since 2010 (Ackers & Eccles, 2015). After King III was adopted, 
37% of CSR reports in South Africa in 2014 were independently assured (Ackers, 2016). 
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Accounting bodies such as the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board recognise the 
need for the assurance standards and guidance provided in IR (Simnett & Huggins, 2015). To 
enhance the relevance and reliability of the information presented, the IIRC has recently released a 
document summarising significant matters raised in a discussion paper about IR assurance (IIRC, 
2014a, 2015a). The document recognised that, while companies may use a range of mechanisms to 
enhance credibility and trust—of which assurance is only one—IR remains in its infancy and, 
therefore, its assurance should evolve with it. 
Because IR assurance (IRA) is still at an early stage of development, a range of research 
opportunities are currently under-explored (Simnett & Huggins, 2015). Therefore, to find relevant 
publications and citation records on the IRA field for this thesis, a Boolean search was conducted 
within the Social Sciences Citation Index.13 The keywords “integrated reporting”, “assurance”, 
“integrated reporting” and “audit” in the bibliographic mapping returned expected results. Without 
filters, only 17 records were found for the past 20 years. To ensure their proper inclusion, papers 
were manually cleaned;14 after this, only six papers, published between 2015 and 2017, were found 
that analysed the relationship between assurance of non-financial information (or sustainability 
information) and IR. 
Previous relevant research focused on the determinants associated with assuring the sustainability 
information in IRs, rather than the economic consequences associated with external verification. 
Prior academic research thus returned mixed evidence. While some argued that the probability of 
disclosing IR correlates positively with having sustainability information assured (Sierra-García, 
Zorio-Grima, & García-Benau, 2015), others claimed that the existence of CSRA does not influence 
the presentation of IR (Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero, & Ruiz, 2015; Vaz, Fernandez-Feijoo, & Ruiz, 
2016). The decision to assure ESG information and the choice of a Big-Four ﬁrm as an assurer is 
mostly explained by country characteristics, a firm’s size and the level of industry visibility 
(Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2015). Companies that present their sustainability information through IR 
are more likely to hire from the Big-Four than those presenting a non-integrated report (Fernandez-
Feijoo et al., 2015). 
Most of the studies in this area have focused on an environment where the decision to present 
sustainability information and its assurance is entirely voluntary. Little evidence has addressed 
                                                             
13 The Social Sciences Citation Index is an online academic citation database within the Thomson Reuters Web of 
Science™ platform (Linnenluecke, 2017). The bibliographic mapping was made using three topic key words: 
“Integrated Reporting”, “Assurance”, and “audit”. Also incorporated was an asterisk (for example, “Integrated 
Reporting*”, “Assurance*, “audit*”) to search for variations of the terms analysed. Results remain unchanged. 
14 For example, there was a paper using the keyword “integrated reporting”, but it was not related to the IR of the 
IIRC—see for example Tait, Cresswell, Lawson, and Creighton (2000). Others analysed assurance, the integration of 
sustainability activities, and how accountants can add value to sustainability initiatives (as discussed earlier in this 
chapter), but they did not develop the concept to IR—see, for example, Ballou, Casey, Grenier, and Heitger (2012).  
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potential interactions between the issue of IRs, the level of the assurance engagement, and market 
consequences. Economics-based theories suggest that the voluntarily choice of audit, as a signal to 
the market, enhances credibility and corporate reputation (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). A high level of 
reputation has been associated with higher firm performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
However, because of the mixed results in this matter and the lack of research into the economic 
effects of the assurance of sustainability information in IR, it is difficult to state clearly the 
motivations for assuring non-financial information when required by regulation. Information quality 
and corporate reputation may be used as a signal to the shareholders to differentiate good corporate 
citizenship from greenwash companies. However, the unexamined South African setting—with its 
unique market conditions, variation in IRA procedures, and range of assurance providers—
introduces some uncertainty to the predictions of this thesis. 
3.7  Summary 
Chapter 3 was an overview of prior research evidence about corporate voluntary disclosure 
decisions. In addition, this chapter reviewed the relevant literature on the benefit of voluntary 
disclosure information and the choice of assuring it. In summary, the literature offers some research 
gaps related to the economic consequences of the quality of IR and IRA. By using economics-based 
theories, this thesis aims to fill this gap and contribute by extending the growing literature on IR 
capital market response, and evaluate whether the quality of IR, the choice to obtain IRA, and the 
type of IRA will be associated with analyst earnings forecast accuracy and market liquidity.  
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Chapter 4: Hypothesis development  
Chapter 4 describes the hypotheses developed in this thesis. Sections 4.1 and 4.3 describe 
Hypotheses 1 to 4, which predict that the quality of IR, and how the assurance of the non-financial 
information disclosed in these reports, impact upon both market liquidity and analyst forecast 
accuracy. Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 focus more deeply on the type of IRA, including issues such as 
the use of assurance standards (ISAE3000 and AA1000AS) and level of the audit performed 
(limited and/or reasonable). Section 4.4 sets out the expected relationship between the combined 
assurance model (CAM) and both market liquidity and the accurate ability of financial analysts to 
arrive at Hypotheses 5 and 6. Finally, a summary of Chapter 4 is presented in Section 4.5. 
4.1 IR quality and market liquidity (H1) 
It is important to consider the economic consequences of IR in a mandatory setting because, in this 
context, there is more likely to be variation in disclosure quality across affected firms. Unlike the 
voluntary disclosure setting, the requirement for JSE firms to provide IR is an exogenous regulatory 
shock. Companies will respond in a variety of ways to the IR requirement, depending on the 
individual incentives they face. For example, some JSE firms were already voluntarily issuing IRs 
prior to these becoming mandatory (Barth et al., 2017). Because the IR Framework is principles-
based, there is likely to be variation across firms in how it is interpreted and applied. If there are 
benefits from IR, it is expected that they will be greater for high-quality IR. This analysis starts by 
examining whether the quality of IR impacts upon market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy. 
Information asymmetry is commonly used as a proxy for market liquidity through the bid-ask 
spread (BAS) (Amihud, 2002; Cheng, Dhaliwal, & Neamtiu, 2011; Flannery, Kwan, & 
Nimalendran, 2004; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). Because voluntary disclosures decrease BAS (Leuz 
& Verrecchia, 2000) and increase stock liquidity (Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999), they reduce 
information asymmetry. This is because informed investors are less sensitive to adverse selection—
that is, less information asymmetry—and are therefore more willing to engage in the market (Cheng 
et al., 2011). Asset liquidity has been found to be inversely associated with BAS (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986; Copeland & Galai, 1983) because reduced information asymmetry can decrease 
transaction costs (Dyer, 1997) and the situation associated with a more liquid market (Edwards, 
Harris, & Piwowar, 2007). Analysing the relationship between information asymmetry and BAS in 
the CSR context indicates that, the higher the levels of information asymmetry, the wider BAS 
should be (Copeland & Galai, 1983; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985). This effect reduces market 
liquidity and increases the cost of capital (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008; Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
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Prior research has found that there is a negative relation between the quality of IR disclosure and 
information asymmetry (Barth et al., 2017). Therefore, it is expected that companies with high 
quality disclosures to providers of financial capital can reduce information asymmetry measured 
through the BAS. The preceding discussion suggests the first hypothesis of this thesis: 
H1: There is a negative association between integrated report quality and stock 
liquidity. 
4.2 IR Quality and analyst forecast accuracy (H2)  
To understand and evaluate the determinants of integrated reporting in South Africa, this thesis 
seeks to determine the economic consequences of the quality of IRs and analyst forecast accuracy. 
Studies have shown that the disclosure of non-financial information is associated with lower analyst 
forecast error, suggesting that issuing CSR reports complements financial disclosure (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2012). Zhou et al. (2017) and Bernardi and Stark (2016) analysed this mandatory setting before 
the international IR framework (IIRF) was endorsed, published and announced by the South African 
IRC. Consistent with the CSR literature and using different quality measures, they support the 
theoretical virtues of IR, suggesting that IR quality is negatively associated with forecast error. 
The IR framework includes a new perspective: a focus on forward-looking information to provide a 
long-term vision about the value creation process over time, strongly focused on providers of 
financial capital. Firms with more comprehensive corporate governance disclosures have more 
accurate analyst earnings forecasts (Lang & Lundholm, 1996), to the extent that financial analysts 
who engage in greater use of forward-looking and internal-structure information offer more 
accurate forecasts (Orens & Lybaert, 2007). Therefore, issuing IR is expected to improve analyst 
forecast accuracy: analysts would be better equipped with long-term information. If this thesis uses 
an in-house ranking system to determine IR quality, and notes IR and CSR evidence, then it would 
be expected that the negative association between IR and forecast error would be tempered by the 
quality of the information disclosed. Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: There is a positive association between integrated report quality and analyst 
earnings forecast accuracy. 
4.3 IR assurance, market liquidity and analysts’ forecast accuracy (H3 and H4) 
The second part of this thesis considers the assurance of non-financial information. In South Africa, 
the assurance of sustainability information has become a mandatory de facto requirement through 
King III regulation: Principle 9.3 requires that sustainability reporting and disclosure be 
independently assured (IoDSA, 2009, p. 49). While the assurance of soft disclosures is not required 
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by regulation in most countries, it has grown significantly in recent years. In 2012, 46% of the 
reports listed on GRI’s Sustainability Disclosure Database indicated some external assurance (GRI, 
2013a). In 2015, 92% of the world’s 250 largest companies (G250) have presented corporate reports 
and almost two-thirds (63%) have been independently assured (KPMG, 2015).  
Given the existing mix of evidence analysed in Sub-section 3.4.1, it seems that, in settings where 
sustainability reports are issued voluntarily, the assurance of non-financial information is not 
always sufficient to reduce information asymmetry. Because little research has analysed the 
economic impact of IRA in a de facto compulsory setting (“apply or explain”), the South African 
regulation may allow firms to signal their quality/reputation to the stakeholders by assuring their IR. 
Companies with high levels of disclosure quality may have incentives to signal this quality to the 
market by assuring their non-financial disclosures, differentiating themselves from firms with lower 
quality disclosure. Companies with high levels of disclosure quality may have incentives to signal 
this quality to the market by assuring their non-financial disclosures, differentiating themselves 
from firms with lower quality disclosure. However, soft disclosures have been found less verifiable 
and easier to mimic than hard items (Clarkson et al., 2008). In relation to IR, Reimsbach, Hahn, and 
Gürtürk (2017) investigated whether the presentation of a standalone report or a set of reports 
interacts with the voluntary assurance of sustainability information. They experiment with 104 
professional analysts (most of them based in Germany) and found that the assurance of 
sustainability information positively affects professional investors’ evaluation of a firm’s 
sustainability performance. 
The literature has found that CSRA is influenced by media and regulatory pressures (Perego & 
Kolk, 2012). Companies also use the assurance of sustainability KPIs to reduce analyst forecast 
error (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Dhaliwal et al., 2012) and to enhance disclosure credibility (Perego 
& Kolk, 2012; Pflugrath et al., 2011) and firm reputation (Cohen & Simnett, 2015; Peters & Romi, 
2015; Simnett et al., 2009). Firm reputation has been associated with better firm performance 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) and future cash flow benefits (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Thus, one might 
expect that reducing the risk of the information presented through the IRA might be an appropriate 
solution for mitigating information asymmetry, considering that all businesses are required to 
present IR as well as its assurance. The preceding discussion suggests the following two 
hypotheses: 
H3: There is a negative association between IR assurance and a company’s stock 
liquidity. 
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H4: There is a positive association between the assurance of the non-financial 
information contained in the IR and analyst earnings forecast accuracy. 
4.3.1 Additional analysis: Assurance standards (H3b and H4b) 
 This thesis also analyses the effects of assurance standards on market liquidity and analyst forecast 
accuracy. During the last decade, the use of standards has been developed to facilitate the 
convergence of information presented because the scope and nature of a CSR/IR assurance 
engagement may vary depending on the type of industry, a company’s size and a firms’ motivation. 
The ISAE3000 and AA1000AS standards are most commonly referenced by assurance providers 
(CorporateRegister, 2008; GRI, 2013a), although the use of these two standards in South Africa is 
not exceptional: the King III code of corporate governance refers to them as a basis for the 
assurance of sustainability information (IRC, 2011). 
In December 2003, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) approved 
the International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 (IAASB, 2009), replacing 
ISAE100 of June 2000. The IAASB also acknowledged the importance of reviewing the ISAE3000 
to ensure the right scope was maintained. Consequently, after a consultation period, it approved the 
project proposal to revise ISAE3000 in March 2009 (IAASB, 2012). The document, “Assurance 
Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information”, provides inter 
alia that the assurance framework not include procedural requirements for the performance of 
assurance engagement. However, ISAE3000 “…establishes basic principles and essential 
procedures for all assurance engagements other than audits or reviews of historical financial 
information covered by ISAs or ISAEs” (IAASB, 2009, p. 1). 
The ISAE3000 (IAASB, 2013) is a general standard that covers assurance engagements other than 
audits or reviews of historical financial information. However, because not all engagements made 
by practitioners involve assurance, they are not covered by the ISAEs (e.g., agreed-upon procedures 
engagements and compilations of financial or other information, and the preparation of tax returns) 
(IAASB, 2004, p. 7). ISAE3000 can only be issued by professional accountants, because assurers 
must comply with the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by the International 
Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (GRI, 2013a). In the audit profession, it is compulsory to 
comply with the International Federation of Accountants’ Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants, and the assurance framework includes the standards issued by the IAASB (Ackers & 
Eccles, 2015). 
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In contrast, the AA1000AS is an internationally accepted open-source standard developed to 
advance responsible business practices—not only on sustainability, and environmental and social 
impacts, but also on stakeholder engagement (AccountAbility, 2008). In 2003, after a global 
consultation process of two years, AccountAbility (known fully as the Institute of Social and 
Ethical AccountAbility), published the first edition of the AA1000AS as the world’s first 
sustainability assurance standard; it aims to enhance the credibility and quality of sustainability 
performance and reporting (AccountAbility, 2008). The second edition, published in 2008 and 
currently in revision for publication in late 2017, was developed through a multi-stakeholder 
process in response to criticism that ISAE3000 focused primarily on professional accountants 
(IRAS, 2015). AA1000AS is principles-based, and is designed specifically for assuring 
sustainability reporting (CorporateRegister, 2008). Unlike ISAE3000, AA1000AS has a broader 
scope, covering the evaluation of specific sustainability performance information. It focuses 
exclusively on the assurance of CSR reports and, unlike ISAE3000, intends to be used 
specifically—but not exclusively—by sustainability assurance practitioners or non-accountant 
assurance providers (IRAS, 2015). 
Consistent with this is the finding that, in countries where the accounting profession is considered 
predominant, the ISAE3000 standard dominates the provision of sustainability assurance (Manetti 
& Becatti, 2009; Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012; Perego & Kolk, 2012). Also evident is that, where 
environmental specialists are the primary assurance providers, AA1000AS is preferred (Manetti & 
Toccafondi, 2012; O'Dwyer & Owen, 2005). More than 60% of the sustainability reports issued by 
the Global Fortune 250 used ISAE3000, 33% used AA1000AS (Simnett, 2012) and 26% have both 
(Manetti & Becatti, 2009). In effect, it is not unusual to find external verification that references 
both standards in the same report.  
Examples of this are British American Tobacco, and Coca-Cola Enterprise Limited,15 which, in the 
independent assurance statements to their CSR reports, declare that their independent assurance has 
been planned and performed following ISAE3000 and AA1000AS.16 Others have gone even 
further, following not only these two standards but also the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. While the GRI is not an assurance standard, it does provide the 
necessary guidelines for implementing CSR assurance (Ackers & Eccles, 2015; CorporateRegister, 
2008), by allowing companies to add a “plus” (+) as a self-declaration that external assurance was 
used for the report (GRI, 2011). As GRI guidelines, AA1000AS and ISAE3000 have been 
                                                             
15 See more at https://www.cokecce.com and https://www.bat.com. 
16 Some other companies that have external assurance in accordance with the AA1000AS and ISAE3000 are Keppel 
Corporation (http://www.kepcorp.com/), Associated British Food plc (http://www.abf.co.uk/), Nestle (www.nestle.com) 
and ANZ Bank (www.anz.com). 
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developed independently and are not in opposition or in conflict; therefore, assurance providers 
might reference them in different combinations (CorporateRegister, 2008). 
The primary standards used by companies listed on the JSE for providing assurance guidelines are 
ISAE3000 and AA1000AS (Ackers & Eccles, 2015). They were written to ensure the credibility 
and quality of assurance engagements and reporting (AccountAbility, 2008; IAASB, 2013). Thus, it 
might be expected that South African companies may try to differentiate themselves from others, 
sending a signal to the market about quality by using ISAE3000 and/or AA1000AS. The absence of 
internationally accepted assurance standards for CSR/IR reports may reduce the comparability of 
definitions, methodology and content, which may produce significant variation between countries in 
the type of assurance provided (Kolk & Perego, 2010; Perego & Kolk, 2012). 
Because the use of assurance standards might be associated with a higher quality of information to 
the market, the following sub-hypotheses are presented: 
H3b: There is a negative association between the use of assurance standards and a 
company’s stock liquidity. 
 
H4b: There is a positive association between the use of assurance standards and analyst 
earnings forecast accuracy. 
4.3.2 Additional analysis: Assurance quality (H3c and H4c) 
Although King III recommends the assurance of CSR reports, referring to the two most common 
assurance standards, it does not prescribe the components that should be assured, nor does it 
mention concepts such as procedures, scope or how the assurance process should be completed 
(Ackers & Eccles, 2015). As indicated in Appendix 1 (“Differences between reasonable assurance 
engagements and limited assurance engagements”), the scope of the assurance performed is 
associated with the level of assurance risk. The international assurance framework, consisting of 
ISAE3000 and AA1000AS, allows the auditor to indicate two levels of assurance: a reasonable and 
a limited assurance engagement. A reasonable level of verification tends to reduce the audit risk to 
the minimum levels and, sometimes, is rarely attainable or cost beneficial (IAASB, 2004). It is 
defined as the process by which the practitioner reduces engagement risk to an acceptably low level 
(IAASB, 2004), with sufficient means to frame the information as reliable, objective, clear and 
understandable (CorporateRegister, 2008). In a high level of assurance engagement, auditors have 
in-depth evidence from internal and external sources of information to ensure the reliability of the 
information presented by the company (AccountAbility, 2008). 
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On the other hand, limited assurance is less extensive in that it reduces error but not to very low or 
zero levels because it has limited evidence from internal parties (AccountAbility, 2008). While it 
reduces risk to acceptable levels, it is greater than for reasonable assurance (IAASB, 2004, 2013). A 
limited assurance process concludes that nothing has come to the attention of the assurer that the 
selective information audited is not presented fairly (CorporateRegister, 2008). It emphasises the 
plausibility of the information disclosed rather than its reliability (AccountAbility, 2008).  
Soft disclosures make it impossible to guarantee an absolute level of assurance (Manetti & Becatti, 
2009). For example, non-financial information is usually difficult to measure and validate and, 
therefore, it is difficult to achieve the highest levels of assurance for it (Ackers & Eccles, 2015). 
Unlike the assurance of financial statements, IRA and CSRA are still developing. The sustainability 
information disclosed by companies originates from different sources that usually are less reliable 
than those used for financial information (PWC, 2007). Due to the costs for reaching reasonable 
assurance can be significant, and also considering that CSRA is mostly voluntary, companies may 
opt for limited assurance (PWC, 2007). 
Nevertheless, in South Africa, different motivations are expected. Companies may engage in 
reasonable assurance for some performance indicators as a signal to the market that they stand apart 
from other market players. The higher the level of assurance, the more rigorous the assurance 
process, and the lower the associated risk (IAASB, 2004). Therefore, one might expect that a 
reasonable assurance process is associated with high levels of quality because of the amount of 
information covered, providing better information to investors and financial analysts. Using the 
level of assurance provided (reasonable assurance engagement and limited level of verification) as a 
proxy of assurance quality, the following sub-hypotheses are proposed: 
H3c: There is a negative association between assurance quality and a company’s stock 
liquidity. 
H4c: There is a positive association between assurance quality and analyst earnings 
forecast accuracy. 
It is also of interest to investigate whether the type of assurer is important. While it has been argued 
that the assurance of CSR reports enhances their credibility (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Cohen & 
Simnett, 2015), some challenges are associated with the type of assurer involved in the assurance 
engagement because of the nature of the soft disclosures and the variety of the information 
presented. The accounting profession and, in particular, the Big-Four accounting firms, dominate 
financial assurance. However, other assurers who focus mainly on evaluating sustainability 
performance are usually involved with the certification of a specific process rather than a complete 
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assurance report (GRI, 2013a). Such assurers are normally composed of environmental, CSR, and 
health and safety consultancies (CorporateRegister, 2008). Early evidence suggests that the effect—
and thus the quality—of the CSRA seems to be conditional on the type of assurer. The credibility of 
CSR reports is greater when assured by a professional accountant rather than sustainability experts 
(Pflugrath et al., 2011) because, as Simnett et al. (2009) suggest, the quality of accounting assurers 
is signiﬁcantly higher than that of consultants. Regarding the level of information assured, other 
assurance providers tend to present higher levels of assurance than accountants, despite concerns 
about the rigour of other providers’ methods (Ackers & Eccles, 2015). 
4.4 Combined assurance model (H5 and H6) 
The IIRC recognises the importance of improving credibility by focusing particularly on the role of 
independent assurers (IIRC, 2015a). It understands that companies use a variety of methods to 
enhance credibility, of which assurance is only one. In response, CAM presents itself as an 
innovative credibility-enhancing method (Simnett, Zhou, & Hoang, 2016; Zhou et al., 2016). 
Principle 3.5 of King III states that “The audit committee should ensure that a CAM is applied to 
provide a coordinated approach to all assurance activities” (IoDSA, 2009, p. 9). King III introduces 
CAM to improve assurance coverage and quality through better coordination of assurance providers 
(PWC, 2017). Once the strategy of external assurance is in place, “…a combined assurance model 
should be followed taking into account assurance provided by management, internal audit, external 
audit, and any other external assurance provider” (IRC, 2011, p. 17). In other words, the audit 
committee should ensure that the CAM “…is appropriate to address all the significant risks facing 
the company” (IoDSA, 2009, p. 33). 
It has been argued that an effective application of CAM should have three lines of defence as its 
backbone (IIA, 2013). Management control is the first line, followed by a variety of oversight 
functions (risk controls and compliance), with independent assurance as the third line (IIA, 2013). 
An effective CAM should be able to assure the board and audit committee that material risks are 
covered in accordance with the company’s capacity for risk (Ackers, 2016). 
The literature in this regard is not extensive: few studies analyse the implementation of CAM and 
its economic effects. Available results show that companies are still learning the implementation 
process, and demonstrating weak risk management because they lack experience in it (Decaux & 
Sarens, 2015; Prinsloo, Walker, Botha, Bruwer, & Smit, 2015; Shewangu, 2016). Decaux and 
Sarens (2015) are among the first to inform about factors affecting the implementation of CAM. 
They argue that a successful CAM depends on six factors: (1) the enterprise’s experience in risk 
management; (2) the level of existing knowledge and the benefits derived from CAM; (3) the 
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appointment of someone in charge of the project; (4) the identification of areas that need assurance 
based on board, executive, and stakeholder priorities; (5) the capacity to avoid duplication or gaps 
in the assurance process; (6) the release of a CAM report to the board and audit committee to allow 
them to exercise proper oversight. Studies have analysed the level of implementation in both the 
private and public sectors in South Africa. Findings indicate that small, medium and micro 
enterprises (SMMEs) lack adequate risk management because they lack CAM initiatives (Prinsloo 
et al., 2015). In the South African public sector, the application of CAM and the assurance 
provision need to be improved and fully implemented (Shewangu, 2016). 
South Africa is the best setting to evaluate the economic consequences of CAM because of 
existence of King III; empirical evidence so far suggests that the implementation of CAM does not 
add value to the South African market. Zhou et al. (2016) investigate whether there was an effect on 
analyst forecast dispersion through the implementation of CAM in South Africa between 2009 and 
2012. Although they did find a negative association between CAM and analysts’ forecast 
dispersion, they did not find a significant effect for analysts’ forecast error, suggesting that CAM 
enhances the reliability of the information disclosed but fails to provide new information to the 
capital market. 
While the little evidence available suggests that the implementation of CAM remains in progress, 
evolving in conjunction with the compulsory requirements of IR and IRA, its implementation may 
be seen to signal to the market that it is a credibility-enhancing mechanism of the assurance process 
and risk management. It is expected that the adequate coordination of internal risk management and 
external assurance may help managers reduce risk information for shareholders (reflected in less 
information asymmetry) and thus enhance the credibility of IR. If that happens, new valuable 
information to analysts, and therefore positive market effects, can be anticipated. This leads to 
Hypotheses 5 and 6: 
 
H5: There is a negative association between CAM implementation and a company’s 
stock liquidity. 
H6: There is a positive association between CAM implementation and analyst earnings 
forecast accuracy. 
4.5 Summary 
Chapter 4 described the hypotheses (and sub-hypotheses) developed in this study. It first discussed 
the expected relationships between both market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy to the 
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quality of information presented through IR and the assurance of non-financial information. An in-
depth analysis, the use of assurance standards, and the quality of the assurance performed were 
hypothesised in H3b/c and H4b/c. Finally, the implementation of CAM and its potential relationship 
with the market was discussed and stated in H5 and H6. The next chapter presents the research 
design, data, statistical models, and empirical results obtained after testing the hypotheses proposed 
in this section.  
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Chapter 5. Research design and results  
This research evaluates the effect of IR quality and IR assurance on both market liquidity (Study 1) 
and analysts forecast accuracy (Study 2). Section 5.1 describes the macro-sample of both studies, 
based on the Integrated Reporting and Assurance Services (IRAS) database. Sections 5.1.1 and 
5.1.3 explain the final sample used for Studies 1 and 2 respectively. Methodologies, empirical 
models and control variables are discussed in Sections 5.1.2 (Study 1) and 5.1.4 (Study 2). 
Descriptive statistics and principal results are presented in Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.4. Finally, 
conclusions and suggestions for future research are outlined in Section 5.3. 
5.1 Sample selection and empirical models 
The companies sampled in this study are those listed on the JSE from 2013 to 2015. The major 
factor driving the selection of this particular period was to analyse not only existing IR practice but 
also to investigate IR two years after King III came into force, when firms had time to develop a 
mature response to the changed reporting environment. Because IR became mandatory on an “apply 
or explain” basis for listed JSE firms from 2010, the sample period commences three years after this 
regulation came into place. Non-financial information has been found less verifiable and easier to 
mimic than financial information (Clarkson et al., 2008). Therefore, if there is some mimicking 
behaviour by poor IR performers, it is expected to occur after a few years of watching other firms 
that perform well in their non-financial information.  
The sample period used in this study also encompasses the period covering the promulgation of the 
International IR Framework (IIRF) in 2013 and its endorsement by the International Reporting 
Committee of South Africa in March 2014. This is in contrast to other IR research in this setting. 
For example, Zhou et al. (2017) used a sample of JSE listed firms from 2009 to 2012, Barth et al. 
(2017) sampled firms from 2011 to 2014, and Bernardi and Stark (2016) used a JSE sample from 
2008 to 2012. This research shows that analysis of the time period marking the start of the “apply or 
explain” regime allows disclosure behaviour to be observed from its inception. However, some 
firms were producing IR even before 2010 (Barth et al., 2017) and the release of the IIRF in 2013 
gave clear guidance to firms regarding the nature and purpose of IR.  
The starting point for sample selection in this thesis is the database compiled by IRAS, which is the 
basis for IR quality rankings used to develop the IR quality variable in this study: the Sustainability 
Disclosure Transparency Index (SDTI). IRAS is an independent consulting company based in 
Johannesburg with more than 16 years experience in providing independent third-party assurance of 
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sustainability content within integrated annual reports. With assurance provisions in 18 countries,17 
IRAS provides the most comprehensive annual review of environmental, social and governance 
reporting in South Africa (IRAS, 2015). One might expect that SDTI performers have sufficient 
governance in place to manage ESG matters within their material business risks and opportunities.  
IRAS offers a SDTI for 279 JSE companies in 2013, 288 in 2014, and 324 in 2015 (see Table 3, 
Panels A and B). In the period analysed, 45 firms had no consecutive score. Those companies were 
not selected as part of the final sample because a balanced panel data is used in both studies. 
Consequently, our timeframe is 2013 to 2015 for the 279 South African companies chosen. 
The SDTI is used as a proxy for IR quality. It assesses the accuracy, consistency, completeness and 
reliability of quantitative data for 84 indicators based on IR and GRI factors (IRAS, 2015). This 
index, which is adapted to the South African context, is subdivided into seven categories adapted to 
the Standard Disclosures (eight indicators), Economics (13), Governance (13), Labour (12), Health 
& Safety (12), Environmental (16) and Corporate Social Investment/Socio-Economic Development 
Spend indicators (ten indicators) (IRAS, 2015) (see Appendix 2). The SDTI uses a three-point scale 
where a 0-value represents an indicator where no data were identified in the annual and 
sustainability reports; a ranking score of 1 is deemed when there was a partial response,18 and a 
ranking of 2 when companies disclosed a reasonable response. By using dummy values, the SDTI 
database also offers information such as whether companies engaged to perform an independent 
assurance on non-financial information, and whether companies used assurance standards as a basis 
for assurance engagement—specifically standards AA1000AS and ISAE3000. 
The use of the SDTI as a proxy for IR quality differentiates the current study from other recent 
papers that evaluate quality reports in the South African setting. For example Barth et al. (2017) use 
a list of criteria based on the IR Framework (or a draft thereof prior to issue) to measure an EY 
score of the top-100 firms on the JSE. Bernardi and Stark (2016) use Bloomberg for ESG disclosure 
scores and Zhou et al. (2017) use a score derived from an index constructed in accordance with the 
IR Prototype Framework issued by the IIRC in 2012. IRAS, instead, produces an SDTI by 
experienced assurance providers in the South African setting.  
As the purpose of this research is to analyse the economic effects of IR on the South African 
market, the sample selection is divided into two studies. The next section describes the data 
availability of dependent and control variables—considering that different models are required—
that affect the final sample of each study. The effect of IR quality and assurance on market liquidity 
                                                             
17 IRAS has completed assurance engagements in Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, France, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
18 This occurs when quantitative data had to be calculated, estimated and/or sourced from documentation outside of 
what was clearly referenced within the report, or where the data presented seemed clearly incorrect 
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is presented in Section 5.1.1. Section 5.1.2 then describes the data and models proposed for Study 2, 
which focuses on the effect of IR quality and assurance on analyst forecast accuracy. 
5.1.1 Sample selection study 1: Information asymmetry 
The primary databases used for dependent and control variables were Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S in 
conjunction with Datastream and ASSET4. These databases cover the 170 largest companies listed 
on the JSE. After filtering for the dependent variable bid-ask spread (BAS), 131 companies 
presented a complete set of information for the three consecutive years. After checking the data 
availability for control variables—explained in Sub-section 5.1.1.2—the final sample consists of 
333 firm-year observations (111 unique firms) between 2013 and 2015 (see Table 4, Panel A). 
5.1.2 Empirical models Study 1 
Similarly to Barth et al. (2017) and Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm (2010), the BAS is used 
specifically as a proxy of stock liquidity and generally for information asymmetry. In a price-driven 
market, informed investors are less sensitive to adverse selection when the information asymmetry 
is small. They are thus motivated to participate actively in the market, resulting in lower BAS and 
increased market depth (Barth et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2011; Cho, Lee, & Pfeiffer, 2013). This 
suggests a positive association between the level of information asymmetry and the BAS. The 
literature indicates that BAS is measured as the median value of the natural logarithm of the daily 
difference between the ask and the bid closing prices divided by the midpoint (Cheng et al., 2011; 
Cho et al., 2013). The measurement period ranges from month -6 to month +6 relative to a firm’s 
fiscal year-end (Barth et al., 2017). A six-month window was chosen because companies’ IRs are 
publicly available a few months after the end of each fiscal year. That should enable the market to 
absorb the spread effects. Following Barth et al. (2017), the proxy was started before the end of the 
fiscal year (month -6) to account for leakage of information. 
This study commences its analysis by examining whether the quality of IR is associated with 
market liquidity in the South African market and, consequently, with the information asymmetry. 
To test Hypothesis 1, the SDTI score is used as a proxy for IR quality (Model 1). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, IR quality has been associated with market liquidity and company value (Barth et al., 
2017). Proponents of IR suggest that these reports have the potential to reduce information 
asymmetry (Barth et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2017). Consequently, a negative association is expected 
between IR quality and BAS. 
Consistent with the literature, a variety of control variables on the BAS were included in Model 1. 
The literature suggests that, in a capital market, outsiders may not have the same level and quality 
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of information as insiders. Insiders, by contrast, tend to have more information that may positively 
affect their ability to monitor and participate in the market (Cho et al., 2013). Institutional investors 
(INST_INV) are included as a control for informed investors and are measured as the percentage of 
total shares held as long-term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking a long-
term return. 
Following Cheng et al. (2011), analyst following (ANANO) and size (SIZE) are included as proxies 
for quality of information environment. Higher analyst following suggests more intense competition 
and greater incentives for financial analysts to enhance forecast accuracy (Dhaliwal et al., 2012) and 
mitigate the asymmetry of information (Barth & Hutton, 2004). Artiach, Lee, Nelson, and Walker 
(2010) suggest that firm size is an important determinant of corporate social performance. Large 
companies are more likely to be politically visible and attract greater attention from stakeholders, 
government and the general public. Larger firms may produce better information, and businesses 
with a larger analyst following can reduce information asymmetry (Cheng et al., 2011).  
Barth et al. (2017) analysed the South African environment to find a positive and significant 
association between BAS and firm complexity. They suggest that complex businesses may find 
integration harder to implement into their business model. Therefore, the literature offers different 
ways to measure complexity and identifies both internal and external observable characteristics. To 
control for this effect, I use two internal and two external control variables as a proxy of firm 
complexity (COMPLEX). To measure internal complexity, higher research and development 
(R&D) expenditure and the ratio market to book value of assets (MVBVA) are used as a proxies for 
more complex firms (Markarian & Parbonetti, 2007). These proxies deal with intangible assets and 
knowledge, which are the primary drivers of business growth (Gu & Lev, 2010). Higher growth 
opportunities have also been associated with the complexity of a firm (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & 
Smith, 2004). As a proxy for external complexity, I use cross-listed companies (CROSSLISTED) 
and the sales to industry ratio (SALES_IND). It has been argued that cross-listed companies are 
more complex than purely domestic firms (Hope, 2003) and that the more sales a company has 
within its industry group, the more likely it will be subject to market pressure (Markarian & 
Parbonetti, 2007). The percentage of a firm’s sales of the total sales within its industry is calculated 
(Sales to Industry ratio, SALES_IND). Variables are derived for the discussion and displayed in 
Appendix 3. Model 1 is used to test H1 as follows: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑋 
4
𝑖𝑡
 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ ℇ𝑖𝑡     (1)   
To test the relationship between the assurance of IR and a company’s stock liquidity (Hypothesis 3), 
Model 1 was modified to include the variable of interest (ASS) as Model 2. It represents the 
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assurance of non-financial information contained in annual or sustainability reports. This dummy 
variable takes a value of 1 if an external provider assured the IR, and 0 otherwise. While the 
literature on CSR assurance returns mixed results, IR assurance has been associated with market 
responses such as stock liquidity and firm value (Barth et al., 2017). Thus, it is expected that the 
assurance of non-financial information in the South African compulsory environment enhances the 
credibility of the information disclosed and consequently affects capital flows. 
Model 2 to test H3 is: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3 𝑡𝑜 9𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
7
𝑖𝑡
 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡       (2)   
Additional testing examines whether SPREAD is sensitive to the use of assurance standards (H3b). 
To test the association between the use of assurance standards and stock liquidity, the dummy 
variable ASS_STD was included in Model 2. This is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
company assured their sustainability information following AA1000AS and/or ISAE3000 assurance 
standards, and 0 otherwise. Additional testing also examines whether the results are sensitive to the 
type of standard followed. As previously discussed, the assurance of non-financial information and 
the use of assurance standards have been developed to assure the credibility and quality of 
sustainability performance and reporting so that a negative association is expected with market 
liquidity. 
In an additional analysis, the effect of the assurance quality on market liquidity is tested (H3c) by 
creating the QUA_ASS variable. This is a manually-collected variable from annual and 
sustainability reports that represents the scope of the information assured. According to the 
international assurance framework, two types of assurance engagement can be performed by 
external parties: a reasonable assurance engagement and a limited assurance engagement (IAASB, 
2004). It is also possible to have limited and reasonable assurance in one engagement for different 
sustainability performances that must be clearly identified in the assurance statement 
(AccountAbility, 2008). The international standards permit a level of information assured from 
combined sources, arguing that the conclusions of the assurance providers should accord with the 
level of assurance engaged: “reasonable or high” and/or “limited or moderate” (AccountAbility, 
2008). Procedures performed by audit firms to obtain a limited level of assurance are aimed at 
determining the plausibility of information assured. They are less extensive in scope than those 
performed to obtain a reasonable level of assurance. When limited assurance is provided, the 
engagement is referred to as a review. In contrast, when reasonable assurance is provided, the 
engagement is referred to as an audit (PWC, 2007). 
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Consequently, the level of assurance engaged thus is associated with the level of risk acceptable to 
the company. Therefore, I expect that the higher the level of information assured, the better the 
information that will be presented as reasonable assurance will focus on the reliability of the 
information disclosed rather than its plausibility (AccountAbility, 2008). To capture the effect of 
the level of information covered as a proxy of assurance quality, the variable QUA_ASS was 
developed that takes the value of 1 if companies do not disclose the level of assurance covered, a 
value of 2 if the assurance performed was limited, a value of 3 if there is a combination between 
limited and reasonable assurance service in one engagement for different sustainability 
performances, and a value of 4 if there is a high level of assurance (reasonable). Fuhrmann et al. 
(2017) find that only a high assurance level of sustainability reports helps increase the credibility of 
the non-financial information reported and thus helps reduce information asymmetries. It is 
expected, therefore, that, whether or not assurance quality affects market liquidity, this effect should 
be manifested in a high-quality assurance process. Therefore, to evaluate H3c, four independent 
variables are incorporated in this analysis: (1) Undisclosed (UND) (where the information could not 
be found in published reports); (2) limited assurance (Limited_ASS); (3) limited and reasonable 
(Lim_&_Rea_ASS); (4) reasonable assurance performed (Reasonable_ASS). 
The literature argues that non-auditors usually perform to high levels of assurance, whereas 
accounting firms tend to provide negatively-framed, limited conclusions (Ackers & Eccles, 2015; 
GRI, 2013a). CorporateRegister (2008) found that 83% of the independent assurance reports by 
accounting firms (Big-Four) state a limited assurance level, while certification bodies and specialist 
consultancies are far more likely to frame their conclusions positively (92% and 73% respectively). 
South Africa shows no difference: 100% of specialist consultancies provided a reasonable assurance 
before King III came into force, while 67% of the accounting firms provided limited assurance 
engagement (Ackers, 2009). Consequently, in this research, sensitivity analyses are used to evaluate 
whether the level of assurance undertaken is associated with the type of assurer. 
Finally, to test the association between the Combined Assurance Model (CAM) and market 
liquidity (H5), the former is incorporated into Model 3. This is a hand-collected dummy variable 
that is coded 1 if the company disclosed the application of CAM, and 0 otherwise. Implementing 
CAM is a listing requirement of King III. It represents the coordinated assurance process for all 
parties involved (internal and external audit), beginning with the audit committee that is primarily 
responsible for developing and overseeing the CAM (Simnett et al., 2016). CAM may be seen as a 
mechanism that improves risk management and a firm’s governance by coordinating internal 
control and external verification. CAM relies on identifying a company’s risks and whether these 
have been appropriately managed and disclosed to the board through the audit committee. It also 
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integrates and aligns the assurance process to maximise the oversight of company risk and 
governance in order to optimise overall assurance to the audit and risk committee (IoDSA, 2009). 
Although there is little evidence about the level of CAM implementation and its possible market 
effects, it can be seen as both a risk management tool and an assurance practice that improves 
reporting to the board and company committees. This suggests two ways to improve the credibility 
and usefulness of assurance: improving risk management and governance, and enhancing the 
coordination of assurance providers’ activities (Simnett et al., 2016). It follows that a negative 
association is expected between CAM implementation and market liquidity. 
Models include year and industry fixed effects. ℇ represents the error term. Variables are specified 
as per Appendix 3 and the preceding discussion. Hypotheses are tested using a balanced panel data 
in STATA software by estimating the following ordinary least square (OLS) regression in equation 
Model 3: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3 𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑡𝑜 10 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
7
𝑖𝑡
 + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ ℇ𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                               (3)   
5.1.3 Sample selection Study 2: Analyst forecast accuracy 
To obtain financial analyst data for Study 2, the main data sources were Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S 
in conjunction with Datastream, which covers the 170 largest firms in the South African market. 
After filtering for forecast error data, the sample was reduced to 120 companies. Finally, after 
checking the available data of financial analysts, assurance, and control variables, the final sample 
of 297 firm-year observations was arrived at during the period under study (99 unique firms, see 
Table 8, Panel A). Together, these companies issued a total of 297 reports, with 132 assured 
(44.4%).19 They were all assured by external parties, and 81% (107 reports) were assured by 
accounting firms (88.8% of these by the Big-Four). More than 54% of companies are concentrated 
in the basic materials and financial industry sectors (see Table 8, Panel B). 
5.1.4 Empirical models Study 2 
To analyse the relationship between the quality of IR and analyst earnings forecast accuracy (H2), 
the model developed by Dhaliwal et al. (2012) was adapted for the South African setting. The 
dependent variable is analyst forecast accuracy. Analyst forecast error will be used to inversely 
measure analyst forecast accuracy in three consecutive periods. Forecast error is defined as the 
                                                             
19 43.4% of the reports present external assurance for non-financial information, different to regulatory requirements. 
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average of the absolute errors of all forecasts made in the year for target earnings, scaled by the 
stock price at the beginning of the year (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Hope, 2003). 
𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅(𝑌)𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ ⌊𝐴𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡,𝑗
𝑌  −  𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑌 ⌋𝑁𝑗=1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
           (4) 
Where: 
𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅(𝑌)𝑖𝑡: The average absolute error of all forecasts made during the year for target earnings, scaled by stock 
price at the beginning of the year. 
Following Dhaliwal et al. (2012), the indicator Y takes three values—0, 1 or 2—which represent 
target earnings and the forecast for the current year, and one and two years ahead respectively. 
Subscripts 𝑖, 𝑡, and 𝑗 represent firm 𝑖, at year 𝑡, and forecast 𝑗. AEF abbreviates “analyst earnings 
forecast”, while EPS stands for “earnings per share”. The indicator P represents the stock price 
obtained at the time of the forecast. The study is limited to a maximum of two years because, 
typically, analysts do not offer a forecast beyond the second fiscal year, and the sample size 
decreases dramatically for projections made three years ahead (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). 
To investigate the relationship between IR quality and analyst earnings forecast accuracy, sample 
firms were assigned their SDTI score from the IRAS dataset. Consistent with the literature, seven 
control variables were also included in Model 5. The IIRF allows companies to prepare IR either as 
a standalone report or included as a distinguishable part of the annual report. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) 
find that stand-alone voluntary disclosure, as a proxy of non-financial information, is associated 
with lower analyst forecast error. Included in Model 5 is the control variable STAND that equals 1 
if the company issues a stand-alone IR during the year, and 0 otherwise. Also, included is analyst 
following (ANANO): higher analyst following suggests more intense competition and, thus, greater 
incentive for financial analysts to enhance forecast accuracy (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). ANANO is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the analyst yearly following for a firm.  
The model controls for a number of variables previously associated with forecast accuracy. The 
literature shows that firm size and analyst following are positively associated with forecast accuracy 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2012). The control for firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of 
market value at the end of the fiscal year. Additionally, the variable (VAREARN) controls for 
earnings volatility, which is negatively related to earnings predictability and, therefore, more 
difficult for analysts to forecast (Dichev & Tang, 2009). VAREARN is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the time-series standard deviation of earnings per share. 
Loss-making firms are denoted with a dummy variable (LOSS) equal to 1 if the company reported a 
loss for the period and 0 otherwise. Analysts’ forecasts of companies with losses are generally less 
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accurate than of firms with profit. Hope (2003) argues that company losses make earnings more 
volatile in markets with more conservative accounting systems. Multi-listed firms are controlled 
through the dummy variable (CROSSLISTED). The literature concludes that, because multi-
jurisdictional firms are more visible, they are more likely to engage in higher quality reporting. 
Hope (2003) adds that multi-listed companies have greater market pressure to improve information 
disclosure. Higher quality of disclosure is expected to improve analyst forecast accuracy.  
Consistent with the literature, control was made for the number of days that elapse between the 
earnings forecast and the earnings announcement date (FHORIZON) (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). 
Predictions close to the time when earnings are announced are likely to be more accurate than those 
issued earlier (García & Sánchez, 2006). Finally, I control for industry by using the dummy variable 
IND because the extent of analyst accuracy can vary according to the type of industry. In summary, 
Model 5 is used to test H2, as follows: 
𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅 (𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 =𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑁𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐹𝐻𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑍𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡       (5) 
ℇ𝑖𝑡 represents the error term. Variables are specified as per Appendix 3 and the discussion above. 
To test the relationship between the assurance of non-financial information and analyst earnings 
forecast accuracy (H4), ASS is included in Model 6. In addition, the interaction term SDTI×ASS 
was included to investigate the relationship, if any, between IR quality, assurance and the ability of 
financial analysts to accurately value the firm. This assumes that the assurance of soft disclosures 
improves company reputation (Cohen & Simnett, 2015), and thus affects company financial 
performance (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Furthermore, stockholders—motivated by a desire to mitigate 
information asymmetry—influence managers to disclose additional information by signalling it 
through the act of selecting an auditor (Bar-Yosef & Livnat, 1984). The risk emerges when some 
companies may not be responsible corporate citizens but use greenwashing disclosures to create the 
benefits of appearing to be a green company and are, therefore, perceived favourably by their 
stakeholders (Ackers & Eccles, 2015).  
In South Africa, different motivations are expected for the assurance of non-financial information. 
While a broad range of stakeholders may use the information disclosed in IR, the IR framework 
primarily focuses on providers of financial capital. It adopts integrated thinking to reduce 
duplication, thus encouraging consistency in the information presented. The assurance of non-
financial information may positively affect the evaluation by financial analysts of the performance 
of a company operating sustainably. Therefore, good environmental performers will tend to 
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differentiate themselves from competitors by assuring their soft disclosures with the aim of sending 
a signal to the shareholders. A negative association is expected between IRA and analyst forecast 
error. 
𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅 (𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 =𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3(𝑆𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 𝑡𝑜 10𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
7
𝑖𝑡
 
+  𝛽5 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡                (6) 
Depending on the conditions of the market under analysis, different motivations are expected for 
those engaged in strategic voluntary assurance. One motivation might be associated with using 
generally accepted assurance standards to signify good corporate citizenship to the market. This 
thesis investigates whether the use of assurance standards is associated with analyst earnings 
forecast accuracy. Model 7 contains the test for H4b, ASS_STD. Owing to the increase in CSR 
reports assured and the variety of information they present (financial and non-financial 
information), assurance standards may help to ensure proper audit processes to unify the level of the 
verification provided by accounting and non-accounting organisations. Additional analyses 
investigate whether results are driven by specific international assurance standards and which type 
of assurers are used. Standards AA1000AS and ISAE3000 are incorporated in Model 7 as variables 
of interest. Regarding the association between assurance standards and assurance providers, 
accounting firms tend to draw more frequently on ISAE3000, while consultant assurance providers 
prefer AA1000AS or other national standards (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012; Perego & Kolk, 2012). 
Consequently, further evaluation is made of the relationship between the type of assurer, the type 
assurance standards used, and the level of information covered. As in Study 1, the level of 
assurance is used in Model 7 to analyse the effect of assurance quality on analyst forecast error 
(H4c). Additional analyses evaluate whether this effect, or any, is associated with the level of 
information assured. Limited assurance (Limited_ASS) is used to do so, and limited and reasonable 
(Lim_&_Rea_ASS) and reasonable assurance performed (Reasonable_ASS) in Model 7. 
Finally, I also use CAM in Model 7 to analyse the relationship between the application of CAM and 
analyst forecast accuracy. South Africa is the best setting to evaluate the economic consequences of 
CAM application because it is bound by King III. While CAM seeks to maximise assurance 
coverage of areas of risk affecting the organisation, its implementation is progressing and evolving 
in conjunction with the assurance of IR. The appropriate implementation of CAM should assist 
managers in reducing information risk and thus enhancing the credibility of companies’ reports. 
This model, which aims to deliver high-quality data, should help improve information management 
for better decision making by integrating internal control with external assurance. If this is so, a 
negative association is expected with analyst forecast error. Variables are explained in Section 5.1, 
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Sub-section 5.1.2, and Appendix 3. Models include year and industry fixed effects. Hypotheses are 
tested using a balanced panel data in STATA software by estimating the following OLS regression: 
𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅 (𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑥𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5 𝑡𝑜 11 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
7
𝑖𝑡
 +  𝛽6 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ℇ𝑖𝑡       (7) 
5.2. Results 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics study I: Market liquidity 
The sample selection is divided into two studies because the different models required affect the 
availability of data for the dependent and control variables. The sample description for Study 1 is 
shown in Table 4, Panel A.20 The final sample is composed of 333 firm-year observations (111 
companies per year), of which 60% of the companies (199 reports) disclosed their IR information 
through a stand-alone report rather than a set of reports. Together, 37.8% of the total sample (126 
reports) presented independent assurance on their soft disclosures, and most were completed by 
accounting firms (93 reports, of which 81 were assured by the Big-Four). Consistent with previous 
such research, ISAE3000 was predominantly used to provide assurance service in South Africa. It 
was referenced in 100 independent reports, compared to 30 reports that referenced AA1000AS. Six 
reports referenced both. Regarding the level of information assured, the majority of the firms chose 
to engage limited assurance over specific aspects rather a full audit (75 of 126 reports audited). In 
contrast, 32 independent assurance reports presented a combination of limited and reasonable 
assurance engagement, while only six showed a reasonable assurance process. Of the total sample, 
56 companies disclosed the amount of research and development expense, and 97 firms traded in 
more than one market. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the industry composition of the South African market. The majority of 
companies are distributed among financial and basic material industries.21 This is not surprising, 
considering that the South African economy has been seen as a leader in outputs of platinum, 
palladium, gold and coal (DTI & Deloitte, 2014). Table 4, Panel C, presents the descriptive 
statistics for Study 1. The mean (median) of the dependent variable SPREAD is -5.649 (-5.83), 
while the SDTI presents a mean (median) of 0.475 (0.476) out of a maximum possible score of 1 in 
                                                             
20 Descriptive statistics for Study 2 and its principal results are presented in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 respectively. 
21 Similarly, Barth et al. (2017) show an industry composition mainly clustered in both basic material and financial 
sectors. 
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the study period (this consistent with the literature).22 Since 2013, the SDTI has increased over eight 
percentage points (41.67% to 49.85%) compared with the initial year of evaluation. This reflects the 
learning period of companies since IR came into effect in 2010 and the IIRF was published in 2013. 
Finally, of the sample of 111 companies per year, 59 disclosed the use of CAM in 2013, 68 in 2014, 
and 78 in 2015 (61% of the total sample = 205 reports). 
[INSERT TABLE 4, PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4, PANEL C ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 sets out Pearson’s (Spearman) correlation coefficients for the regression analysis. An 
examination of the correlation matrix indicates a negative and significant association among the 
main variables of interest: SPREAD, SDTI, ASS, and CAM. The correlation matrix suggests that 
variables of interest are not strongly correlated. To test the severity of multicollinearity in the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions analysis, the variance inflation factor (VIF) and its 
tolerance was tested (defined as 1/VIF) (O’brien, 2007). VIF for Models 1, 2 and 3 was 1.36, 1.51 
and 1.52 respectively. Control variables SIZE and ANANO presented the biggest values with 2.1 
and 1.964 in Model 3, and thus correlated more with the dependent variable. All other variables 
show a VIF under 2, suggesting that these models do not present multicollinearity problems.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.2 Principal results Study I 
Table 6 contains the results for the BAS consistent with H1, H3 and H5. Using OLS to estimate the 
parameters proposed, the coefficients of the three variables of interest—SDTI, ASS, and CAM—
show a negative and significant association before and after adding control variables. In the first 
instance, the BAS association with the market was evaluated, specifically with the quality of the 
information presented through IR. After testing H1 in Model 1, SDTI was found to be negative and 
highly significant (-0.723; p < 0.000), meaning that companies with a better IR quality score have 
smaller BAS and, therefore, higher liquidity. In particular, the regression results suggest that a one-
unit increase in the quality of IR disclosure (SDTI) decreases the scaled BAS by 72.3%. Similar 
research (e.g., (Barth et al., 2017) finds that these results support the first hypothesis, suggesting 
that the quality of IR is associated with a smaller BAS (higher liquidity), thereby mitigating the 
                                                             
22 Barth et al. (2017), analysing a similar context in South Africa, present a SPREAD mean (median) of -5.97 (-6.00). 
Their quality proxy that was obtained from an Ernst and Young score presenting a mean (median) of 53.44% (53.73%). 
In contrast, the mean disclosure score of the IRs used by Zhou et al. (2017) in a sample study before the IR Framework 
was published (from 2009 to 2012), was 6.273 out of a maximum possible score of 31 (20.23%), reflecting the early 
stage of producing IRs. 
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information asymmetry. In an industry analysis (not tabulated), this negative and significant 
association between SDTI and SPREAD is driven mainly by those companies belonging to the 
industrial (-1.818, p < 0.005) and financial industries (-0.623, p < 0.049). As expected, control 
variables INST_INV, ANANO, and SIZE are negatively and significantly associated with BAS at 
the 0.01 level. In contrast, the firm complexity proxies used in Model 1 do not show a significant 
effect on SPREAD. 
Similar results were found by using the second variable of interest in Model 2; H3 posits that the 
assurance of non-financial disclosures has a negative association with SPREAD. As expected, H3 is 
supported, having a negative and significant association (-0.116; p < 0.067) with the proxy of 
market liquidity. In terms of economic significance, results suggest that the assurance of 
sustainability KPIs is associated with an 11.6% decrease in BAS. The SDTI remains significant (-
0.525, p < 0.007) as well as the control variables mentioned above. These results support the idea 
that a high quality of information presented, plus the assurance of soft disclosures, increases the 
liquidity of the market when the information risk is reduced. These results confirm that IR and its 
assurance have the potential to mitigate information asymmetry in a de facto compulsory setting 
like South Africa. Industry fixed-effect analysis (not tabulated) indicates that industries with a 
significant estimate on SPREAD through the assurance of soft disclosures are the financial (-0.323; 
p < 0.008) and basic materials (-0.427; p < 0.002) sectors. 
To better understand if reducing the information risk influences market liquidity, the third variable 
of interest, CAM, is used in Model 3. H5 tests the relationship between implementing a CAM and 
market liquidity. Model 3 in Table 6 shows that the existence of a CAM is statistically significant, 
with a 9.3% decrease in BAS (-0.093; p < 0.058). Also, SDTI and ASS remain in a negatively 
significant association with BAS (-0.453 and -0.129; p < 0.022 and 0.042 respectively).23 
Regarding control variables, Models 1 to 3 (see Table 6) support the prediction of Cho et al. (2013) 
that institutional investors have more information than outsiders, thus positively affecting the ability 
to participate in the market (-0.84, -0.948, -0.947; p < 0.000 Models 1 to 3). Additionally, and 
consistent with the research, control variables ANANO and SIZE, as proxies for a quality 
information environment, present a high negative correlation with SPREAD. As expected, larger 
firms with a larger number of analysts following tend to reduce their information asymmetry. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                             
23 The regressions include industry-fixed effects and are estimated using OLS for the coefficient estimates. To check 
whether the results identified are robust using alternate model specifications, the regressions were re-run using linear 
and random effects models. Consistent with my findings, the results (not tabulated) remain stable. In addition, sensitive 
analyses calculating the robust standard error clustered by firm and year, and the use of a different proxy of IR quality, 
are specified and described in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2. 
 53 
 
Additional analyses explore in depth the effects of assurance on market liquidity—specifically on 
whether the type of assurer, the use of an international assurance standard, the type of standard, and 
the quality of the assurance engaged by companies mitigate information asymmetry. Using Model 3 
for this analysis, Table 7 shows the regression results for H3b and H3c. Whether the type of audit 
firm influences the significance previously obtained in H3 was first analysed. The results shown in 
column 3A indicate that, while accounting and non-accounting firms associate negatively with 
SPREAD, the assurance effect is driven mainly by accounting assurers, because it is significant at 
the 0.05 level (-0.133; p < 0.048). In contrast, other assurers (specialists and consultancies) are not 
statistically significant. Table 7, Column 3B, shows the regression used to test whether the use of 
assurance standards affects market efficiency. As expected in H3b, the use of assurance standards 
ISAE3000 and/or AA1000AS associates negatively and significantly with a company’s stock 
liquidity. A deep analysis of the use of a particular standard, illustrated in Column 3C, suggests that 
the negative association is driven by those companies using ISAE3000 as a guide to the assurance 
process (-0.155; p < 0.017). In contrast, AA1000AS is not statistically significant (0.042; p < 
0.641). 
Finally, the quality of assurance is analysed in Column 3D. Owing to the nature of soft disclosures, 
it is expected that the quality of assurance performed is positively associated with the level of 
information covered. The results in Table 7 support these predictions, suggesting that companies 
with a limited level of assurance do not significantly associate with SPREAD (-0.102; p < 0.116). 
However, firms that engaged in both a limited and reasonable assurance in the same report for 
different sustainability performance present a negative and significant association (-0.262; p < 
0.007). A similar situation is found for those companies that disclose a reasonable assurance for 
sustainability KPIs (-0.369; p < 0.041). These findings show that the quality of the audit performed 
influences a company’s stock liquidity, thus mitigating the information asymmetry. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.2.1 Additional analysis study 1. Robust standard errors 
The standard errors were clustered by firm and year to examine the robustness of these findings. 
The results contained in Appendix 4, Panel A, support the association between market liquidity 
(measured through the BAS) and both IR quality and the implementation of a CAM in South 
Africa. However, while the results do not show a significant association between BAS and the 
assurance of sustainability information, the evidence in Model 3, Appendix 4, supports the 
predictions of Hypotheses 1, 3 and 5, showing a negative and significant relationship between BAS 
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and the main variables of interest: IR quality (-0.46, p < 0.021), the assurance of sustainability KPIs 
(-0.109, p < 0.086), and the implementation of a CAM (-0.093, p < 0.054).  
Further test results shown in Appendix 4, Panel B, support the main findings regarding the 
assurance of sustainability KPIs in South Africa. The results of the robustness checks are evidence 
that the use of assurance standards influences market liquidity, having a negative and significant 
association with SPREAD. In a sensitivity analysis, the effect is associated with the use of 
ISAE3000AS. Consistent with the notion that the level of assurance engagement matters to 
investors, when the assurance variable is subdivided into limited and reasonable engagement, a 
negative and statistically significant association is found between the level of information assured 
and market liquidity. As expected, sensitivity analyses suggest that the market does not react for 
those companies that engage in a limited audit because significant results are only associated with 
the reasonable assurance process. Therefore, the results corroborate those found in the main 
analysis that provides support for Hypotheses 1, 3, 3a, 3b, and 5.  
 [INSERT APPENDIX 4 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT APPENDIX 4 PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.2.2 Alternative measures of IR quality 
My results are consistent with the early literature on IR (see, for example, Barth et al. (2017) 
suggesting a positive association between market liquidity and the quality of the information 
disclosure. In the main analyses of this thesis, the quality of IR was measured using the SDTI, an 
in-house quality proxy designed by a South African assurance firm (IRAS) that provides a score 
quality based on aspects of IR and GRI. However, given the significant variation in the quality of 
information presented and the inevitable subjectivity that goes into the coding process, additional 
analyses are shown in Appendix 5.  
Following Bernardi and Stark (2016) and Zhou et al. (2017), a different proxy for IR quality is used 
to mitigate this limitation. Unlike other ESG database providers that usually offer information about 
a company’s social performance, Thomson Reuters incorporates economic performance as an 
additional pillar to reflect a balanced view of a company. This overall Economic, Environmental, 
Social and Governance (EESG) score is an example of how a firm’s financial and non-financial 
disclosures can be equally weighted. The literature suggests that CSR performance reduces 
information asymmetry when it is calculated through the BAS (Cho et al., 2013). Therefore, 
considering that IR aims to support integrated thinking between the all functional units and the 
capital—financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural—used by 
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companies, this quality proxy is used to evaluate IR disclosures. Consequently, an equally weighted 
rating of a firm’s performance consists of four pillars—(1) economic, (2) environmental, (3) social, 
and (4) corporate governance—incorporated from the main models studied. Appendix 5, Panels A 
and B, show that the use of a different IR quality proxy produces similar results to those obtained 
from the main analysis when testing H1, H3 and H5. The results of the proposed hypotheses hold, 
concluding that improvement in IR disclosure, the assurance of sustainability performance, the use 
of assurance standards, and the implementation of a CAM have the potential to reduce information 
asymmetry. 
[INSERT APPENDIX 5 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT APPENDIX 5 PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.3 Descriptive statistics study 2. Analyst forecast accuracy 
Table 8, Panel C, shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control 
variables. The yearly SDTI mean (median) for companies analysed in the sample and ranked by 
IRAS were 0.443 (0.441), 0.524 (0.541) and 0.513 (0.518) for 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively. 
The period mean (median) was 0.493 (0.494) (with a possible maximum of 1), close to the mean of 
0.53 reported by Barth et al. (2017) who used, as a quality score, the information reported by Ernst 
and Young in its Excellence in Integrated Reporting awards survey.24 No outliers were found in the 
IRAS quality proxy. The mean (median) of the dependent variable FERROR was 0.034 (0.010), 
0.045 (0.021) and 0.054 (0.030) for the current, one-year-, and two-year-ahead forecasts. Of the 
total sample, 44% of the companies presented their non-financial information as assured by external 
parties (131 reports), of which 27 referenced AA1000AS and 110 reports ISAE3000. Six referenced 
both standards. Consistent with prior research, ISAE3000 is the most common standard used by 
audit firms. The mean (median) of assurance quality is 1.522 (1) to a maximum of four. Following 
King III, the implementation of CAM has increased during the study period: 59, 68 and 77 
companies disclosed the use of CAM in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. Of 299 reports analysed, 
126 were presented as stand-alone rather than a set. The mean (median) of the natural logarithm of 
analyst following was 1.62 (1.78). In the three years analysed, the minimum of analysts following a 
company was one while the maximum was 16 in 2013 and 2014, and 18 in 2015. Of the total 
sample, 270 are cross-listed companies, while 28% experienced losses. The mean (median) of SIZE 
and VAREAN were 14.275 (1.779) and 0.112 (0.159) respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 8, PANEL C ABOUT HERE] 
                                                             
24 A survey of integrated reports of South Africa’s top 100 JSE-listed companies 
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Table 9 illustrates the Pearson’s (Spearman) correlations coefficients below (above) for the 
regression analysis of 299 firm-year observations for 99 companies in the period between 2013 and 
2015. The quality of IRs (SDTI) is negatively correlated with forecast error (FERROR) for all three 
forecasting horizons. There is also a significant positive association between quality of IR (SDTI) 
and analysts following (ANANO). To test multi-collinearity problems in the main regressions, the 
VIF and tolerance (defined as 1/VIF) for each variable were analysed. Both methods are widely 
used measures of the degree of multicollinearity (O’brien, 2007). Because the overall mean VIF 
(tolerance) in Model 5 for FY1, FY2 and FY3 (see Table 9, Panel A) to test H2 was 1.51 (0.662), 
there is less likely to be multi-collinearity problems that may affect the results. Some scholars and 
advanced statistical textbooks suggest that VIF values that are greater than 10 may merit further 
investigation (O’brien, 2007). For H4 in Model 6 (Table 9, Panel B), the mean VIF (tolerance) was 
6.6 (0.151). This value is increased mainly due to the interaction between the variables ASS and 
SDTI×ASS. In additional testing, I examine the VIF effect on regression 6 by removing the variable 
SDTI×ASS. The mean VIF (tolerance) is reduced to 1.61 (0.621), without significant changes in my 
principal regression results. Similarly, Model 7, including the variable CAM, presents a mean VIF 
(tolerance) of 6.14 (0.162), mainly influenced by the highest value of the interaction between ASS 
and SDTI×ASS. My additional analysis shows that the mean VIF (tolerance) is reduced to 1.57 
(0.637) without considering the interaction mentioned. This effect did not affect the main results of 
regression 6. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.4 Main results study 2 
Table 10 presents the results by estimating the OLS regressions for the main variables of interest in 
H2, H4 and H6. Regressions without control variables and Hypothesis 2 are showed in Panel A, for 
which I used a fixed effects model for regressions 5 to 7. Additionally, to ensure that results are not 
driven by extreme values, variables were winsorised at both the 1 and 99 percentile. 
Similar to Zhou et al. (2017) and Dhaliwal et al. (2012), and consistent with the CSR literature, the 
results of Model 5 support H2, indicating that IR quality is has a significant negative association 
with FERROR for the three forecasting horizons (-0.113, -0.098, -0.098; p < 0.009, 0.02, 0.021; for 
FY1, FY2 and FY3 respectively). I found that the coefficients estimated on SDTI for the three fiscal 
years (-0.113, -0.098, and 0.098) correspond to an average decrease of 86%. These findings suggest 
that while IR disclosure is associated with improved analyst forecast accuracy, it seems to be 
stronger in a short-term forecast than a long-horizon projection. After analysis of the control 
variables, it appears that analyst forecast errors are higher for firms with volatile returns. Findings 
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show that VAREARN is significantly associated with FERROR, and that SIZE becomes highly 
significant for the three fiscal years analysed. 
Further analysis of industry fixed effects (not tabulated) indicates that firms in the basic materials 
industry sector are driving the main effect for H2. Because the extractive industries are important in 
the South African economy (DTI & Deloitte, 2014), I expect that firms in this sector represent a 
relatively large proportion of the sample because this would reflect their representation on the JSE.25 
Higher levels of resources allow companies to produce reports according to stakeholder pressures 
(Herbohn et al., 2014) and large firms are more likely to achieve economies of scale in corporate 
sustainability activities (Artiach et al., 2010). Similarly to Herbohn et al. (2014), who found that 
large listed firms from the extractive industries produce greater sustainability disclosures, the 
findings of this thesis show that the basic materials industry associates significantly with analyst 
forecast accuracy. 
[INSERT TABLE 10, PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
Turning to H4, the results in Panel B of Table 10 for Model 6 show no support for the prediction 
that assurance of IR improves analyst earnings forecast accuracy. While Model 6 supports the 
proposition that IR quality, as measured by the SDTI score, improves forecast accuracy for the three 
fiscal years, no additional effect seems to be provided by the assurance of non-financial 
information. In further testing (see Table 11, Panels A and B), I examined whether the results are 
sensitive to use of assurance standards and the level of information assured (H4b and H4c). 
However, the results remain constant, suggesting that some mimicking behaviour occurs within 
South Africa’s regime and/or the allowance for companies to use “boiler-plate” language. 
Finally, the association between analyst forecast error and the implementation of a CAM (H6) was 
tested in Table 10, Panel B, Model 7. As expected, organisations are interested in demonstrating 
their commitment to stakeholders, thus enhancing their credibility through coordinating assurance 
providers. The results show a negative and significant association between CAM and FERROR for 
the three fiscal years (-0.027, -0.029, -0.034; p < 0.026, 0.017, 0.011). Industry analysis suggests 
that these results are mainly influenced by those companies that belong to the basic materials 
industry. Similar to the literature, the regressions of Model 7 support the argument that the quality 
of IR helps reduce analyst forecast error. Overall, these findings suggest that the quality of the 
reports presented and the implementation of CAM, as a mechanism for reducing information risk, 
do matter to analysts in the calculation of the earnings per share projected. 
                                                             
25 As in our study, Barth et al. (2015) showed an industry composition mainly clustered in both the basic materials and financial 
sectors. 
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A control variables analysis reveals a significant positive relationship between earnings volatility 
and forecast error, maintaining the idea that it is more difficult to predict earnings per share when 
firms have volatile returns. Finally, and consistent with the literature, Model 7 shows a negative and 
significant association between FERROR and SIZE for the three fiscal years analysed.26 
[INSERT TABLE 10 PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.4.1 Additional analysis study 2. Robust standard errors 
This section shows the results of the sensitivity analysis, calculating the robust standard error and 
using a different proxy for IR quality. Firstly, to validate the results of Study 2, the robust standard 
errors were calculated as shown in Appendix 6, Panels A to D. Overall, the use of the robust 
standard errors clustered by firm and year shown in Model 7, Panel B, produce qualitatively similar 
results to those obtained from the principal analysis. These findings consolidate the evidence that IR 
quality disclosures (Hypothesis 2) and the application of a CAM (Hypothesis 6) add value to the 
market by reducing analyst forecast error. 
[INSERT APPENDIX 6 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT APPENDIX 6 PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
However, as for the results for Hypothesis 4b, the coefficient on assurance standards (ASS_STD) 
now becomes positive and significant for the three fiscal years (Appendix 6, Panel C) as opposed to 
the insignificant results shown in the principal analysis in Table 10, Panel B. This significant 
association is mainly influenced by those companies using ISAE3000 rather than AA1000AS. A 
similar situation is found when testing Hypothesis 4c on the relationship between the level of 
information assured (reasonable and limited) and analyst earnings forecast error. In the latter case, a 
significant and positive association is obtained, in contrast to the insignificant results in the primary 
analysis. 
My results lend some support to the conclusion that the assurance of sustainability performance, in 
a de facto compulsory requirement, would probably be engaged by poor IR performers adopting the 
use of “boiler‐plate” disclosure. As discussed previously, the literature has found soft disclosures 
less verifiable and easier to mimic than the hard disclosures (Clarkson et al., 2008). The sample 
period of this study allows understanding that possibly mimics behaviour by poor IR performers. It 
                                                             
26 As with Study 1, alternate model specifications were used to check the robustness of the results. Regressions for 
Model 7 were re-run, including time fixed effects. Due to its high level of correlation, the variable SDTI*ASS was 
removed from Model 7 to avoid multicollinearity problems. Such model specification has little impact on the main 
conclusions for the three principal variables of interest (SDTI, ASS, CAM) and control variables. In addition, sensitive 
analyses calculating the robust standard error clustered by firm and year, and the use of a different proxy of IR quality, 
are specified and described in Sections 5.2.4.1 and 5.2.4.2.  
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is expected, therefore, that, if there is mimicking behaviour by those companies that are not able to 
disclose high-quality information, it may happen a few years after the regulation comes into force. 
Results suggest that poor IR performers may use the assurance of non-financial information to 
disguise their weak IR commitment to the market. 
[INSERT APPENDIX 6 PANEL C ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT APPENDIX 6 PANEL D ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.4.2 Alternative measures of IR quality 
As previously mentioned in Study 1, an alternative proxy of IR quality was used to check the 
robustness of these results. The second study of this thesis evaluates how the quality of the 
information presented influences market decisions, specifically on analyst forecast accuracy. To test 
the association between IR quality and analyst predictions, the SDTI quality proxy as designed by 
IRAS was used. Due to the variation of the information quality presented through the SDTI proxy, 
as well as possible bias on the data collection process, a different IR quality proxy is used. To 
address these possible limitations, the Thomson Reuters Economic, Environmental, Social and 
Governance (EESG) score is used in the primary model of study. As stated above, this index is 
appropriate for measuring IR quality because it covers not only CSR activities but also financial 
activities. Overall, the introduction of the EESC variable in Models 5, 6 and 7 in Appendix 7, 
Panels A to D, had little qualitative impact on the main results relating to the relationship between 
analyst forecast error and the quality of IR information, the assurance of sustainability indicators, 
and the implementation of CAM. When the association between IR quality and analyst forecast 
error is tested in Model 5, the variable EESC is only significant in fiscal year 1. In contrast to my 
principal findings, this quality proxy is no longer significant for fiscal years 2 and 3. 
[INSERT APPENDIX 7 PANEL A to D ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.4.3 Number of analysts following 
In the sample selection, the average of the number of analysts following a firm through the fiscal 
years varies from 1 to 18. In addition, 6% of the companies have only one analyst informing 
forecasts, 17.7% of them have two, and 29.4% of the sample have at least three analysts following. 
To ensure that the results are not caused by the peculiarity of some financial analysts associated 
with companies with lower analysts following—similar to Bernardi and Stark (2016)—the sample 
was restricted to those firms that have at least two (246 observations out of 297) and three analysts 
making earnings forecasts (211 observations out of 299). The results (not tabulated) after analysing 
 60 
 
the regressions with these new parameters show that the restriction established does not influence 
the main conclusions of this study 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and future research 
6.1 Conclusions 
The IIRC published the IIRF in December 2013 to show the gaps in accounting information and to 
relate the business model, governance, strategy, and financial, social, and economic performance of 
a firm, using a principles-based approach to the implementation of IR (IIRC, 2013c). IR is aimed at 
providers of financial capital, with the IIRF asserting that “The primary purpose of an integrated 
report is to explain to providers of financial capital how an organization creates value over time” 
(IIRC, 2013c, p. 4). While most of the studies analysing the South African context have found 
evidence similar to the CSR field, all have focused on a period where the IIRF, and the endorsement 
of it in South African, had not been published (e.g., (Barth et al., 2017; Bernardi & Stark, 2016; 
Frias et al., 2014; Haji & Anifowose, 2016, 2017; Lee & Yeo, 2016; Lipunga, 2015; Zhou et al., 
2016; Zhou et al., 2017)). Unlike other literature on this matter, this thesis analyses the period from 
2013 to 2015, after South Africa’s “apply or explain” IR regime and the IIRF being in place for five 
and three years respectively. Motivated by a need to understand the economic implications in a 
compulsory environment as South Africa, this thesis investigates whether the quality of the 
information disclosed in IR, the assurance of non-financial information, and the implementation of 
a CAM, is associated with market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy. 
This thesis first hypothesised that the quality of the information disclosed through IR positively 
affects market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy. Using an in-house measurement of IR quality 
provided by IRAS—a South African assurance firm that developed a unique index of SDTI—it was 
found that, IR quality is significantly associated with both market liquidity and lower analyst 
earnings forecast error before and after controlling for various potentially confounding factors. The 
findings are consistent and robust, demonstrating the benefits of disclosing IR information to the 
market. Consistent with the theory that earnings volatility reduces the ability of analysts to predict 
earnings per share (Dichev & Tang, 2009), these results also suggest a negative association between 
highly volatile profits and analyst forecast accuracy. 
The literature argues that firm size is an important determinant of CSR performance because large 
corporations are visible to the market (Artiach et al., 2010). This thesis contributes to the literature 
by showing that large companies tend to disclose useful information to financial analysts who may 
reduce the error between what the company announces and their forecast. Larger firms also tend to 
better inform their stakeholders, reducing information asymmetry (Cheng et al., 2011). Consistent 
with the literature, the regression in the results of this thesis show that a company’s size associates 
positively with market liquidity and negatively with analyst forecast error. 
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Using economics-based theories, Herbohn et al. (2014) found a significant association between 
sustainability performance and sustainability disclosure in mining and energy companies. Results in 
this thesis suggest that the effect of IR quality on market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy is 
highly influenced by the large mining, financial and industrial firms in the JSE-listed sample. This 
is not surprising, considering that this sample’s composition derives from the JSE. It suggests that 
IR quality disclosure is not only associated with a better information environment, measured as 
analyst forecast accuracy, but also complements financial disclosure by mitigating information 
asymmetry. 
Furthermore, and consistent with the mix of evidence from the CSR assurance literature (Clarkson 
et al., 2015), this thesis finds that the assurance of sustainability disclosures appears to not affect 
forecast accuracy, irrespective of who provides the assurance. Results remain constant when the use 
of assurance standards and the level of the information assured are evaluated. In South Africa, it 
does not appear that financial analysts use non-financial information. It seems rather that they rely 
on audited financial information as a primary indicator of corporate disclosures for forecast and 
evaluation. Additionally, existing assurance standards can be used to facilitate the convergence of 
the information being presented. However, the wide variety of information on each industry and 
qualitative, subjective or forward-looking information as the basis of a more comprehensive 
reporting is beyond the scope of conventional assurance models; this increases the uncertainty of 
whether the assurance of IR adds value (Maroun, 2017). The results of this thesis are evidence that 
the assurance of sustainability KPIs, the use of assurance standards, and the level of information 
assured do not contribute new value-relevant information to financial analysts. Audit experts and 
those preparing IR in South Africa agree that it is difficult to objectively assure IR using assurance 
standards because most of the content is subjective and financial statements are still the main 
consideration for investors (Maroun, 2017). Consequently, the current findings suggest that, for 
financial analysts, the assurance of IR is still considered complementary information that has little 
impact on analysts’ forecast accuracy. On the other hand, and consistent with the theory that CSR 
assurance increases the likelihood of attracting more investors, the findings suggest that IR 
assurance and the use of assurance standards, in an “apply or explain” regime, have a positive and 
significant association with market liquidity. 
Unlike ISAE3000—considered a general assurance standard for accounting firms that deal with 
assurance engagements other than audits of historical financial information—AA1000AS focuses 
on CSR factors that can be used by different assurance providers. In contrast, the scope of an 
assurance service through ISAE3000 may cover different areas, such as sustainability reports, legal 
or regulatory compliance, and value for money (IAASB, 2009). Therefore, the auditing profession 
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should comply with ISAE3000 to evaluate CSR/IR reports, whereas other assurers may also use 
ISAE3000 assurance methods or combine elements of ISAE3000 with standards such as AA100AS. 
The literature suggests that, in countries where the accounting profession is predominant, the 
standard ISAE3000 predominates in assuring non-financial information (Perego & Kolk, 2012). 
Consistent with these findings, further analyses suggest that, in South Africa, the significant 
association found with market liquidity is mainly driven by ISAE3000 rather than AA1000AS. 
Caution should be used in assessing non-financial information when following different CSR 
assurance standards. While some authors suggest that ISAE3000 and AA1000AS are 
complementary rather than conflicting (Gillet, 2012; Jones & Jonas, 2011), the use of different 
assessment criteria may result in assurance providers combining heterogeneous procedures that 
might be mutually conflicting, particularly in an environment where the audit of CSR information is 
a de facto requirement. One might expect that, in South Africa, there might be more specialists 
available in some specific sustainability areas owing to that market’s conditions. However, most 
assurers (77%) belong to the accounting profession rather than being sustainability specialists. The 
results of this thesis suggest that, in South Africa, the inconsistency in the application of CSR/IR 
assurance practices by accounting and non-accounting organisations may negatively affect an 
analyst’s ability to understand the nature and scope of assurance engagement. Combining those 
standards might be likely to deliver enhanced results to the investors, but it also might be 
considered a double-edged sword to adopt one set or more of these principles as a guide to assuring 
IR reports in a market where the IR assurance regime is mandatory through King III 
Additional testing evaluated the effect of the level of information assured, as a proxy of the quality 
assurance process, on market liquidity. The variable ASS_QUA was subdivided into four values 
representing the level of assurance engaged: (1) undisclosed (the information could not be found in 
published reports), (2) limited assurance, (3) limited and reasonable assurance, and (4) reasonable 
assurance engagement. As expected, the level of information covered is associated with market 
liquidity, which itself associates significantly with those companies that engage in at least some 
degree of reasonable assurance process. In contrast, limited audit procedures do not show statistical 
significance with BAS. Consistent with prior studies, the assurance results in this thesis support the 
notion that sustainability assurance serves to enhance the credibility of information reported to 
investors (Cohen & Simmett, 2015; Simnett et al., 2009). The benefits of assuring non-financial 
information also seem to be closely linked to the type of firms providing the audit service—in this 
case, accounting assurers (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Pflugrath et al., 2011). However, the fact that 
assurance of IR seems to be a quality surrogate in investor perceptions contains certain perils. The 
assurance of soft disclosures aims to verify the accuracy of information presented, which should 
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lead to a better perception by financial analysts. For example, Casey and Grenier (2015) find that 
CSR assurance reduces analyst forecast error in the US market, an effect that does not occur in 
South Africa. This may suggest, for example, a mimicking behaviour for those companies that 
engage in external CSR assurance, or that IR assurance is considered unimportant by analysts in 
preparing their forecasts. Further research might clarify how analysts use relevant assured 
information in their forecasts and the mechanisms that help them do so. 
This research also examined whether the application of a CAM is associated with market liquidity 
and reduced analyst forecast error. Theoretically, CAM attempts to elevate assurance coverage from 
management to external assurance providers to ensure that significant risks are adequately 
addressed through coordinated work. The results of this thesis support its research expectations that 
implementing this new assurance model is negative and significantly associated with both analyst 
forecast error and market liquidity. This contrasts with Zhou et al. (2016), who argue that, while 
CAM helps reduce information risk, it does not significantly affect analyst forecast error. It is 
notable that Zhou et al. (2016) analysed reports produced from 2009 to 2012 by JSE-listed 
companies: on average, 30.47% declared they had adopted a CAM whereas, in 2009, only 1.75% 
had implemented one. Therefore, the sample period used in this thesis (2013 to 2015) might reflect 
the experience of JSE firms five years after the adoption. In effect, 409 of the 630 reports analysed 
in this study (65%) reported adoption of a CAM. The evidence of this research extends the 
discussion about the benefits of this new mechanism of credibility and its informational value to the 
market. The use of a homogeneous process between internal and external assurance to reduce 
material information risk by implementing a CAM seems to inform financial analysts about the 
credibility and quality of sustainability performance and reporting. 
The findings of this thesis have important ramifications for the understanding of researchers and 
accounting practitioners of the impact of IR disclosure, its assurance, and the value of implementing 
a CAM. Overall, and consistent with CSR/IR theory, IR has the potential to usefully inform the 
market. These findings complement some recent papers, such as Zhou et al. (2017), Bernardi and 
Stark (2016), Barth et al. (2017) and Zhou et al. (2016), which also show the benefits of IR. 
Moreover, this thesis contributes to the discussion about whether the assurance of sustainability 
information adds value to the capital market, specifically for investors and financial analysts. 
Consistent with the CSR assurance literature, while the assurance of IR does not significantly affect 
analyst forecast accuracy, it does significantly associate with market liquidity. 
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6.2 Limitations 
There are limitations to the research of this thesis. Firstly, the results obtained cannot be generalised 
to other jurisdictions. While the South African economy is unique and is thus the best setting to 
investigate IRs, new economies are also working actively on IR disclosures, so future research is 
likely to extend the literature in this field by comparing different countries. Secondly, while the 
availability of data constrained the sample size of Studies 1 and 2, this only mediates against 
finding any statistically significant result. For example, while the IRAS database offers information 
about 324 JSE companies in 2015, 288 in 2014, and 279 in 2013, Datastream covers only the 170 
largest South African firms for each period while the construction of the dependent variables also 
reduced the final sample analysed. Despite the sample reduction, robust and consistent results are 
found in the market liquidity and analyst forecast accuracy proxies. Thirdly, because the dummy 
variable CAM only represents those companies that disclosed their application of a CAM, valuable 
information regarding this new assurance model’s implementation could be omitted. That might 
cause biased coefficient estimates of the regression results and, therefore, biased conclusions. 
6.3 Future research 
This thesis indicates future research possibilities. Its evidence suggests that incentives to demand 
external auditing of non-voluntary reports seem associated with the potential to reduce information 
asymmetry and control conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. However, it does 
not add value for financial analysts. Companies might use CSR assurance for clever marketing 
rather than as a genuine effort to open a variety of unanswered research questions and uncertainties 
that may be resolved by future research. This would ask: Is IR assurance a false signal to the 
market? What is the type of information assured? Is the amount of information assured significant 
compared to the level of information disclosed? Are financial analysts interested in soft disclosure 
assurance? Is the content of information assured the same in a compulsory and voluntary 
environment? A deep analysis of the content, methodologies, and how much information is assured 
may answer those questions. In some cases, while companies declare that the non-financial 
disclosures in their IR have been externally audited, a deep and detailed reading reveals that only a 
few specific aspects have been externally assured. Therefore, a thorough content analysis may help 
clarify whether the assurance of soft disclosures has been used as a signal to the market or whether 
it is part of a mimicking behaviour for companies that are not able to disclose high-quality 
information. 
King III came into force on an “apply or explain” basis in 2010. However, King III has been 
entirely replaced by the publication of King IV, affecting those JSE firms that present integrated 
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reporting for the financial years commencing from April 2017. The 75 principles in King III have 
been replaced in King IV by 17 principles (see Appendices 8 and 9). While, some principles of 
King III were best practice, King IV differentiates between what principles and what practices are. 
In this sense, the main difference between them is that, through King IV, the principle adoption is 
assumed and based on an “apply and explain” approach (IoDSA, 2016a). Companies must explain 
how the practices have been implemented to achieve the governance principles. Because King IV 
mentions how it uses the IIRF to implement its IR, future research may evaluate the effect of this 
new regulation, by considering that companies will not have the option to explain why principles 
were not applied. In this case, considering the potential of IR for mitigating the information 
asymmetry, there might be different motivations for disclosing and assuring non-financial 
information. 
[INSERT APPENDIX 8 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT APPENDIX 9 PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
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List of tables 
Table 1a. Comparison of annual, sustainability and integrated reports (Fasan, 2013) 
  Annual Reports Sustainability Reports Integrated Reporting 
Target  
Specific stakeholders 
(shareholders and 
investors) 
Several stakeholders 
(social and environmental 
perspective) 
Primarily providers of 
financial capital 
Mandatory or 
voluntary 
Mandatory 
Voluntary (with some 
exceptions: Denmark, 
Sweden and France) 
Voluntary (except for 
South Africa) 
Regulation / 
guidelines 
National and international 
laws. GAAP / IFRS 
Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 
IIRC Framework 
Comparability High Medium Low 
Industry 
Customization 
Low 
Medium (sector 
supplements) 
High 
Assurance 
Level 
High Low Low 
Scope 
Financial reporting entity 
(company or group of 
companies) 
Broader than financial 
reporting entity (supply 
chain, life-cycle 
assessment approach) 
Broader than financial 
reporting entity (supply 
chain, life-cycle 
assessment approach) 
 
Table 1b. Key differences between sustainability and integrated reporting 
 
  Sustainability Reporting Integrated Reporting 
Target Several stakeholders. 
Providers of financial capital/long-term 
investors (shareholders). 
Focus 
SR focuses on impacts on the 
environment, society and the economy. 
The effects of capital on the value creation 
process over time. 
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Table 2. Timeline of IR regulation in South Africa (World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, 2014) 
November 1994  The first king Report published the same year that the country became a full 
democracy. In 1994 the King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) was 
published by the King Committee on Corporate Governance. King I 
encouraged companies to disclose non-financial information. 
March 2002 King II published. It urged companies to adopt an inclusive stakeholders 
approach and broaden the firm’s responsibility to include financial, social 
and environmental matters. The JSE required that companies include in 
their annual report a narrative statement of how they complied with the 
principles established in the Code. 
September 2009 King Code of Governance for South Africa is published (King III), which 
incorporates the concept of Integrated Reporting. It differs from King II in 
that it requires adoption of IRs or explanation of why they are not doing so 
(“apply or explain” basis) (IoDSA, 2009). 
March 2010 The JSE requires listed companies to adopt IR as set out in King III. 
May 2010 Integrated Reporting Committee (IRC) of South Africa created to develop 
best practice on integrated reporting. 
January 2011 IRC releases the first discussion paper, “Framework for Integrated 
Reporting and the Integrated Report.” 
December 2013 The International Integrated Reporting Framework published. 
March 2014 The Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa announces its 
endorsement of the international IR framework as guidance on good 
practice to prepare IR. 
Jun 2014 The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa publishes the King III Practice 
Note on the Integrated Report. It includes information about the contents 
and how to disclose them. 
December 2014 The IRC publishes Preparing an Integrated Report: a Starter’s Guide, to 
assist new prepares of IR. 
March 2016 The King IV draft was released for public comments (IoDSA, 2016a). 
November 2016 King Code of Governance for South Africa King IV is published. Its 
difference to King III is that it adopts an apply-or-explain basis. King IV 
assumes application of all principles (“apply and explain”) 
 
  
 69 
 
Table 3. Sample description IRAS database 
Panel A: Statistical description of IRAS database: Sustainability 
Disclosure Transparency Index (SDTI) scores. 
  2013 2014 2015 
Numbers of Reports Analysed 279 288 324 
Min. 0.119 0.149 0.137 
Max. 0.754 0.824 0.917 
Mean 0.351 0.424 0.382 
Median 0.322 0.395 0.339 
Std. Dev. 0.145 0.16 0.172 
Reports over the media (mean) 120 127 135 
Reports under the media (mean) 159 161 189 
Report Assured 56 56 58 
Big-Four 37 37 40 
        
 
 
 
Panel B: Industry composition of IRAS database 2015. Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS). 
   
Industry Firms %  
   Energy 7 2.2% 
Basic Materials 73 22.5% 
Industrial 63 19.4% 
Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services 15 4.6% 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services 17 5.2% 
Financials 111 34.3% 
Healthcare 16 4.9% 
Technology 12 3.7% 
Telecommunications Services 10 3.1% 
   Total sample 324 100.0% 
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Table 4. Sample description Study 1: Market liquidity. 
 
Panel A: Sample description panel data 2013-2015 
  Firms 
Total IRAS observation  324 
Missing IRAS data items  -45 
Final IRAS observation in the period analysed  279 
Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S coverage  170 
SPREAD missing data 
 
-39 
Control variables 
 
-20 
  
 
  
 
Final sample panel analysis   111 
   
Firm-year observations (2013-2015) 
 
333 
Stand-alone CSR report 
 
199 
Set of reports 
 
134 
Reports independently assured 
 
126 
            Big-Four 81 
             Others accounting firms 12  
            Other firms 33  
Reports referencing AA1000AS 
 
30 
Reports referencing ISAE3000 
 
100 
Reports disclosed application of CAM   205 
 
 
 
Panel B: Industry composition 
   Industry Firms %  
   Energy 1 0.90% 
Basic materials 23 20.72% 
Industrial 14 12.61% 
Consumer cyclicals 16 14.41% 
Consumer non-cyclicals 14 12.61% 
Financials 33 29.73% 
Healthcare 3 2.70% 
Technology 3 2.70% 
Telecommunications services 4 3.60% 
   Total sample 111 100% 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistic (N=333) 
  Min. Max. Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev. 
SPREAD -6.808 -3.717 -5.649 -5.83 -6.138 -5.26 0.688 
SDTI 0.127 0.917 0.475 0.476 0.356 0.595 0.161 
ASS 0 1 0.378 0 0 1 0.486 
ASS_STD 0 1 0.372 0 0 1 0.484 
QUA_ASS 1 4 1.471 1 1 2 0.742 
CAM 0 1 0.616 0 1 1 0.487 
INST_INV 0 0.46 0.145 0.13 0.07 0.22 0.111 
ANANO 0 2.95 1.511 1.7 0.8 2.32 0.905 
SIZE 5.09 12.93 9.716 9.949 8.663 10.82 1.596 
R&D 0 0.022 0.0006 0 0 0 0.002 
MVBVA 8.60E-05 0.138 0.0016 0.0009 0.0005 0.002 0.002 
CROSSLISTED 0 1 0.874 1 1 1 0.332 
SALES_IND 3.00E-06 0.535 0.0732 0.024 0.006 0.073 0.117 
 
Variable Definitions. SPREAD = Bid-ask spread is measured as the median value of the natural logarithm of the 
daily difference between the ask and the bid closing prices divided by the midpoint over the period ranging from 
month -6 to month +6 relative to the end of the firm’s fiscal year-end; SDTI = IR quality measure obtained from 
IRAS database; ASS = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the IR is assured by an external provider and 0 otherwise; 
ASS_STD = dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company assured their soft information following 
AA1000AS and/or ISAE3000 assurance standards as guideline for assurance engagement, and 0 otherwise; 
QUA_ASS = four-value variable as a proxy of assurance quality. It takes value 1 if companies do not disclose the 
level of assurance covered, value 2 if the assurance performed was limited, value 3 if there is a combination of 
limited and reasonable assurance service, and value 4 if there is a high level of assurance (reasonable); CAM = 
dummy variable that codes 1 if the company disclosed the application of CAM, and 0 otherwise; INST_INV = as a 
proxy of informed investors, the level of institutional investors is measured as the percentage of total shares in 
issue held as long term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking a long-term return. It will be 
included in the respective datatype only if the investor holds > 5% shares; ANANO = the natural logarithm of 
analyst following for a firm through the year; SIZE = the natural logarithm of the market value at the end of the 
fiscal year; R&D = ratio of R&D expense to total sales; MVBVA = ratio of market to book value of assets; 
CROSSLISTED = dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is listed in more than one stock and 0 otherwise; 
SALES_IND = ratio of sales to industry sales. 
 
 
 72 
 
Table 5. Pearson’s (Spearman) correlation matrix (N=333). 
 
SPREAD SDTI ASS CAM INST_INV ANANO SIZE R&D MVBVA CROSSLISTED SALES_IND 
            SPREAD 1 -0.39*** -0.41*** -0.25*** -0.19*** -0.68*** -0.82*** -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.25*** -0.58*** 
SDTI -0.39*** 1 0.64*** 0.2*** 0.06 0.35*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.06 0.16*** 0.28*** 
ASS -0.39*** 0.63*** 1 0.11* -0.09 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.2*** -0.12** 0.18*** 0.32*** 
CAM -0.28*** 0.2*** 0.11* 1 0.09 0.27*** 0.23*** -0.02 -0.03 0.11** 0.37*** 
INST_INV -0.22*** 0.07 -0.1* 0.05 1 0.19*** 0.08 0.1* 0 0.11** 0.2*** 
ANANO -0.66*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.17*** 1 0.64*** 0.16*** 0.2*** 0.32*** 0.59*** 
SIZE -0.77*** 0.23*** 0.33*** 0.23*** 0.03 0.62*** 1 0.17*** 0.11* 0.22*** 0.55*** 
R&D -0.12** 0.2*** 0.04 -0.11** 0.17*** 0.09* 0.08 1 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
MVBVA -0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.19*** -0.1* 0.17*** 0.04 0.13** 1 0.09 -0.01 
CROSSLISTED -0.25*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.11** 0.08 0.33*** 0.23*** 0.11** 0.06 1 0.3*** 
SALES_IND -0.42*** 0.12** 0.2*** 0.28*** 0.1* 0.42*** 0.46*** -0.07 -0.06 0.2*** 1 
 
This table sets out Pearson’s (Spearman) correlations coefficients below (above) for the regressions analysis for 333 firm-year observations for 111 companies in 
the period between 2013 and 2015. * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; ***Correlation is significant at the 
0.1 level. Variable Definitions. SPREAD = Bid-ask spread is measured as the median value of the natural logarithm of the daily difference between the ask and 
the bid closing prices divided by the midpoint over the period ranging from month -6 to month +6 relative to the end of a firm’s fiscal year-end; SDTI = IR quality 
measure obtained from IRAS database; ASS = an indicator variable equalling 1 if the IR is assured by an external provider and 0 otherwise; CAM = dummy 
variable that codes 1 if the company disclosed the application of CAM and 0 otherwise; INST_INV = as a proxy of informed investors, the level of institutional 
investors is measured as the percentage of total shares in issue held as long term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking a long-term return. 
It will be included in the respective datatype only if the investor holds > 5% shares; ANANO = the natural logarithm of analyst following for a firm through the 
year; SIZE = the natural logarithm of the market value at the end of the fiscal year; R&D = ratio of R&D expense to total sales; MVBVA = ratio of market to 
book value of assets; CROSSLISTED dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is listed in more than one stock and 0 otherwise; SALES_IND =  ratio of sales to 
industry sales. 
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TABLE 6 
Market liquidity, IR quality and IR assurance 
           Table 6: Main models. Dependent variable SPREAD 
    
      
Hypotheses 
    
Models 
 
1 (H1) 
 
2 (H3) 
 
3 (H5) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Without 
C.V. 
 
SDTI 
 
ASS 
 
CAM 
           SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.955*** 
 
-0.723*** 
 
-0.525*** 
 
-0.453** 
ASS 
 
- 
 
-0.316*** 
   
-0.116** 
 
-0.129** 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.306*** 
     
-0.093** 
INST_INV 
 
- 
   
-1.015*** 
 
-1.085*** 
 
-1.1*** 
ANANO 
 
- 
   
-0.147*** 
 
-0.146*** 
 
-0.138*** 
SIZE 
 
- 
   
-0.329*** 
 
-0.324*** 
 
-0.32*** 
R&D 
 
+ 
   
-2.632 
 
-3.926 
 
-8.494 
MVBVA 
 
+ 
   
-3.079 
 
-5.253 
 
-9.664 
CROSSLISTED 
 
+ 
   
-0.016 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
SALES_IND 
 
+ 
   
-0.097 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.006 
           N 
   
333 
 
333 
 
333 
 
333 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.2231 
 
0.6929 
 
0.7025 
 
0.706 
F 
   
32.79*** 
 
84.39*** 
 
84.76*** 
 
77.33*** 
Industry Indicator 
   
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Year Indicator 
   
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
                      
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Variable Definitions SPREAD = Bid-
ask spread is measured as the median value of the natural logarithm of the daily difference between the ask and 
the bid closing prices divided by the midpoint over the period ranging from month -6 to month +6 relative to the 
end of the firm’s fiscal year-end; SDTI = IR quality measure obtained from IRAS database; ASS = indicator 
variable equal 1 if the IR is assured by an external provider and 0 otherwise; ASS_STD = dummy variable that 
takes value of 1 if the company assured their soft information following AA1000AS and/or ISAE3000 as 
guideline for assurance engagement, and 0 otherwise; CAM = dummy variable that codes 1 if the company 
disclosed the application of CAM, and 0 otherwise; INST_INV = as a proxy of informed investors, the level of 
institutional investors is measured as the percentage of total shares in issue held as long-term strategic holdings 
by investment banks or institutions seeking a long-term return. It will be included in the respective datatype only 
if the investor holds > 5% shares; ANANO = the natural logarithm of analyst following for a firm through the 
year; SIZE = the natural logarithm of the market value at the end of the fiscal year; R&D = ratio of R&D 
expense to total sales; MVBVA = ratio of market to book value of assets; CROSSLISTED = dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the company is listed in more than one stock and 0 otherwise; SALES_IND = ratio of sales to 
industry sales. 
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TABLE 7 
Market liquidity, IR quality and IR assurance 
Table 7: Additional analysis. Dependent variable SPREAD 
    
   
Additional Analysis 
 
Model 
 
3A 
 
3B 
 
3C 
 
3D 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
TYPE OF 
ASSURER  
 
STANDARDS 
(H3b)  
TYPE OF 
STANDARD 
(H3b) 
 
QUALITY 
(H3c) 
          SDTI - 
 
-0.456** 
 
-0.436** 
 
-0.518*** 
 
-0.446** 
CAM - 
 
-0.094* 
 
-0.094* 
 
-0.109** 
 
-0.092* 
INST_INV - 
 
-1.105*** 
 
-1.105*** 
 
-1.141*** 
 
-1.108*** 
ANANO - 
 
-0.137*** 
 
-0.138*** 
 
-0.13*** 
 
-0.135*** 
SIZE - 
 
-0.32*** 
 
-0.319*** 
 
-0.323*** 
 
-0.32*** 
R&D + 
 
-8.42 
 
-8.696 
 
-5.648 
 
-10.481 
MVBVA + 
 
-9.59 
 
-9.851 
 
-6.549 
 
-9.408 
CROSSLISTED + 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
0.001 
 
-0.014 
SALES_IND + 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.01 
 
0.034 
 
0.003 
Non-accounting Firm - 
 
-0.117 
      Accounting Firm - 
 
-0.133** 
      ASS_STDxASS - 
   
-0.07** 
    AA1000AS - 
     
0.042 
  ISAE3000AS - 
     
-0.155** 
  Limited_ASS - 
       
-0.103 
Lim_&_Rea_ASS - 
       
-0.262*** 
Reasonable_ASS - 
       
-0.369** 
N 
  
333 
 
333 
 
333 
 
333 
Adj R-squared   
  
0.6961 
 
0.7065 
 
0.6988 
 
0.7087 
F 
  
70.14*** 
 
77.51*** 
 
71.03*** 
 
64.88*** 
Industry Indicator 
  
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Year Indicator     Included   Included   Included   Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 3. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 8. Study 2. Analyst forecast accuracy 
Panel A: Sample description panel data 2013-2015 
  Firms 
Total IRAS Observation  324 
Missing IRAS data items  -45 
Final IRAS Observation in the period analysed 
 
279 
Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S coverage  170 
Forecast Error missing data 
 
-50 
Time Horizon missing data  
 
-20 
Companies without SDTI score 
 
-1 
  
 
Final sample Panel Analysis   99 
 
 
Panel B: Industry composition 
   Industry Firms %  
   Energy 2 2.02% 
Basic materials 30 30.30% 
Industrial 11 11.11% 
Cyclical consumer goods & services 11 11.11% 
Non-cyclical consumer goods & services 12 12.12% 
Financials 24 24.24% 
Healthcare 3 3.03% 
Technology 2 2.02% 
Telecommunications services 4 4.04% 
   
Total sample 99 100% 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistic (N=297) 
  Min. Max. Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev 
        FERROR_FY1 6.50E-05 0.833 0.033 0.01 0.005 0.024 0.095 
FERROR_FY2 4.89E-04 0.691 0.044 0.021 0.012 0.038 0.092 
FERROR_FY3 0.001 0.754 0.054 0.03 0.019 0.056 0.093 
SDTI 0.169 0.917 0.493 0.494 0.378 0.607 0.158 
ASS 0 1 0.444 0 0 1 0.498 
CAM 0 1 0.687 1 0 1 0.465 
ASS_STD 0 1 0.441 0 0 1 0.497 
QUA_ASS 1 4 1.522 1 1 2 0.754 
STAND 0 1 0.542 1 0 1 0.499 
ANANO 0 2.918 1.623 1.779 1.05 2.319 0.804 
SIZE 5.409 12.93 9.717 9.95 8.663 10.828 1.596 
VAREARN -3.275 5.934 0.112 0.159 -0.806 0.888 1.403 
LOSS 0 1 0.286 0 0 1 0.453 
FHORIZON 2.485 5.878 4.531 4.585 4.22 4.898 0.598 
CROSSLISTED 0 1 0.909 1 1 1 0.288 
                
 
Variable Definitions. FERROR = average absolute error of all forecasts made during the year for target 
earnings, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the year. The indicator Y takes three values 0, 1, or 2, 
which represent target earnings and the forecast; for the current year, one and two years ahead respectively. 
Subscripts i, t, and j correspond to firm i at year t, and forecast j. AEF is analyst earnings forecast and EPS is 
the actual earnings per share. The indicator P represents the stock price obtained at the time of the forecast; 
SDTI = IR quality measure obtained from IRAS database; ASS = indicator variable equals 1 if the IR is 
assured by an external provider and 0 otherwise; CAM = dummy variable that codes 1 if the company 
disclosed the application of CAM and 0 otherwise; ASS_STD = dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the 
company assured their soft information following AA1000AS and/or ISAE3000 as guidelines for assurance 
engagement, and 0 otherwise; QUA_ASS = four-value variable as a proxy of assurance quality. It takes 
value 1 if companies do not disclose the level of assurance covered, value 2 if the assurance performed was 
limited, value 3 if there is a combination between limited and reasonable assurance service, and value 4 if 
there is a high level of assurance (reasonable); STAND = variable that equals 1 if company issues a stand-
alone IR during the year, and 0 otherwise; ANANO = the natural logarithm of analyst following for a firm 
through the year; SIZE = the natural logarithm of market value at the end of the fiscal year; VAREARN = 
natural logarithm of the time-series standard deviation of earnings per share. A rolling window of ten years 
was used, with minimum of two years prior to the year evaluated, to calculate the standard deviation; LOSS 
= dummy variable equal to 1 if the company reported a loss for the period and 0 otherwise; FHORIZON = 
the number of days between the previous forecast made by financial analyst and the earnings announcement 
date. It is the median forecast horizon of analyst forecasts for each company each year; CROSSLISTED = 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company is listed in more than one stock and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 9. Pearson’s (Spearman) correlation matrix (N=297). 
 
This table sets up Pearson’s (Spearman) correlations coefficients below (above) for the regressions analysis for 299 firm-year observations for 99 companies in 
the period between 2013 and 2015. * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; ***Correlation is significant at the 
0.1 level. Variable Definitions. FERROR = the average absolute error of all forecasts made during the year for target earnings, scaled by stock price at the 
beginning of the year. The indicator Y takes three values 0, 1, or 2, which represent target earnings and the forecast; for the current year, one and two years ahead 
respectively. Subscripts i, t, and j correspond to firm i at year t, and forecast j. AEF is analyst earnings forecast and EPS is the actual earnings per share. The 
indicator P represents the stock price obtained at the time of the forecast; SDTI = IR quality measure obtained from IRAS database; ASS = indicator variable 
equalling 1 if the IR is assured by an external provider and 0 otherwise; CAM = dummy variable that codes 1 if the company disclosed the application of CAM 
and 0 otherwise; STAND = variable that equals 1 if company issues a stand-alone IR during the year, and 0 otherwise; ANANO = the natural logarithm of 
analyst following for a firm through the year; SIZE = the natural logarithm of market value at the end of the fiscal year; VAREARN = the natural logarithm of 
the time-series standard deviation of earnings per share. A rolling window of ten years was used, with minimum of two years prior to the year evaluated, to 
calculate the standard deviation; LOSS = dummy variable equal to 1 if the company reported a loss for the period and 0 otherwise; FHORIZON = the number of 
days that elapse between the previous forecast made by financial analyst and the earnings announcement date. It is the median forecast horizon of analyst 
forecasts for each company each year; CROSSLISTED = dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company is listed in more than one stock and 0 otherwise. 
FERROR_FY1 FERROR_FY2 FERROR_FY3 SDTI ASS CAM STAND ANANO SIZE VAREARN LOSS FHORIZON CROSSLISTED
FERROR_FY1 1 0.8*** 0.72*** -0.02 0.14** -0.17*** -0.02 -0.3*** -0.38*** -0.12** -0.13** -0.01 -0.08
FERROR_FY2 0.92*** 1 0.89*** 0.04 0.18*** -0.18*** 0 -0.24*** -0.37*** -0.04 -0.13** 0.01 -0.08
FERROR_FY3 0.87*** 0.97*** 1 0.08 0.18*** -0.19*** 0.01 -0.2*** -0.38*** -0.01 -0.15** 0.001 -0.09
SDTI -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 1 0.66*** 0.14** -0.39*** 0.3*** 0.19*** 0.47*** 0.06 -0.26*** 0.19***
ASS 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.65*** 1 0.09 -0.32*** 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.41*** 0.03 -0.34*** 0.14**
CAM -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.23*** 0.15*** 0.09 1 -0.05 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.03 -0.01 -0.04
STAND -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.38*** -0.32*** -0.05 1 -0.26*** -0.19*** -0.23*** -0.17*** 0.25*** 0.06
ANANO -0.15** -0.15*** -0.14** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.18*** -0.23*** 1 0.71*** 0.53*** 0.19*** -0.2*** 0.35***
SIZE -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.19*** -0.17*** 0.67*** 1 0.5*** 0.18*** -0.26*** 0.3***
VAREARN 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.5*** 0.4*** 0.14** -0.21*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 1 0.14** -0.34*** 0.25***
LOSS 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.13** 1 -0.01 0.04
FHORIZON -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.23*** -0.28*** -0.03 0.18*** -0.14** -0.2*** -0.3*** -0.02 1 -0.09
CROSSLISTED 0.001 -0.03 -0.05 0.19*** 0.14** -0.04 0.06 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.04 -0.05 1
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Table 10. Analyst forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance 
Panel A: Main models. Dependent variable FERROR (H2) 
          
Hypotheses 
  
 
  
 
Without Control Variables 
 
Model 5 (H2) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.111** 
 
-0.098** 
 
-0.087* 
 
-0.113*** 
 
-0.098** 
 
-0.098** 
ASS 
 
- 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.207 
 
-0.021 
      CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.031** 
 
-0.031*** 
 
-0.035*** 
      SDTI*ASS 
 
- 
            STAND 
         
-0.014 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.013 
ANANO 
         
-1.00E-05 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
SIZE 
         
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
VAREARN 
         
0.016*** 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.02*** 
LOSS 
         
0.012 
 
0.004 
 
-0.001 
FHORIZON 
         
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
CROSSLISTED 
         
0.029 
 
0.016 
 
0.01 
N 
   
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.0565 
 
0.0497 
 
0.0505 
 
0.0984 
 
0.1145 
 
0.1281 
F 
   
4.89*** 
 
4.5*** 
 
4.64*** 
 
5.04*** 
 
5.78*** 
 
6.44*** 
Industry-year Indicator       Included   Included   Included   Included   Included   Included 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Variable Definitions. FERROR = is the average absolute error of all forecasts made during the year 
for target earnings, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the year. The indicator Y takes three values 0, 1, or 2, which represent target earnings and the forecast; for the 
current year, one and two years ahead respectively. Subscripts i, t, and j correspond to firm i at year t, and forecast j. AEF is analyst earnings forecast and EPS is the actual 
earnings per share. The indicator P represents the stock price obtained at the time of the forecast; SDTI = IR quality measure obtained from IRAS database; ASS = an 
indicator variable equalling 1 if the IR is assured by an external provider and 0 otherwise; CAM = a hand collected dummy variable that codes 1 if the company disclosed 
the application of CAM and 0 otherwise; SDTI*ASS = the interaction between the SDTI and ASS; STAND = variable that equals 1 if company issues a stand-alone IR 
during the year, and 0 otherwise; ANANO = the natural logarithm of analyst following for a firm through the year; SIZE = the natural logarithm of market value at the end 
of the fiscal year; VAREARN = the natural logarithm of the time-series standard deviation of earnings per share; LOSS = dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
reported a loss for the period and 0 otherwise; FHORIZON = the number of days that elapse between the previous forecast made by financial analyst and the earnings 
announcement date; CROSSLISTED = dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company is listed in more than one stock and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Analyst forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance 
Panel B: Main models. Dependent variable FERROR (H2-H4-H6) 
    
Hypotheses 
  
 
  
 
Model 6 (H2-H4) 
 
Model 7 (H2-H4-H6) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.2*** 
 
-0.164*** 
 
-0.153** 
 
-0.176*** 
 
-0.141** 
 
-0.126** 
ASS 
 
- 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.006 
 
0.01 
 
-0.032 
 
0.0003 
 
0.017 
SDTI*ASS 
 
- 
 
0.11 
 
0.057 
 
0.027 
 
0.102 
 
0.045 
 
0.012 
CAM 
 
- 
       
-0.027** 
 
-0.028** 
 
-0.034*** 
STAND 
   
-0.01 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.011 
ANANO 
   
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0004 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
SIZE 
   
-0.02*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.02*** 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.02*** 
 
0.016*** 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.021*** 
LOSS 
   
0.01 
 
0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
0.009 
 
0.002 
 
-0.002 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.004 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.006 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.03 
 
0.019 
 
0.008 
 
0.025 
 
0.012 
 
-0.001 
N 
   
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1141 
 
0.1254 
 
0.1355 
 
0.1362 
 
0.1494 
 
0.1659 
F 
   
4.81*** 
 
5.24*** 
 
5.64*** 
 
5.24*** 
 
2.73*** 
 
6.35*** 
Industry Indicator 
   
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Year Indicator       Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
All variables are defined in Appendix 3. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles.  
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Table 11. Analyst forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance 
Panel A: Additional analysis. Dependent variable FERROR (H3b) 
    
STANDARDS 
  
 
Model 
 
7 (H3b) 
 
7 (H3b) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.174*** 
 
-0.142** 
 
-0.129** 
 
-0.18*** 
 
-0.15** 
 
-0.138** 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.027** 
 
-0.028** 
 
-0.034*** 
 
-0.026** 
 
-0.027** 
 
-0.032*** 
SDTI*ASS 
 
- 
 
0.093 
 
0.047 
 
0.021 
 
0.154 
 
0.107 
 
0.081 
STAND 
   
-0.013 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.009 
ANANO 
   
0.0002 
 
0.001 
 
0.003 
 
0.0001 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
SIZE 
   
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.016*** 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.018*** 
 
0.021*** 
LOSS 
   
0.009 
 
0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
0.007 
 
0.0002 
 
-0.004 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.004 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.006 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.025 
 
0.012 
 
-0.001 
 
0.026 
 
0.013 
 
0.00005 
STAND×ASS 
 
- 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.001 
 
0.012 
      AA1000AS×ASS 
 
- 
       
-0.04 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.021 
ISAE3000AS×ASS 
 
- 
       
-0.007 
 
-0.0005 
 
0.002 
Limited_ASS 
 
- 
       
 
   
 
Lim_Rea_Ass 
 
- 
            Reasonable_Ass 
 
- 
            N 
   
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
297 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1364 
 
0.1497 
 
0.166 
 
0.1385 
 
0.1512 
 
0.1659 
F 
   
5.25*** 
 
5.74*** 
 
6.36*** 
 
4.97*** 
 
5.39*** 
 
5.91*** 
Industry Indicator 
   
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Year Indicator       Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
All variables are defined in Appendix 3. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles.  
 81 
 
 
TABLE 11 (continued) 
Analyst forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance 
Panel B: Additional analysis. Dependent variable FERROR (H3c) 
         
    
ASSURANCE QUALITY 
  
 
Model 
 
7 (H3c) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.154*** 
 
-0.135** 
 
-0.128** 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.027** 
 
-0.028** 
 
-0.033*** 
SDTI*ASS 
 
- 
 
0.021 
 
0.021 
 
0.02 
STAND 
   
-0.01 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.01 
ANANO 
   
0.0002 
 
0.002 
 
0.003 
SIZE 
   
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.024*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.016*** 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.021*** 
LOSS 
   
0.012 
 
0.003 
 
-0.001 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.005 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.025 
 
0.012 
 
-0.0002 
STAND×ASS 
 
- 
      AA1000AS×ASS 
 
- 
      ISAE3000AS×ASS 
 
- 
      Limited_ASS 
 
- 
 
0.016 
 
0.016 
 
0.016 
Lim_Rea_Ass 
 
- 
 
0.033 
 
0.022 
 
0.015 
Reasonable_Ass 
 
- 
 
0.005 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.013 
N 
   
297 
 
297 
 
297 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1395 
 
0.1502 
 
0.1643 
F 
   
4.69*** 
 
50.2*** 
 
5.48 
Industry Indicator 
   
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Year Indicator       Yes   Yes   Yes 
All variables are defined in Appendix 3. All continuous variables are winsorized at the first and 
99th percentiles.  
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LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Indra’s capital business model: Annual integrated report 201327.  
 
   
Figure 2. Coca-Cola’s HBC business model: Integrated report 2013.28  
 
 
                                                             
27 Information obtained from Indra’s Annual Integrated Report 2013, available at 
http://www.indracompany.com/en/informeanual/13/presentation 
28 Information obtained from Coca-Cola’s Integrated Report 2013, available at 
http://examples.theiirc.org/organisation/110 
 
 83 
 
Figure 3. Building an effective third line of defence (EY, 2016) 
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Figure 4. Combined assurance model and company risk 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The three lines model (IIA, 2013) 
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Figure 6. Assurance providers N100 and G250 (KPMG, 2015) 
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List of abbreviations used in the thesis 
 
A4S Prince’s Accounting for Sustainability Project  
ACCA Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CFOs Chief Financial Officers 
CG Corporate Governance 
BAS Bid-ask spread 
CAM Combined Assurance Model  
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility  
CSRA Corporate Social Responsibility Assurance 
ESG Environmental, social and corporate governance 
G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GICS Global Industry Classification Standard 
GRI The Global Reporting Initiative 
IAASB International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board  
IIRC International Integrated Reporting Council 
IIRF International Integrated Reporting Framework 
IR Integrated Reporting 
IRA Integrated Reporting Assurance 
IRAS Integrated Reporting and Assurance Services 
IRC Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa  
IRs Integrated Reports 
ISAE International Standard on Assurance Engagements  
JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange  
KPI Key performance indicators 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
SDTI Sustainability Disclosure Transparency Index  
SGX The Singapore Exchange 
SMMEs Small Medium and Micro Enterprises  
SR Sustainability Report 
SRs Sustainability Reports  
VIF Variance Inflation Factor  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Differences between reasonable assurance engagements and limited assurance engagements (IAASB, 2004) 
Type of 
assurance 
engagement 
Objective Evidence-gathering procedures The assurance report 
Reasonable 
assurance 
engagement 
A reduction in assurance engagement risk to 
an acceptably low level in the circumstances 
of the assurance engagement, as the basis for 
a positive form of expression of the 
assurance practitioner’s conclusion.  
Reasonable assurance means a high, but not 
absolute, level of assurance.  (Ref: Para. 11) 
Sufficient appropriate evidence is obtained as part of a 
systematic assurance engagement process that includes:   
 • Obtaining an understanding of the assurance 
engagement circumstances; 
• Assessing risks;   
• Responding to assessed risks;   
• Performing further evidence-gathering procedures 
using a combination of inspection, observation, 
confirmation, recalculation, re-performance, analytical 
procedures and enquiry.  Such further evidence-
gathering procedures involve substantive procedures, 
including, where applicable, obtaining corroborating 
information, and, depending on the nature of the subject 
matter, tests of the operating effectiveness of controls; 
and  
• Evaluating the evidence obtained.  (Ref: Para. 51-52) 
Description of the assurance 
engagement circumstances, 
and a positive form of 
expression of the 
conclusion. (Ref: Para. 58) 
Limited 
assurance 
engagement 
A reduction in assurance engagement risk to 
a level that is acceptable in the circumstances 
of the assurance engagement but where that 
risk is greater than for a reasonable assurance 
engagement, as the basis for a negative form 
of expression of the assurance practitioner’s 
conclusion.   (Ref: Para. 11) 
Sufficient appropriate evidence is obtained as part of a 
systematic assurance engagement process that includes 
obtaining an understanding of the subject matter and 
other assurance engagement circumstances, but in 
which evidence-gathering procedures are deliberately 
limited relative to a reasonable assurance engagement. 
(Ref: Para. 53)   
Description of the assurance 
engagement circumstances, 
and a negative form of 
expression of the 
conclusion. (Ref: Para. 59) 
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Appendix 2. Sustainability Disclose Transparency Index (IRAS, 2015) 
1. Standard Disclosure 
1. Is the report GRI-compliant? 
2. Has the report been assured? 
3. Did the assurance provider test specific data points and provide insightful 
findings? 
4. Has the company made a CDP submission? 
5. Has the company had a WDP submission? 
6. Does the repot contain a King III compliance checklist? 
7. Is the company a signatory of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC)? 
8. Is the company a signatory of any industry-specific regulatory body (e.g., 
ICMM) or the Equator Principles? 
2. Economic 
1. Rand value of total revenue generated. 
2. Rand value of net profit generated. 
3. Rand value of total compensation paid to employees, including wages and 
benefits. 
4. Total rand value of compensation paid to executive directors, excluding LTIP 
gains. 
5. Total rand value of LTIP gains, executive directors. 
6. Total rand value of compensation paid to prescribed officers, excluding LTIP 
gains. 
7. Total rand value of LTIP gains, prescribed officers. 
8. Rand value of total discretionary/measured procurement spend. 
9. Rand value of historically disadvantaged South African (HDSA) procurement 
spend. 
10. Rand value of total taxes borne and collected on behalf of government(s), 
inclusive of VAT, income tax, royalties, rates & taxes, etc. 
11. Rand value of funds invested in research & development. 
12. Rand value of dividends paid to shareholders. 
13. Rand value of earnings retained. 
3. Governance 
1. Number of board members. 
2. Number of board members who are non-executive. 
3. Number of board members who are deemed ‘independent’. 
4. Number of board members who are deemed ‘HDSA’. 
5. Number of board members who are women. 
6. Average length of service, executive directors. 
7. Average length of service, non-executive directors. 
8. Average length of service, overall. 
9. Average age of directors. 
10. Average attendance at board and committee meetings. 
11. Auditor remuneration: Percentage of non-audit fees/fees for other services. 
12. Auditor length of service. 
13. Number of prescribed officers. 
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4. Labour 
1. Total number of employees. 
2. Total number of temporary employees (contractors, seasonal, casual, 
temporary). 
3. Percentage of employees who are deemed ‘HDSA’. 
4. Percentage of employees who are women. 
5. Percentage of employees who are permanent. 
6. Percentage of employees who belong to a trade union. 
7. Employee turnover (i.e., number of persons who departed relative to the total 
number of employees at year-end). 
8. Total number of person hours worked (PHW), reported. 
9. Total number of employees trained, including internal and external training 
interventions. 
10. Rand value of employee training spend. 
11. Total number of person days lost due to absenteeism. 
12. Total number of person days lost due to industrial action (i.e., strikes). 
 5. Health & Safety 
1. Number of fatalities (i.e., injuries on duty leading to death). 
2. Number of first aid cases (FACs i.e., injuries on duty leading to minor 
treatments, such as plaster or pain tablet). 
3. Number of medical treatment cases (MTCs i.e., injuries on duty leading to 
medical treatment but no lost days). 
4. Number of lost time injuries (LTIs, i.e., injuries on duty leading to at least one 
lost day). 
5. Total number of recordable injuries, including MTCs, LTIs and fatalities. 
6. Fatal injury frequency rate (FIFR, i.e., number of fatalities per 200 000 hours 
worked). 
7. Lost time injury frequency rate (LTIFR, i.e., number of LTIs per 200 000 
hours worked). 
8. Total recordable injury frequency rate (TRIFR, i.e., number of LTIs, MTCs 
and fatalities per 200 000 hours worked). 
9. Does the company report a LTIFR and/or TRIFR target? 
10. Number of employees & contractors receiving voluntary counselling and 
testing (VCT) for HIV/AIDS. 
11. Total number of employees & contractors tested for HIV/AIDS. 
12. HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among employees. 
6. Environmental 
1. Total direct energy consumption (gigajoules, GJ); i.e., from fuels burned. 
2. Total indirect energy consumption (gigajoules, GJ); i.e., from electricity 
purchased. 
3. Total electricity consumption (MWh). 
4. Target: reduction in electricity intensity. 
5. Target: reduction in energy intensity. 
6. Total carbon emissions (tons of carbon dioxide equivalents, CO2e) 
7. Total carbon emissions including the following mix (scopes 1 to 3) (OLD) 
Total scope 1 CO2e emissions (tons). 
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8. Total scope 2 CO2e emissions (tons). 
9. Total scope 3 CO2e emissions (tons). 
10. Target: Reduction in carbon emission intensity. 
11. Total water consumption (kilolitres, or m3). 
12. Target: Reduction in water intensity. 
13. Total volume of non-hazardous waste disposed (tons). 
14. Total volume of hazardous waste disposed (tons). 
15. Total volume of waste sent for recycling (tons). 
16. Percentage of waste disposed that is sent for recycling, reported. 
CSI/SED Expenditures 
1. Rand value of total corporate social investment (CSI)/socioeconomic 
development (SED) expenditures, reported. 
2. Rand value of CSI/SED spend on education. 
3. Rand value of CSI/SED spend on skills development, including adult basic 
education & training (ABET). 
4. Rand value of CSI/SED spend on health, including HIV/AIDS. 
5. Rand value of CSI/SED spend on basic needs & social development, including 
nutrition and/or feeding programmes. 
6. Rand value of CSI/SED spend on infrastructure development. 
7. Rand value of CSI/SED spend on arts & culture. 
8. Rand value of CSI/SED Spend on other. 
9. Comprehensive discussion of returns on CSI/SED expenditures. 
10. Rand value of enterprise development spend. 
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Appendix 3: Definitions of variables 
Dependent Variables 
SPREAD Bid-ask spread is measured as the median value of the natural 
logarithm of the daily difference between the ask and the bid closing 
prices divided by the midpoint over the period ranging from month -
6 to month +6 relative to the end of the firm’s fiscal year-end. 
FERROR The average absolute error of all forecasts made during the year for 
target earnings, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the year. 
The indicator Y takes three values, 0, 1, or 2, which represent target 
earnings and the forecast; for the current year, one and two years 
ahead respectively. Subscripts i, t, and j correspond to firm i at year 
t, and forecast j. AEF is analyst earnings forecast and EPS is the 
actual earnings per share. The indicator P represents the stock price 
obtained at the time of the forecast. 
Variables of interest 
SDTI Sustainability Data Transparency Index score obtained from IRAS 
database. 
ASS An indicator variable equal 1 if the IR is assured by an external 
provider and 0 otherwise. 
CAM Manually-collected dummy variable that codes 1 if the company 
disclosed the application of CAM and 0 otherwise. 
ASS_STD Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the company assured their 
soft information following AA1000AS and/or ISAE3000 as 
guidelines for assurance engagement, and 0 otherwise. 
AA1000AS Represents the dummy variable Assurance Standard AA1000AS, 
equalling 1 if the company reported the engagement under 
AA1000AS, and 0 otherwise. 
ISAE3000 Represents the dummy variable ISAE3000 equalling 1 if the 
company reported the engagement under AA1000AS, and 0 
otherwise. 
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QUA_ASS Four-value variable as a proxy of assurance quality. It takes value 1 
if companies do not disclosure the level of assurance covered, value 
2 if the assurance performed was limited, value 3 if there is a 
combination between limited and reasonable assurance service, and 
value 4 if there is a high level of assurance (reasonable). 
Limited_ASS Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if companies obtained a 
limited assurance, and 0 otherwise. 
Lim_&_Rea_Ass : Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if companies obtained a 
combination of both limited and reasonable assurance in the 
assurance engagement, and 0 otherwise. 
Reasonable_Ass Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if companies obtained a 
reasonable assurance, and 0 otherwise. 
QUA_ASS*ASS Interaction between the assurance of non-financial information 
(ASS) and quality of assurance (QUA_ASS). 
SDTI*ASS The interaction between the Sustainability Data Transparency Index 
score and the assurance. 
Control Variables in all Models 
ANANO The natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm 
through the fiscal year analysed.  
SIZE The natural logarithm of the market value at the end of the fiscal 
year.  
CROSSLISTED Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is cross-listed and 0 
otherwise. 
IND An indicator variable that takes value 0 if companies are in the 
energy industry, 1 for basic materials, 2 for industrial, 3 for 
consumer cyclicals, 4 for consumer non-cyclicals, 5 for financials, 6 
for healthcare, 7 for technology, and 8 for telecommunications 
services. 
Other control variables: BAS model 
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INST_INV Percentage of shares held by institutional investors if shareholding 
greater than or equal to 5%, and 0 otherwise.  
COMPLEX To measure complexity, two internal and two external proxies were 
constructed. Internal: R&D, as the ratio of R&D expense to total 
sales, and MVBVA as the ratio of market to book value of assets. 
External proxies: CROSSLISTED defined above, and SALES_IND 
as the ratio of sales to industry sales. 
Other control variables forecast accuracy model  
STAND Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company issues a stand-alone IR 
during the year, and 0 otherwise. 
VAREARN The natural logarithm of the time-series standard deviation of 
earnings per share. A rolling window of ten years was used, with a 
minimum of two years prior to the year evaluated to calculate the 
standard deviation. 
LOSS Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company reported a loss for the 
period and 0 otherwise. 
FHORIZON The number of days that elapse between the forecast and the 
earnings announcement date. It is the median forecast horizon of 
analyst forecasts for each company each year. 
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Appendix 4. Market liquidity, IR quality and IR assurance 
Panel A: Additional analysis. Dependent variable SPREAD (H1-H3-H5) 
 
     
Hypotheses 
  
Model 
  
1 (H1) 
 
2 (H3) 
 
3 (H5) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
  
SDTI 
 
ASS 
 
CAM 
          SDTI 
 
- 
  
-0.702*** 
 
-0.534*** 
 
-0.46** 
ASS 
 
- 
    
-0.093 
 
-0.109* 
CAM 
 
- 
      
-0.093* 
INST_INV 
 
- 
  
-1.015*** 
 
-1.079*** 
 
-1.091*** 
ANANO 
 
- 
  
-0.14*** 
 
-0.139*** 
 
-0.131*** 
SIZE 
 
- 
  
-0.323*** 
 
-0.317*** 
 
-0.315*** 
R&D 
 
+ 
  
-0.234 
 
-1.829 
 
-5.476 
MVBVA 
 
+ 
  
-2.877 
 
-4.922 
 
-9.696 
CROSSLISTED 
 
+ 
  
-0.018 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.005 
SALES_IND 
 
+ 
  
-0.154 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.079 
N 
    
333 
 
333 
 
333 
Adj R-squared   
    
0.7 
 
0.702 
 
0.706 
F 
    
96.22*** 
 
840.5*** 
 
81.12*** 
Firm Indicator 
    
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Year Indicator 
    
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
                    
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. 
Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 4 
Market liquidity, IR quality and IR assurance 
Panel B: Additional analysis. Dependent variable SPREAD (H3b-H3c) (N = 333) 
  
   
Additional Analysis 
 
Model 
 
3A 
 
3B 
 
3C 
 
3D 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
TYPE OF 
ASSUROR  
 
STANDARDS 
(H3b)  
TYPE OF 
STANDARD 
(H3b) 
 
QUALITY 
(H3c) 
SDTI - 
 
-0.472** 
 
-0.427** 
 
-0.539*** 
 
-0.456*** 
CAM - 
 
-0.094* 
 
-0.094** 
 
-0.106** 
 
-0.094* 
INST_INV - 
 
-1.103*** 
 
-1.102*** 
 
-1.132*** 
 
-1.079*** 
ANANO - 
 
-0.129*** 
 
-0.13*** 
 
-0.126*** 
 
-0.127*** 
SIZE - 
 
-0.315*** 
 
-0.313*** 
 
-0.316*** 
 
-0.314*** 
R&D + 
 
-5.409 
 
-5.816 
 
-3.175 
 
-5.552 
MVBVA + 
 
-10.006 
 
-10.055 
 
-8.874 
 
-7.694 
CROSSLISTED + 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
0.002 
 
-0.004 
SALES_IND + 
 
-0.081 
 
-0.087 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.138 
Non_Accounting Firm - 
 
-0.117 
      Accounting Firm - 
 
-0.082* 
      ASS_STDxASS - 
   
-0.126*** 
    AA1000AS - 
     
0.044 
  ISAE3000AS - 
     
-0.127** 
  Limited_ASS - 
       
-0.068 
Lim_&_Rea_ASS - 
       
-0.193*** 
Reasonable_ASS - 
       
-0.236** 
Adj R-squared   
  
0.706 
 
0.707 
 
0.708 
 
0.709 
F 
  
75.19*** 
 
81.43*** 
 
77.38*** 
 
64.97*** 
Firm-Year Indicator 
  
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are winsorized at the first and 99th 
percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.
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Appendix 5. Market liquidity, IR quality (EESC) and IR assurance 
Panel A: Additional analysis. Dependent variable SPREAD (H1-H3-H5) 
     
Hypotheses 
     
1 (H1) 
 
2 (H3) 
 
3 (H5) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
  
EESC 
 
ASS 
 
CAM 
          EESC 
 
- 
  
-0.397*** 
 
-0.266** 
 
-0.244** 
ASS 
 
- 
    
-0.141*** 
 
-0.147*** 
CAM 
 
- 
      
-0.109** 
INST_INV 
 
- 
  
-0.983*** 
 
-1.091*** 
 
-1.099*** 
ANANO 
 
- 
  
-0.143*** 
 
-0.14*** 
 
-0.128*** 
SIZE 
 
- 
  
-0.307*** 
 
-0.304*** 
 
-0.302 
R&D 
 
+ 
  
-5.474 
 
-5.8 
 
-9.188 
MVBVA 
 
+ 
  
-5.703 
 
-7.882 
 
-13.061 
CROSSLISTED 
 
+ 
  
0.024 
 
0.025 
 
0.027 
SALES_IND 
 
+ 
  
-0.105 
 
-0.1 
 
-0.035 
N 
    
333 
 
333 
 
333 
Adj R-squared   
    
0.693 
 
0.699 
 
0.7048 
F 
    
103.8*** 
 
88.74*** 
 
83.7*** 
Firm Indicator 
    
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Year Indicator 
    
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
                    
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. 
Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 5. Market liquidity, IR quality (EESC) and IR assurance 
Panel B: Additional analysis. Dependent variable SPREAD (H3b-H3c) 
  
   
Additional Analysis 
 
Model 
 
3A 
 
3B 
 
3C 
 
3D 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
TYPE OF 
ASSUROR  
 
STANDARDS 
(H3b)  
TYPE OF 
STANDARD 
(H3b) 
 
QUALITY 
(H3c) 
EESC - 
 
-0.244* 
 
-0.232* 
 
-0.245* 
 
-0.249* 
CAM - 
 
-0.109** 
 
-0.109** 
 
-0.122** 
 
-0.111** 
INST_INV - 
 
-1.1*** 
 
-1.109*** 
 
-1.136*** 
 
-1.071*** 
ANANO - 
 
-0.128*** 
 
-0.127*** 
 
-0.125*** 
 
-0.125*** 
SIZE - 
 
-0.302*** 
 
-0.301*** 
 
-0.301*** 
 
-0.302*** 
R&D + 
 
-9.19 
 
-9.17 
 
-8.858 
 
-9.167 
MVBVA + 
 
-13.068 
 
-13.181 
 
-12.812 
 
-10.06 
CROSSLISTED + 
 
0.027 
 
0.025 
 
0.031 
 
0.027 
SALES_IND + 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.106 
Non_Accounting Firm - 
 
-0.148** 
      Accounting Firm - 
 
-0.147** 
      ASS_STD - 
   
-0.162*** 
    AA1000AS - 
     
-0.047 
  ISAE3000AS - 
     
-0.166*** 
  Limited_ASS - 
       
-0.086 
Lim_&_Rea_ASS - 
       
-0.24*** 
Reasonable_ASS - 
       
-0.245** 
N 
  
333 
 
333 
 
333 
 
333 
Adj R-squared   
  
0.0704 
 
0.706 
 
0.706 
 
0.707 
F 
  
76.07*** 
 
84.01*** 
 
76.68*** 
 
68.44*** 
Firm-Year Indicator     Included   Included   Included   Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are winsorized at the first and 
99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 6. Analysts forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance. Robust standard errors 
Panel A: Main models. Dependent variable FERROR (H2-H4) (N = 297) 
    
Hypotheses 
  
 
  
 
Model 5 (H2) 
 
Model 6 (H2-H4) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.089 
 
-0.076 
 
-0.078 
 
-0.2** 
 
-0.166** 
 
-0.154** 
ASS 
 
- 
       
-0.065 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.015 
SDTI*ASS 
 
- 
       
0.173** 
 
0.114 
 
0.078 
ASS_STD 
 
- 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.012 
ANANO 
 
- 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.002 
 
0.0003 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
SIZE 
   
-0.022*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.025*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.016 
 
0.017* 
 
0.02* 
 
0.015 
 
0.016 
 
0.02* 
LOSS 
   
0.007 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.006 
 
0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.006 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.01 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.029* 
 
0.018 
 
0.008 
 
0.03* 
 
0.019 
 
0.009 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1228 
 
0.1384 
 
0.1517 
 
0.144 
 
0.1549 
 
0.1647 
F 
   
2.67*** 
 
4.02*** 
 
4.81 
 
2.29** 
 
3.46*** 
 
4.1*** 
Firm-Year Indicator     Included   Included   Included 
 
Included   Included   Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are winsorized at the first and 99th 
percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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Appendix 6 (continued) 
Analysts forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance. Robust standard errors 
Panel B: Main models. Dependent variable FERROR (H2-H4-H6) (N = 297) 
    
Hypotheses 
  
 
  
 
Model 7 (H2-H4-H6) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.176** 
 
-0.142** 
 
-0.127* 
ASS 
 
- 
 
-0.055 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.003 
SDTI*ASS 
 
- 
 
0.151* 
 
0.091 
 
0.053 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.033** 
 
-0.033*** 
 
-0.038*** 
STAND 
   
-0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.01 
ANANO 
   
-0.001 
 
0 
 
0.002 
SIZE 
   
-0.021*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.015 
 
0.017* 
 
0.02* 
LOSS 
   
0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.006 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.006 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.022 
 
0.011 
 
-0.001 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1683 
 
0.181 
 
0.169 
F 
   
2.16** 
 
3.44*** 
 
4.22*** 
Firm-Year Indicator     Included   Included   Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI 
are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. 
Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 6 (continued) 
Analysts forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance. Robust standard errors 
Panel C: Additional assurance analysis. Dependent variable FERROR (H4b) (N = 297) 
    
STANDARDS 
  
 
Model 
 
7 (H4b)  7 (H4b) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.116** 
 
-0.106* 
 
-0.105* 
 
-0.111 
 
-0.098 
 
-0.098 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.035*** 
 
-0.034*** 
 
-0.038*** 
 
-0.034** 
 
-0.033** 
 
-0.037*** 
STAND 
   
-0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.01 
ANANO 
   
-0.002 
 
0 
 
0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
0 
 
0.001 
SIZE 
   
-0.021*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.021*** 
 
-0.022*** 
 
-0.023*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.015 
 
0.017* 
 
0.02** 
 
0.015 
 
0.017* 
 
0.02** 
LOSS 
   
0.007 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.005 
 
0.008 
 
0 
 
-0.005 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.007 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.021 
 
0.01 
 
-0.001 
 
0.022 
 
0.011 
 
-0.001 
ASS_STD 
   
0.024*** 
 
0.025** 
 
0.024** 
      AA1000AS 
 
- 
       
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.0005 
ISAE3000AS 
 
- 
       
0.013** 
 
0.013** 
 
0.012** 
Adj R-squared   
 
- 
 
0.1595 
 
0.1772 
 
0.1952 
 
0.1607 
 
0.1781 
 
0.1954 
F 
   
2.35** 
 
3.82*** 
 
4.55*** 
 
2.62*** 
 
3.63*** 
 
4.15 
Firm-Year Indicator     Included   Included   Included   Included   Included   Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Appendix 6 (continued) 
Analysts forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance. Robust standard errors 
Panel D: Additional assurance analysis. Dependent variable FERROR (H4c) (N = 297) 
         
    ASSURANCE QUALITY 
  
 
Model 
 
7 (H4c) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
SDTI 
 
- 
 
-0.124** 
 
-0.107** 
 
-0.104** 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.032*** 
 
-0.033*** 
 
-0.037*** 
STAND 
   
-0.008 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.009 
ANANO 
   
-0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.003 
SIZE 
   
-0.022*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.014 
 
0.016* 
 
0.02** 
LOSS 
   
0.008 
 
0 
 
-0.004 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.007 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.008 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.022 
 
0.011 
 
0 
Limited_ASS 
 
- 
 
0.022*** 
 
0.023** 
 
0.023** 
Lim_Rea_Ass 
 
- 
 
0.062** 
 
0.049** 
 
0.039** 
Reasonable_Ass 
 
- 
 
0.027*** 
 
0.014 
 
0.004 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1755 
 
0.1858 
 
0.1998 
F 
   
3.49*** 
 
3.64*** 
 
3.76*** 
Firm-Year Indicator     Included   Included   Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by year. Interactions ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 7. Analysts forecast accuracy, IR quality (EESC) and IR assurance 
 
Panel A: Main models. Dependent variable FERROR (H2-H4) (N = 297) 
 
    
Hypotheses 
 
  
 
  
 
Model 5 (H2) 
 
Model 6 (H2-H4) 
 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
EESC 
 
- 
 
-0.057* 
 
-0.051 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.067* 
 
-0.065* 
 
-0.062* 
 
ASS 
 
- 
       
0.039 
 
0.059 
 
0.071 
 
SDTI*ASS 
 
- 
       
-0.05 
 
-0.079 
 
-0.1 
 
STAND 
 
- 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.013 
 
ANANO 
 
- 
 
0.002 
 
0.003 
 
0.004 
 
0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
SIZE 
   
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
VAREARN 
   
0.013*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.018*** 
 
0.013*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.019*** 
 
LOSS 
   
0.013 
 
0.004 
 
0 
 
0.014 
 
0.005 
 
0.001 
 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.007 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.033 
 
0.02 
 
0.009 
 
0.035 
 
0.023 
 
0.012 
 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1176 
 
0.1106 
 
0.1227 
 
0.0915 
 
0.1111 
 
0.1234 
 
F 
   
3.83*** 
 
4.09*** 
 
4.43*** 
 
3.13*** 
 
3.45*** 
 
3.78*** 
 
Firm-Year Indicator     Included   Included   Included 
 
Included   Included   Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. 
Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The models include year and industry fixed effects. 
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Appendix 7 (continued) 
 
Analysts forecast accuracy, IR quality (EESC) and IR assurance 
 
Panel B: Main models. Dependent variable FERROR (H2-H4-H6) (N = 297) 
 
    
Hypotheses 
 
  
 
  
 
Model 7 (H2-H4-H6) 
 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
EESC 
 
- 
 
-0.061 
 
-0.059 
 
-0.054 
 
ASS 
 
- 
 
0.036 
 
0.056 
 
0.068 
 
SDTI*ASS 
 
- 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.071 
 
-0.091 
 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.031*** 
 
-0.031*** 
 
-0.036*** 
 
STAND 
   
-0.012 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.012 
 
ANANO 
   
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.004 
 
SIZE 
   
-0.022*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
VAREARN 
   
0.014*** 
 
0.016*** 
 
0.02*** 
 
LOSS 
   
0.013 
 
0.004 
 
0.0003 
 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.028 
 
0.015 
 
0.003 
 
N 
   
297 
 
297 
 
297 
 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1186 
 
0.1391 
 
0.1578 
 
F 
   
3.51*** 
 
3.88*** 
 
4.45*** 
 
Firm-Year Indicator     Included   Included   Included 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. The models include year and industry fixed effects. 
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Appendix 7 (continued) 
Analysts forecast accuracy, IR quality (EESC) and IR assurance 
Panel C: Additional assurance analysis. Dependent variable FERROR (H3b) (N = 297) 
    
STANDARDS 
  
 
Model 
 
7 (H3b)  7 (H3b) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
 
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
EESC 
 
- 
 
-0.061 
 
-0.059 
 
-0.055 
 
-0.064* 
 
-0.061* 
 
-0.056 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.031*** 
 
-0.031*** 
 
-0.037*** 
 
-0.029** 
 
-0.03*** 
 
-0.035*** 
STAND 
   
-0.012 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.009 
ANANO 
   
0.003 
 
0.004 
 
0.005 
 
0.002 
 
0.003 
 
0.004 
SIZE 
   
-0.022*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
 
-0.022*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.014*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.019*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.016*** 
 
0.02*** 
LOSS 
   
0.012 
 
0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
0.012 
 
0.003 
 
-0.001 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.008 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.027 
 
0.015 
 
0.002 
 
0.029 
 
0.016 
 
0.003 
ASS_STD 
 
- 
 
0.011 
 
0.014 
 
0.013 
      AA1000AS 
 
- 
       
-0.024 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.02 
ISAE3000AS 
 
- 
       
0.009 
 
0.01 
 
0.009 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.151 
 
0.1701 
 
0.1584 
 
0.1549 
 
0.1738 
 
0.1897 
F 
   
3.84*** 
 
4.18*** 
 
4.74*** 
 
3.71*** 
 
4*** 
 
4*** 
Firm-Year Indicator 
   
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. 
Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The models include year and industry fixed effects. 
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Appendix 7 (continued) 
Analysts forecast accuracy, IR quality and IR assurance 
Panel D: Additional assurance analysis. Dependent variable FERROR (H3c) (N = 297) 
         
    ASSURANCE QUALITY 
  
 
Model 
 
7 (H3c) 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
FY1 
 
FY2 
 
FY3 
EESC 
 
- 
 
-0.068* 
 
-0.063* 
 
-0.058 
CAM 
 
- 
 
-0.031** 
 
-0.031*** 
 
-0.037*** 
STAND 
   
-0.01 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.01 
ANANO 
   
0.003 
 
0.005 
 
0.006 
SIZE 
   
-0.023*** 
 
-0.023*** 
 
-0.024*** 
VAREARN 
   
0.013** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.019*** 
LOSS 
   
0.013 
 
0.005 
 
0.003 
FHORIZON 
   
-0.007 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.008 
CROSSLISTED 
   
0.029 
 
0.016 
 
0.003 
Limited_ASS 
 
- 
 
0.017 
 
0.018 
 
0.018 
Lim_Rea_Ass 
 
- 
 
0.03 
 
0.022 
 
0.015 
Reasonable_Ass 
 
- 
 
0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.011 
Adj R-squared   
   
0.1292 
 
0.1434 
 
0.1576 
F 
   
3.35*** 
 
3.58*** 
 
4.03*** 
Firm-Year Indicator     Yes   Yes   Yes 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. All continuous variables excluding indicator variable SDTI are 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles. Interactions ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. The models include year and industry fixed effects. 
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Appendix 8. Corporate governance principles, King III (IoDSA, 2009) 
Governance Element Principle Principle Description 
1. Ethical leadership and 
corporate citizenship 
Principle 1.1 The board should provide effective leadership based 
on an ethical foundation. 
Principle 1.2 The board should ensure that the company is, and is 
seen to be, a responsible corporate citizen. 
Principle 1.3 The board should ensure that the company’s ethics 
are managed effectively. 
2. Boards and directors Principle 2.1 The board should act as the focal point for, and 
custodian of, corporate governance. 
Principle 2.2 The board should appreciate that strategy, risk, 
performance and sustainability are inseparable. 
Principle 2.3 The board should provide for effective leadership 
based on an ethical foundation. 
Principle 2.4 The board should ensure that the company is, and is 
seen to be, a responsible corporate citizen. 
Principle 2.5 The board should ensure that the company’s ethics 
are managed effectively. 
Principle 2.6 The board should ensure that the company has an 
effective and independent audit committee. 
Principle 2.7 The board should be responsible for the governance 
of risk. 
Principle 2.8 The board should responsible for information 
technology (“IT”) governance. 
Principle 2.9 The board should ensure that the company complies 
with applicable laws and considers adherence to 
non-binding rules, codes and standards. 
Principle 
2.10 
The board should ensure that there is an effective 
risk-based internal audit. 
Principle 
2.11 
The board should appreciate that stakeholders’ 
perceptions affect the company’s reputation. 
Principle 
2.12 
The board should ensure the integrity of the 
company’s integrated report. 
Principle 
2.13 
The board should report on the effectiveness of the 
company’s internal controls. 
Principle 
2.14 
The board and its directors should act in the best 
interests of the company. 
Principle 
2.15 
The board should consider business rescue 
proceedings or other turnaround mechanisms as 
soon as the company has been/may be financially 
distressed as defined in the Company’s Act, 71 of 
2008. 
Principle 
2.16 
The board should elect a chairman of the board who 
is an independent non-executive director. The CEO 
of the company does not also fulfil the role of 
chairman of the board. 
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Principle 
2.17 
The board should appoint the chief executive officer 
and has established a framework for the delegation 
of authority. 
Principle 
2.18 
The board should comprise a balance of power, with 
a majority of non-executive directors. The majority 
of non-executive directors are independent. 
Principle 
2.19 
Directors should be appointed through a formal 
process. 
Principle 
2.20 
The induction of, and ongoing training and 
development of, directors should be conducted 
through a formal process. 
Principle 
2.21 
The board should be assisted by a competent, 
suitably qualified and experienced company 
secretary. 
Principle 
2.22 
The evaluation of the board, its committees and 
individual directors should be performed every year. 
Principle 
2.23 
The board should delegate certain functions to well-
structured committees without abdicating from its 
own responsibilities. 
Principle 
2.24 
A governance framework should be agreed upon 
between the group and its subsidiary boards. 
Principle 
2.25 
The company should remunerate its directors and 
executives fairly. 
Principle 
2.26 
The company should disclose the remuneration of 
each individual director and prescribed officer. 
Principle 
2.27 
The shareholders should approve the company’s 
remuneration policy. 
3. Audit committees Principle 3.1 The board should ensure that the company has an 
effective and independent audit committee. 
Principle 3.2 Audit committee members should be suitably skilled 
and experienced independent non-executive 
directors. 
Principle 3.3 The audit committee should be chaired by an 
independent non-executive director. 
Principle 3.4 The audit committee should oversee integrated 
reporting. 
Principle 3.5 The audit committee should ensure that a CAM has 
been applied which provides a coordinated approach 
to all assurance activities. 
Principle 3.6 The audit committee should be satisfied with the 
expertise, resources and experience of the 
company’s finance function. 
Principle 3.7 The audit committee should be responsible for 
overseeing internal audit. 
Principle 3.8 The audit committee should be an integral 
component of the risk management process. 
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Principle 3.9 The audit committee should be responsible for 
recommending the appointment of the external 
auditor and overseeing the external audit process. 
Principle 
3.10 
The audit committee should report to the board and 
the shareholders as to how it has discharged its 
duties. 
4. The governance of 
risk 
Principle 4.1 The board should be responsible for the governance 
of risk. 
Principle 4.2 The board should determine the levels of risk 
tolerance. 
Principle 4.3 The risk committee and/or audit committee should 
assist the board in carrying out its risk 
responsibilities. 
Principle 4.4 The board should delegate to management the 
responsibility to design, implement and monitor the 
risk management plan. 
Principle 4.5 The board should ensure that risk assessments are 
performed on a continual basis. 
Principle 4.6 The board should ensure that frameworks and 
methodologies are implemented to increase the 
probability of anticipating unpredictable risks. 
Principle 4.7 The board should ensure that management has 
considered and has implemented appropriate risk 
responses. 
Principle 4.8 The board should ensure continual risk monitoring 
by management. 
Principle 4.9 The board should receive assurance regarding the 
effectiveness of the risk management process. 
Principle 
4.10 
The board should ensure that there are processes in 
place which enable complete, timely, relevant, 
accurate and accessible risk disclosure to 
stakeholders. 
5. The governance of 
information technology 
Principle 5.1 The board should be responsible for IT governance. 
Principle 5.2 IT should be aligned with the performance and 
sustainability objectives of the company. 
Principle 5.3 The board should delegate to management the 
responsibility for the implementation of an IT 
governance framework. 
Principle 5.4 The board should monitor and evaluate significant 
IT investments and expenditure. 
Principle 5.5 IT should be an integral part of the company’s risk 
management plan. 
Principle 5.6 The board should ensure that information assets are 
managed effectively. 
Principle 5.7 A risk committee and audit committee should assist 
the board in carrying out its IT responsibilities. 
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6. Compliance with 
laws, rules, codes and 
standards 
Principle 6.1 The board should ensure that the company complies 
with applicable laws and considers adherence to 
non-binding rules, codes and standards. 
Principle 6.2 The board, and each individual director, should have 
a working understanding of the effect of applicable 
laws, rules, codes and standards on the company and 
its business. 
Principle 6.3 Compliance risk should form an integral part of the 
company’s risk management process. 
Principle 6.4 The board should delegate to management the 
implementation of an effective compliance 
framework and process. 
7. Internal audit Principle 7.1 The board should ensure that there is an effective 
risk-based internal audit. 
Principle 7.2 Internal audit should follow a risk based approach to 
its plan. 
Principle 7.3 Internal audit should provide a written assessment 
of the effectiveness of the company’s system of 
internal controls and risk management. 
Principle 7.4 The audit committee should be responsible for 
overseeing internal audit. 
Principle 7.5 Internal audit should be strategically positioned to 
achieve its objectives. 
8. Governing 
stakeholder 
relationships 
Principle 8.1 The board should appreciate that stakeholders’ 
perceptions affect a company’s reputation. 
Principle 8.2 The board should delegate to management to 
proactively deal with stakeholder relationships. 
Principle 8.3 The board should strive to achieve the appropriate 
balance between its various stakeholder groupings, 
in the best interests of the company. 
Principle 8.4 Companies should ensure the equitable treatment of 
shareholders. 
Principle 8.5 Transparent and effective communication with 
stakeholders is essential for building and 
maintaining their trust and confidence. 
Principle 8.6 The board should ensure that disputes are resolved 
effectively and expeditiously as possible. 
9. Integrated reporting 
and disclosure 
Principle 9.1 The board should ensure the integrity of the 
company’s integrated report. 
Principle 9.2 Sustainability reporting and disclosure should be 
integrated with the company’s financial reporting. 
Principle 9.3 Sustainability reporting and disclosure should be 
independently assured. 
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Appendix 9: Corporate governance principles, King IV (IoDSA, 2016b) 
Govern-
ance 
element 
Principle 
1 The board should lead ethically and effectively. 
2 The board should govern the ethics of the organisation in a way that supports the 
establishment of an ethical culture. 
3 The board should ensure that the organisation is and is seen to be a responsible 
corporate citizen 
4 The board should appreciate that the organisation’s core purpose, its risks and 
opportunities, strategy, business model, performance and sustainable development 
are all inseparable elements of the value creation process. 
5 The board should ensure that reports issued by the organisation enable 
stakeholders to make informed assessments of the organisation’s performance and 
its short, medium and long-term prospects. 
6 The board should serve as a focal point and custodian of corporate governance in 
the organisation. 
7 The board should comprise the appropriate balance of knowledge, skills, 
experience, diversity and independence for it to discharge its governance role and 
responsibilities objectively and effectively. 
8 The board should ensure that its arrangements for delegation within its own 
structures promote independent judgment, and assist with balance of power and 
effective discharge of its duties. 
9 The board should ensure that the evaluation of its own performance and that of its 
committees, its chair and its individual members, support continued improvement 
in its performance and effectiveness. 
10 The board should ensure that the appointment of, and delegation to, management 
contribute to role clarity and the effective exercise of authority and 
responsibilities. 
11 The board should govern risk in a way that supports the organisation in setting and 
achieving its strategic objectives  
12 The board should govern technology and information in a way that supports the 
organisation in setting and achieving its strategic objectives. 
13 The board should govern compliance with applicable laws and adopted, non-
binding rules, codes and standards in a way that supports the organisation being 
ethical and a good corporate citizen.  
14 The board should ensure that the organisation remunerates fairly, responsibly and 
transparently so as to promote the achievement of strategic objectives and positive 
outcomes in the short, medium and long term. 
15 The board should ensure that assurance services and functions enable an effective 
control environment, and that these support the integrity of information for 
internal decision-making and of the organisation’s external reports. 
16 In the execution of its governance roles and responsibilities, the board should 
adopt a stakeholder-inclusive approach that balances the needs, interests and 
expectations of material stakeholders in the best interests of the organisation over 
time.  
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17 The governing body of an institutional investor organisation should ensure that 
responsible investment is practiced by the organisation to promote the good 
governance and the creation of value by the companies in which it invests 
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